US embassy cable - 04RANGOON1322

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BURMA'S NEW FOREIGN MINISTER: "EXPECT NO CHANGE IN GOB POLICY"

Identifier: 04RANGOON1322
Wikileaks: View 04RANGOON1322 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Rangoon
Created: 2004-10-05 10:43:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PINR BM
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001322 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV, INR/B; PACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PINR, BM 
SUBJECT: BURMA'S NEW FOREIGN MINISTER: "EXPECT NO CHANGE IN 
GOB POLICY" 
 
REF: A. RANGOON 1250 
     B. RANGOON 1237 
 
Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  New Foreign Minister U Nyan Win met with the 
COM on October 5, only his third encounter as FM with a 
diplomat in Rangoon.  By all appearances, Nyan Win is a 
caretaker foreign minister under instructions from SPDC 
Chairman Than Shwe to hold the regime line.  He declared that 
the GOB has no intention of changing its foreign policy, 
reiterating standard SPDC arguments that Burma is 
misunderstood and that ASSK and the NLD are destabilizing 
elements.  His message is entirely consistent with the SPDC's 
determined march to complete its road map with a regional 
stamp of approval, marginalize the democratic opposition, 
consolidate full control over Burmese territory, and prolong 
its staying power.  We can expect some cooperation on several 
apolitical bilateral issues, but we have no expectation that 
the new FM will be responsive on other important policy 
issues.   End Summary. 
 
2. (U) On October 5, the COM called on Burma's new Foreign 
Minister, U Nyan Win.  The FM, one of only a few cabinet 
members to meet with U.S. Embassy officers since new 
sanctions were imposed in July 2003, was joined by new Deputy 
Foreign Minister U Maung Myint, Deputy DG Phae Thann Oo, and 
new Americas Division Director U Paw Lwin Sein.  The DCM and 
P/E chief (notetaker) also participated. 
 
3. (SBU) FM Nyun Win's meeting with the COM was only his 
third meeting with a diplomatic envoy in Rangoon since 
assuming duties on September 18.  Nyun Win has met with the 
Japanese Ambassador-designate and, on October 5, with the 
visiting Indian Foreign Secretary.  Following his meeting 
with the COM, the Foreign Minister was scheduled to meet with 
the Singaporean Ambassador, dean of the diplomatic corps. 
The new FM joined the GOB delegation to the UNGA last week 
(and he expressed to the COM gratitude for his last minute 
visa), where he said he had the opportunity to meet UNSYG 
Koffi Annan and "explain" the Burma situation. 
 
4. (C) Nyun Win--demonstrating minimal though better than 
expected English language skills--said that he has long been 
aware of the United States as a superpower and he therefore 
desired closer cooperation.  However, he added, the GOB has 
no intention of changing its foreign policy.  "If the U.S. 
participates with us," he said, "we will reach our goals 
quickly."  Offering a familiar SPDC argument, he said that 
Western countries misunderstand Burma and impose sanctions 
that only inflict suffering upon the Burmese people.  "You 
(the Embassy) are in a better position than your Congress to 
understand our situation and to explain to Americans that our 
points of view are not all that different." 
 
5. (SBU) The Foreign Minister also criticized the NLD, 
positing that the West had pressured the GOB to allow NLD 
participation in the National Convention (NC), but the 
opposition party then proceeded to boycott and "destabilize 
the road map process."  The GOB, he said, had freed ASSK in 
the past only to watch her force confrontation and refuse to 
participate in nation building.  "Why don't you push ASSK and 
the NLD like you push us?" he asked.  Nyun Win also 
complained that the international media portrays an 
inaccurate view of Burma.  The COM quickly retorted that the 
GOB needed to allow journalists to enter the country.  "You 
might not like everything that gets written," she said, "but 
access to information is important not only for the outside 
world, but for the Burmese people as well." 
 
6. (SBU) The COM stated that the GOB's road map would lack 
any credibility whatsoever unless authorities release senior 
NLD leaders and establish a fixed timeline.  "If the GOB is 
sincere about an inclusive process," she said, "then how can 
you expect the NLD to participate while their leaders 
languish in detention?"  The COM forcefully pointed out that 
immediate freedom for ASSK and U Tin Oo was a basic human 
right and reminded the FM that ASSK was the victim of a 
premeditated assault on May 30, 2003--not the aggressor, as 
the GOB has frequently attempted to portray her and the NLD. 
 
7. (SBU) The U.S. will not change its Burma policy unless the 
GOB undertakes serious measures to achieve national 
reconciliation, was the message the COM exhorted the FM to 
deliver to the SPDC.  The issue is not just bilateral, she 
added, and pointed to EU sanctions and the UNSYG's August 
statement criticizing the NC as examples of international 
concern.  The COM urged Nyun Win to speak with SPDC Chairman 
Than Shwe about allowing the immediate return of the UNSYG's 
Special Envoy and the UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights. 
(Note:  The COM provided the FM with a copy of the 
Department's October 4 statement on the UNSYG's September 29 
Burma meeting.  End Note.) 
 
8. (C) Bio notes:  Both Nyun Win and his deputy, Maung Myint, 
were dressed in traditional Burmese civilian clothing, 
backing reports that they have doffed their military uniforms 
and taken sabbatical from active duty.  DFM Maung Myint made 
no contributions during the 30-minute meeting and appeared to 
have minimal or no English language comprehension.  The new 
DFM, according to his junior colleagues, will be in charge 
only of administrative matters while a second Deputy Foreign 
Minister, the unimpressive Kyaw Thu, will assume the role of 
"senior DFM" responsible for most policy matters. 
 
Comment: Caretaker Foreign Minister 
 
9. (C) By all appearances, Nyan Win is a caretaker foreign 
minister under instructions from SPDC Chairman Than Shwe to 
hold the regime line.  Since the September 18 ouster of the 
GOB's experienced former foreign affairs team (ref B), the 
long-time diplomat U Tin Winn, Minister of Labor and 
concurrently a Minister in the Prime Minister's Office (and 
former Ambassador to the U.S.), has carried the regime's 
water to the international community, including in his role 
as head of delegation to the UNGA and as senior GOB 
representative at the imminent ASEM Summit in Vietnam. 
 
11. (C) We were not surprised by FM Nyan Win's narrow views 
or his message that the GOB has no intention of changing its 
foreign policy.  His approach is entirely consistent with the 
SPDC's determined march to complete the road map with a 
regional stamp of approval, marginalize the democratic 
opposition, consolidate full control over Burmese territory, 
and prolong its staying power.  The COM also pressed for 
appropriate cooperation on our joint opium yield survey, 
humanitarian remains recovery operations, and the 
construction of a new embassy compound.  We can expect some 
cooperation on these efforts, but have no expectation that 
the new FM will be responsive on other important policy 
issues.  End Comment. 
Martinez 

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