US embassy cable - 04BRUSSELS4274

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 BRUSSELS 004274 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2014 
TAGS: PREL, IZ, IR, CH, IS, PTER, EUN, USEU BRUSSELS 
SUBJECT: US/EU POLICY PLANNING TALKS 
 
Classified By: USEU/POL: Harry O'Hara, reasons 1.4 b/d 
 
 1.  (C) Summary: US and EU policy planners met September 20 
to discuss the transatlantic relationship, the Middle East 
Peace Process (MEPP), Iraq, Iran, and the Broader Middle East 
and North Africa and the EU's Barcelona Process.  Discussions 
were frank about the challenges in the main message from 
discussions on Iraq was that European nerves were still raw: 
time and again EU representatives dwelled more on what had 
happened over Iraq, then on what should happen to help 
stabilize Iraq.  When pressed by Reiss, a broad range of EU 
diplomats, think tankers and journalists admitted that their 
publics do not see Iraq as critical to their security (and, 
by extension, this sentiment will continue to limit what the 
EU collectively and its members individually can offer the 
Iraqi Interim Government). In contrast, Europeans placed 
greater emphasis on the MEPP and the Quartet. EU officials ) 
facing a dead-end of the EU-3 diplomacy over Iran -- 
demonstrated little appetite for tougher measures, and hoped 
that somehow the US could rescue the day by launching a 
&grand bargain8 with the Iranian government.  End Summary. 
 
2. (U) S/P Director Dr. Mitchell B. Reiss and S/P Principal 
Deputy Director Barry Lowenkron met September 20-23 with a 
broad range of European Council and Commission officials, 25 
member state Political and Security Ambassadors, as well as 
NGOs, European Parliament members, academics and journalists 
to take the temperature of the transatlantic relationship and 
to explore ways to revitalize the relationship. Key EU 
officials that Reiss and Lowenkron met with include EU 
Council Policy Unit Head Christoph Heusgen; Council Director 
Jim Cloos; the 25 EU Ambassadors assigned to the EU Political 
and Security Committee; Solana Personal WMD Representative 
Annalisa Giannella; and also from the Council policy unit: 
Gyorgy Tatt, Rein Tamsaar, Andreas Papaconstantinou, Bjorn 
Larsson, Antonio Alvarez Barthe and Petr Hladik. 
 
The transatlantic relationship: a warm-up round 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
3.  (C) EU and US participants reviewed key findings of the 
recent German Marshall Fund (GMF) report on transatlantic 
relations. Discussed were the common transatlantic public 
recognition of the need for the US and Europe to work 
together, US/European support for the UN, US public support 
for a stronger EU, and differences over the use of force. 
Reiss stressed that the results could boost efforts to renew 
the relationship:  both sides of the Atlantic wanted close 
cooperation, and the American public supported a strong EU. 
The key was how both sides could build on the findings to 
tackle key problems, above all the Middle East agenda:  Iraq, 
Iran, BMENA, and the MEPP. 
 
EU not opposed to the use of force 
---------------------------------- 
 
4. (C) Cloos said that Iraq posed many questions for the EU 
including under what circumstances could force legitimately 
be used.  He warned against drawing a conclusion that just 
because the EU disapproved the use of force in Iraq, that 
therefore, Europe opposes the use of force per se.  He said 
that Kosovo, Sierra Leone and Afghanistan showed that Europe 
could accept the use of force; furthermore, Kosovo showed 
that Europe could support the use of military force without 
UN blessing.  Heusgen added that now Russia is seeking to 
justify its right to take unilateral action against 
terrorists anywhere on the basis of the rationale used by the 
US to justify its use of force in Iraq.  He also claimed that 
the Sudanese government has borrowed the US concept of 
"illegal combatants," as developed and applied to Guantanamo, 
to justify some of its current actions. 
 
 
Afghanistan 
----------- 
 
5. (C) Reiss noted that Afghanistan was one area everyone is 
touting as a model of multilateral cooperation.  That being 
the case, he asked what more the EU could do there. Setting 
aside what some member states and NATO are doing, Cloos 
replied that the EU is working on developing capabilities to 
support its missions abroad, including in Afghanistan, and 
will get there eventually.  He admitted that there is a gap 
between EU will and EU capabilities and that the EU can't do 
all that it would like to do.  Heusgen noted that European 
publics understand that Afghanistan is a security problem 
both for being a source of drugs and base for various 
terrorist camps. 
 
Iraq 
---- 
 
6. (C) Reiss asked the central question as whether both sides 
could cooperate on Iraq today.  He asked if European publics 
see what is happening in Iraq as important to their security 
and their futures and, if so, what are they prepared to do 
about it. Heusgen noted strong European public feelings that 
Iraq is not an European mess, that the US-led coalition had 
made this mess, and that Iraq and Afghanistan were different. 
 Lowenkron noted that the US had been working to 
internationalize the post-war effort, represented by two UN 
Security Council resolutions.  It was perfectly reasonable to 
ask the EU ) especially given its strong support for the UN 
-- to help in any way, including offering protection to the 
UN officials working to prepare the January elections.  Cloos 
responded that US actions in the UN were &too late.8  He 
argued that had the US approached the UN right after the end 
of hostilities with the ideas it has presented since, then 
the mood in Europe might have been different.  Cloos 
suggested that more "fundamental" to him than these recent US 
internationalization efforts was a US concept that the 
"mission defines the coalition."  He said that this concept 
undermines 40 years of transatlantic relations - not just 
with the EU but also with NATO.  We need to work together as 
a coalition to define the mission, he said.  On Iraq, Cloos 
said that Europe found a way to say "no" to the US.  Heusgen 
added that he was pessimistic that the EU, particularly 
France and Germany, will want to do anything new on Iraq -- 
not just before, but even after, November 2. 
 
The "war" on terrorism 
---------------------- 
 
7.  (C) Heusgen suggested that the US reconsider its effort 
to link Iraq to the war on terrorism, as this linkage does 
not work among European publics.  He suggested that European 
audiences would more sympathetic to language on the plight of 
"failed," "fragile" or "failing" states.  On Iraq, the US 
would have a better chance if it depicted the challenge as 
reconstructing a failed state or preventing a failed state. 
Heusgen emphasized that the very notion of a "war" on 
terrorism does not sound good in Europe, Madrid 
notwithstanding.  Cloos rejected an idea that Europe somehow 
needs another terrorist attack to become sympathetic to the 
US views on terrorism. Europe fears terrorism but doesn,t 
see this as a war. Lowenkron suggested that in the fight/war 
on terrorism, the difference seems to be that Europe is 
concerned about it while the US is committed to fight it. 
 
EU as "partner" or "leader" 
--------------------------- 
 
8. (C) Heusgen said that the GMF study showed that US and 
European publics wanted the EU to be a leader. He doubted, 
however, that the US is ready to accept the EU -- with all 
its weaknesses -- as a partner. On the MEPP, he argued that 
the EU needs to believe that the US is willing to share 
leadership with the EU -- something that currently is not the 
case. On Iraq, the current situation is so "out-of-hand" that 
he has trouble seeing how individual member states might want 
to move in at all. At an EU-wide level, there is no support 
for doing more in Iraq, he said. Perhaps if European public 
understood that there would an end-point or departure state, 
that would help but he wondered if anyone realistically could 
see an end-point in Iraq.  Reiss replied that the challenge 
is to stabilize the situation in the cities so our troops can 
leave them and no longer be a lightening rod. Police can do a 
better job and we currently are in a race between the 
insurgents and the government until January 2005 elections. 
Heusgen said that regardless, European public opinionremained "very difficult" 
on Iraq. 
 
Problems with US leadership: Style or Issues? 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
9. (C) Heusgen said that the European don't oppose US 
leadership per se, just the current style of leadership. 
Cloos demurred and questioned whether focusing on style leads 
to a constructive debate.  He said that one way to turn 
around negative European perceptions is to "get rid" of 
Guantanamo, an issue that undercuts the US claim to offer 
"moral leadership."  The recent controversy of various USG 
memos on the use of torture had revealed an America that 
Europeans did not know. He blamed these memos for 
contributing to growing cynicism on international human 
rights.  He added that the prison incidents in Abu Ghraib had 
done "horrible damage" to the US.  For a number of reasons, 
including embarrassment, many in the EU didn't even want to 
talk about or raise Abu Ghraib with the US.  Cloos suggested 
that differences over issues, not style, were at the heart of 
the current condition of the relationship. Beside Guantanamo, 
Iraq and Abu Ghraib, the EU was still upset about the 
International Criminal Court and Kyoto.  Reiss explained the 
domestic history of these two issues -- including the role 
and attitude of the Congress -- and added that not a single 
major European country is meeting its Kyoto targets.  Reiss 
asked if the damage was so great that the US has lost a 
generation in Europe. Cloos answered with "no-but" while 
Heusgen said the transatlantic relation was in a "deep hole." 
 
