US embassy cable - 04ROME3849

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 003849 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/29/2014 
TAGS: MOPS, MARR, PREL, IT, AFGHANISTAN, IRAQI FREEDOM 
SUBJECT: ITALIAN PRT/FSB ON BACK BURNER FOR NEAR FUTURE 
 
REF: A) ROME 2913 B) ROME 2122 
 
Classified By: ACTING POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR JONATHAN COHEN 
FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
1. (C) Summary.  Facing budget cuts and with a military 
straining to meet its current obligations overseas, Italy 
will not consider deploying a PRT/FSB in the near term. 
However, Italy has not ruled out leading a PRT/FSB at some 
point in the future.  Italy will keep the possibility on the 
back burner while its NRF battalion remains deployed in 
Afghanistan, and during its ISAF command from July through 
December 2005.  To make a PRT and/or FSB feasible for Italy 
in the future, the U.S. will have to take the initiative to 
convince other Allies to contribute.  End Summary. 
 
2. (C) On September 27 POLMIL Counselor engaged MFA NATO 
Office Director Giovanni Brauzzi on Italy's position with 
respect to a prospective phase II PRT/FSB deployment. 
Brauzzi did not rule out Italy's reconsideration of a PRT/FSB 
deployment, but indicated that the GOI did not intend to be 
proactive on the matter and was not inclined to consider such 
a deployment before 2006, when Italy will have finished its 
semester of ISAF command (July-December 2005). 
 
3. (C) Lack of resources, according to Brauzzi, is the main 
factor impeding PRT/FSB deployment.  He repeated the 
frequently cited point that, in a year of unexpected military 
budget cuts, Italy is already pushing its limits in foreign 
military operations.  Because of its deployment of the NRF 
land battalion in support of Afghan elections through 
December 2004, its assumption of ISAF command in July 2005, 
and its commitments in Iraq, Italy will find itself strapped 
for resources at least through the end of 2005.  (Note: Italy 
will also take on EUFOR and KFOR leadership in late 
2005/early 2006.) 
 
4. (C) Addressing possible Italian command of a future FSB in 
Herat, Brauzzi noted that the Italian Air Force had recently 
expressed greater confidence in its ability to provide air 
support requirements.  Brauzzi said an Italian-commanded FSB 
was still conceivable, though, again, not in the short term. 
In any case, Brauzzi emphasized that an Italian-commanded FSB 
would require strong commitment of resources from Allies as 
well as, he hoped, substantial participation by Afghan 
forces. 
 
5. (C) Discussing current demands on Italian military 
resources, Brauzzi pointed out that Iraq has become Italy's 
number one priority.  Afghanistan is obviously highly 
important as well, but Italian politicians' claims that 
Afghanistan takes precedence serve mainly to assure the 
public that Italy's military commitments abroad are in line 
with NATO and the UN.  Brauzzi said that the GOI now has too 
heavy a political and military investment in Iraq to see its 
reconstruction fail. 
 
6. (C) Commment. The Italian PRT/FSB is off the front burner 
but not off the table.  For now, the  MoD still must decide 
how to implement a cut that amounts to some four percent of 
total defense spending; and the Italian military is close to 
maxing out its current deployment capabilities.  Still, Italy 
has a political interest in being a visible part of the 
solution in Afghanistan.  In 2003-2004 Italy completed 
detailed planning for PRTs in Ghazni and Herat, in both cases 
withdrawing a standing offer only in response to last-minute 
U.S. requests.  Once Italy's NRF land battalion is back on 
home soil and Italy's ISAF command expires, Italian officials 
may be willing to consider further military commitments in 
Afghanistan.  However, even in 2006, Italy would be unlikely 
to have either the resources to stand up a PRT/FSB on its own 
or the clout to cajole sufficient partner participation.  To 
convince Italy to take on a PRT and/or FSB, the U.S. will 
have to put serious political muscle into finding willing 
partners.  End Comment. 
 
7. (U) Minimize Considered. 
 
 
SEMBLER 
 
 
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	2004ROME03849 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL