US embassy cable - 04ANKARA5712

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 005712 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, ECON, TU 
SUBJECT: TURKISH PRESIDENT SEZER OPENS PARLIAMENT WITH 
CRITICISM OF U.S. NON-ACTION AGAINST TERRORIST PKK 
 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman; reasons: E.O. 
12958 1.4 (b,d). 
 
1. (U) Summary: While underscoring the importance of 
relations with the U.S., President Sezer used his Oct. 1 
address to parliament twice sharply to criticize U.S. 
non-action against the terrorist PKK sheltering in northern 
Iraq.  In a lengthy and wooden assessment of the domestic 
state of affairs, Sezer repeatedly deprecated the performance 
of Islam-influenced ruling AKP and warned that he and other 
elements of the Ataturkist State will continue to oppose what 
they assert is AKP's intention to subvert the secular order. 
End summary. 
 
2. (U) In his 75-minute Oct. 1 address to open the 2004-2005 
session of the Turkish parliament, Sezer -- as is his custom 
-- focused more on domestic affairs, in particular by drawing 
secular red lines against the current Islam-influenced AKP 
government (see below, paras 5-7). 
 
3. (U) While casting a positive light on Turkey's foreign 
policy achievements and aspirations in the remaining portion 
of his address, he twice sharply criticized U.S. failure to 
take action in northern Iraq against the separatist PKK, 
e.g., "The U.S. and MFN's failure to take action against this 
separatist organization...is in contradiction to 
Turkish-American friendship and our alliance and to 
obligations in the international war on terrorism." 
 
4. (C) Other highlights of Sezer's foreign policy review: 
 
--EU membership, a top priority, is key as an additional 
guarantor for Turkey's multi-party, secular, democratic 
political system and against all forms of extremism; Turkey 
must not hesitate to correct its own mistakes, mistakes which 
strengthen the hands of those who would keep Turkey outside 
the EU.  (Note: for Sezer, EU membership thus becomes a 
shield against the threat to the secular state he perceives 
AKP to be.  End note.) 
 
--Of equal fundamental priority are relations with the U.S.; 
President Bush's June visit reflected the importance of 
bilateral relations; collaboration between Turkey and the 
U.S. from the Balkans to central Asia is a welcome 
development; maintaining trans-Atlantic and NATO ties is of 
key importance for Turkey.  (Note: the warm tone, length of 
his remarks about Turkish-U.S. relations, and his casting 
them on an equal footing with the EU stand in contrast to 
Sezer's cool, almost offhand reference to the U.S. in his 
2003 address.  His remarks appear to be a signal from the 
secular Establishment to the U.S. that we should reciprocate 
toward the Establishment, not AKP.  Thus the two criticisms 
of U.S. non-action against the PKK stand out even more 
starkly.  End note.) 
 
--Sezer singled out for positive assessment relations with 
Greece, with Russia ("of great importance" especially in 
cooperation in "Eurasia he avoided any criticism of Putin's 
policy on Cyprus, in north or south Caucasus or Putin's 
reversion to authoritarianism), and with Iran (only a very 
convoluted, vague and indirect reference to the need for Iran 
to follow better policies, i.e., on nukes).  He expressed 
hope for improvement in relations with Armenia but put the 
onus on Yerevan. 
 
5. (C) As in 2003, Sezer made preservation of the Ataturkist 
system, mainly secularism -- as defined in the Turkish way -- 
the centerpiece of his address.  In this regard he aimed 
repeated heavy criticism at AKP for what he called 
irresponsible legislation and made clear his intention to 
continue to veto laws he considers threatening to the methods 
or Ataturkist nature of the current State. 
 
6. (C) In a similar vein of criticism he emphasized the 
overarching importance of a "law-based state" (hukuki 
devlet), a way of implying that he expects the judiciary to 
continue to act as a brake on AKP.  His reiteration that all 
three branches are equal was a reply to constant AKP 
criticisms that the judiciary is blocking the will of the 
parliament, i.e., the electorate.  To repeated applause from 
main opposition CHP, and in the context of expressing 
wariness toward the BMENA initiative, he forcefully rejected 
the concepts of Turkey as a model for "moderate Islam" and 
Turkey as an "Islamic republic".  By implication he thus 
gratuitously recalled Secretary Powell's misstatement of 
Turkey as an Islamic republic.  Calling for continued 
struggle against religious reactionism (irtica) -- which 
Turkish secularists assert is AKP's real agenda -- he 
underscored the incompatibility of even a "moderate" 
theocracy (din devleti) and democracy.  Praising the Turkish 
armed forces as the symbol of modernity and progressiveness 
in Turkey, he called for adequate support for the military's 
modernization and for an adequate national military 
industrial capability. 
 
7. (U) In a more rational, grounded way than the 
left-of-center CHP parliamentary opposition, Sezer criticized 
AKP's economic performance, especially in the area of job 
creation, and noted the need for reform of social security, 
greater private investment, and foreign direct investment. 
Implying neglect on AKP's part, he called for serious efforts 
to improve education. 
8. (C) Comment: Although underscoring the importance of 
relations with the U.S., Sezer also signaled that U.S. 
inaction against the PKK remains a barrier to fuller 
cooperation. 
 
9. (C) Comment, contd.: In greater part a ritual defense of 
Ataturkist principles which have become no more than 
hortatory slogans, in lesser part a cogent criticism of AKP's 
approach and performance, Sezer's address would have had more 
impact if he had not insisted on using the desiccated 
ideology and artificial vocabulary of the arch-secularists 
(neologisms with no resonance in everyday speech).  With PM 
Erdogan asserting that the legislative branch is paramount 
over the judiciary and spreading the message that AKP will 
aim to oust Sezer by passing constitutional changes to a 
presidential system (possibly tailored for him) after getting 
an EU start date for accession negotiations, Sezer threw down 
the gauntlet from the other side.  We can thus expect a 
strong post-post-modern reaction from the Turkish State to 
any AKP attempt to change the constitutional order.  In sum, 
2005 will be a tricky year for Turkey. 
EDELMAN