MEPP 
---- 
 
10. (C) Cloos said that the MEPP is central, not just for the 
EU, but also for the transatlantic relationship.  He said 
that the US has a number of fundamental misconceptions ) 
including its belief that the EU is somehow biased against 
Israel.  He argued that the EU does try to engage Israel 
positively and does condemn Palestinian terrorism. He said 
that even though many depict the EU and the US as having huge 
difference on the MEPP and the roadmap, this is false. The 
one big difference is that the EU believes that Arafat, as 
bad as he is, can't be ignored.  Cloos also expressed 
frustration that Israel is able to bypass the Quartet and 
make direct deals with the US on Roadmap issues that should 
be dealt with in the Quartet. 
 
BMENA 
----- 
 
11.  (C) Reiss briefed EU officials on the state of play on 
BMENA, reinforcing the President,s message that the G-8 Sea 
island initiative is multi-decade, multilateral, diplomatic 
in focus and not designed to substitute for the MEPP -- all 
things that the European have told us they want.  Reiss said 
that the US is interested in working with Europe and is 
disappointed with the EU's lack of enthusiasm.  Heusgen said 
that the EU agreed on the objectives of BMENA and is already 
spending one billion euros/year on its own Barcelona Process. 
 The Barcelona Process, 10 years old and an object of pride 
for Solana when it was created when he was the Spanish 
Foreign Minister, is in need of revitalization, he admitted. 
Heusgen said that it was good that the US, through BMENA, 
sought engagement in the region -- though EU had had some 
concerns that US had been interested in imposing it on the 
region.  Lowenkron reminded Cloos that the leaked document 
that touched off the original criticism in the Arab World had 
been a G-8 document ) and that none of the language that had 
been shared among the G-8 members claimed that the West was 
intent on imposing change in the region.  Cloos asked if we 
could find a work-around regarding EU's fears that BMENA 
would be used to distract from the MEPP. 
 
Possible BMENA/Barcelona Process Cooperation 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
12. (C) Heusgen suggested that with all this behind us, 
perhaps we could then explore some concrete areas of 
cooperation in education, private investment and local 
administration.  The EU is working on action plans, which 
would contain a broad range of regional assistance packages, 
for internal EU discussion next month.  There had been some 
internal EU hesitation about moving ahead with these action 
plans but these have been overcome.  Perhaps the US and the 
EU, or EC, might explore how their projects might be fitted 
together; for example, in education, where the EU tends to 
emphasize higher education while US assistance is focused on 
secondary and elementary education.  Reiss and Heusgen agreed 
that Egypt is a key country.  Reiss noted that promoting 
democracy there would be complex and various structures 
needed to be in place beforehand and that a premature push 
for elections could create instability. 
 
Political teeth for the Barcelona Process? 
------------------------------------------ 
 
13. (C) Heusgen noted that the Barcelona Process had been 
helpful in Tunisia on the business side but had not worked 
well in promoting human rights.  From a policy planning 
perspective, Heusgen said that it was not great for the EU to 
providing economic support that also strengthens an 
undemocratic government.  Reiss suggested that we could draw 
from the old Helsinki Process Basket III approach of 
reviewing and monitoring progress on human rights. Hladik 
noted that precisely the Helsinki model frightens some 
Arabian countries.  Lowenkron stressed that it is important 
that, whatever the EU or the US does, these efforts do not 
degenerate into economics-only assistance.  Heusgen suggested 
that the EU might use the forthcoming 10th anniversary of the 
Barcelona Process to make it better and also to make it more 
visible to the people that it is helping. 
 
14. (C) EU policy unit member Vassalo noted that the BMENA 
project is developing in a positive direction and said that 
there is wider acceptance of it in the region. Nonetheless, 
Heusgen said that the EU will stick to the Barcelona Process. 
USEU Min-Couns Scott noted that in many countries, where the 
US and the EU wanted to help, we had only a limited universe 
of participants/partners to work with.  Perhaps US and EU 
reps in the field could consider closer coordination under 
these circumstances.  Already we are doing this in a number 
of Gulf States, he noted. 
 
Iran: fork in the road 
---------------------- 
 
15. (C) Heusgen noted that while the EU-3 process had made 
some progress in the last year, the Iranians have not stopped 
enrichment.  We can expect to enter into a difficult time 
between now and the November IAEA Board of Governors Meeting. 
 EU policy planner Bjorn Larsson said that Iran will decide 
whether we go to a good or a bad scenario.  He asked if some 
kind of grand deal is possible among the EU, the US, Russia 
and Iran to put it on the good road.  Reiss replied that Iran 
already is in non-compliance on its safeguard agreement and 
that we should act on that first.  In addition, Reiss noted 
that he had seen nothing from the Iranians indicating 
interest in working with the US on a grand deal. He said if 
the EU-3 argues against toughness on Iran, then we will have 
a highly divisive issue in the transatlantic relationship. 
As policy makers, he asked if there is a way that we can 
imagine a combination of joint US/EU carrots and sticks to 
get the Iranians to do the right thing.  But this would not 
be US sticks and EU carrots, rather the EU would have to show 
sticks and be tough on Iran.  Reiss cautioned that some in 
the US see the current situation as one of now that the EU-3 
has "failed" in Iran, they are now in a "cul-du-sac;" and 
therefore the EU should now ask the US to step in and fix it. 
 Heusgen noted that he sees some possibility that the US and 
the EU could cooperate on Iran, after November 2. 
 
Cloos on Iraq: Round II 
----------------------- 
 
16. (C) Key Solana advisor on transatlantic affairs, Jim 
Cloos, was even blunter in his September 21 conversation than 
he had been the previous day. He said that the EU is not 
willing to play in Iraq.  While he agreed that could be a 
window of opportunity to discuss this after November 2 -- 
regardless of who wins -- he questioned what help the EU 
could provide that would make a difference to the situation 
in Iraq.  Reiss asked if European publics and leaders would 
resonate with an appeal for help to Iraq based US help to 
Europe in WWII -- something that could be explored in various 
ceremonies from WWII that would take place this year.  Cloos 
said that using these models would be "over the top."  If the 
US wants to work on Iraq with the EU, we would need to start 
some private talks with Solana but currently, Cloos said, the 
EU is not prepared to deal with us on Iraq in a serious 
fashion.  Cloos also said that "nice words" from the US would 
not be enough to get a serious commitment from the EU on 
Iran.  The MEPP would be a different matter -- this is for 
the EU and for Solana, the number one foreign policy problem 
for the EU and an area where US leadership is essential and 
desirable. 
 
Cloos on MEPP: Round II 
17. (C) Cloos said that "emotions in the EU on the Quartet 
are boiling" with him and others increasingly seeing this as 
something to keep the Europeans happy.  He sees Israel as not 
respecting the Quartet and the US tacitly permitting this. 
Cloos said that despite this, no one in the EU opposes US 
leadership in the MEPP. 
 
What the EU can do for the US? 
------------------------------ 
 
18.  (C) When asked by Reiss what the EU offers the US if we 
would work together more in foreign policy, Cloos listed 
greater legitimacy in the international arena for our 
actions, political links that the US does not have, some 
independent EU capabilities from its nascent battle groups to 
election observers, financial assistance to key countries 
through the Barcelona Process, and trade and cooperation 
agreements -- a powerful carrot for countries like Iran. 
 
PSC Ambassadors lunch 
--------------------- 
 
19.  (C) Director Reiss addressed the ambassadors of the EU 
Political and Security Committee (PSC) over lunch, focusing 
on the critical challenges facing the US and EU in the 
greater Middle East: Iraq, Iran, BMENA, and the MEPP.   Most 
of the discussion following Reiss,s presentation covered the 
MEPP with Reiss fielding questions about settlements, Gaza, 
Israel, and US views on a nuclear free zone in the mid-east 
(as a way to get a handle on Iran,s nuclear program).  While 
most participants preferred to talk about the MEPP and the 
failure of the US and the EU to work well together there, the 
Dutch PSC Ambassador tried to shift the discussion to Iraq. 
In the short discussion on Iraq, Ambassador Hamer, the Dutch 
Presidency Ambassador who chaired the lunch for the EU, said 
that the EU was not disengaged from Iraq and that the EU 
supported the Iraqi President, that discussions on debt 
relief were "ongoing", that the EU is considering election 
support and support for UN and other protection forces. 
 
Other topics 
------------ 
 
20. (C) On China, one PSC Ambassador said that the current EU 
arms embargo was only about Tianmanen and not the current 
human rights situation in China.  The French Ambassador 
highlighted the EU Code of Conduct, while arguing that it was 
unnatural for the EU to lump China in with a handful of 
states where the EU still retained sanctions.  Another PSC 
Ambassador suggested that US/EU differences over China arms 
will lead to another transatlantic disagreement.  On 
terrorism, a number of PSC Ambassadors said that the US is 
too focused on military responses.  On a more positive note, 
one PSC Ambassador praised US/EU cooperation in the Balkans 
as good for the Balkans and good for transatlantic relations. 
 
NGO/think tank/journalist discussion 
------------------------------------ 
 
21. (SBU) Reiss met with a broad range of journalists, think 
tankers, EU officials, European Parliamentarians at two 
off-the-record conversations, one sponsored by the German 
Marshal Fund on September 20 and the second by the Bertelsman 
Foundation on September 21. Participants echoed many of the 
comments and concerns expressed in the policy planning talks. 
However, the tone was often sharper. 
 
Iraq 
---- 
 
22. (SBU) Numerous Europeans described the damage done by 
Iraq to the US image in Europe as significant. Others 
admitted that the European reaction had a strong emotional 
content that made this difficult to repair. There was strong 
consensus that "things were far from normal" in the 
transatlantic relationship, despite recent efforts at Summits 
to "paper things over." Others wondered whether the European 
could "trust" what the US says in light of the lack of WMD in 
Iraq. 
 
23. (SBU) There was widespread feeling that the Mid-East 
Peace Process is much more important than Iraq for Europeans. 
One participant argued that Iraq was not the cause of the 
current transatlantic crisis, rather Europe felt slighted by 
the lack of a US effort to work with Europe in the immediate 
aftermath to 9/11.  Another participant wondered if US 
foreign policy was being driven by conflict between a &good 
side8 and a &bad side.8 The problem for the US, from a 
European perspective, is that the bad side is winning.  This 
"bad side" wins when the US commits a fundamental breach of 
values through its use of torture and when US leaders 
allegedly do not accept the consequences of their actions. 
If the US continues in this way, there will be a major 
transatlantic break with foreign policy coordination 
occurring on a case-by-case basis and not on the basis on 
common beliefs or values. 
 
Iran 
---- 
 
24. (SBU) On Iran, a journalist suggested that if Europe is 
given the choice between an Iran with nukes or a decision to 
bomb Iran, Europe will choose an Iran with nukes.  If the US 
does bomb Iran, this will be the nail in the coffin of the 
transatlantic relationship.  Another journalist said that 
Iran should be seen less dramatically and as a test of US 
commitment to multilateralism -- especially when 
multilateralism is "hard." 
 
US Response: questions are two-way 
---------------------------------- 
 
25. (SBU) Both Reiss and Lowenkron noted that a clear message 
coming through from many of their European interlocutors is 
that, despite the difficult state of transatlantic relations, 
Europeans expected the US to help them out whether it be the 
MEPP or Iran.  What this misses is that US also has questions 
about the transatlantic relationship, Europe's commitment to 
helping Iraq, and fighting terrorism and nuclear 
proliferation.  Lowenkron told the Bertelsman Foundation 
participants that a message to Washington comprising of 
"press the Israelis and don,t ask us for any help on Iraq8 
was hardly fruitful for building a solid trans-atlantic 
relationship.  Several participants took exception to the 
stark way the view was presented ) but not to the view 
itself. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
26. (C) At every event, Director Reiss and Dep. Dir. 
Lowenkron asked their European hosts to imagine a blank sheet 
onto which they were free to write down as many policy 
recommendations as they would like as to what the U.S. should 
do in Iraq.  Most left their pages blank.  Two (Heusgen and 
Cloos) argued that the sheet should have one point:  move out 
on the Israeli-Palestinian front.  The failure of Europe to 
see that what happens in Iraq is important for European 
security, and not just the security of the United States, was 
sobering.  If this is indeed the case, then the EU is in 
danger of missing an opportunity post-November 2 to try to 
fix the relationship.  The bottom line message to Dir. Reiss 
was the EU seems willing to run the risk that it can &sit 
out8 Iraq (while demanding greater action on MEPP and US 
carrots on Iran) without further damaging the trans-atlantic 
relationship. 
 
27. (U) S/P cleared this message. 
 
28. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
 
Schnabel