US embassy cable - 04TAIPEI3071

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 003071 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/RSP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - 
ROBERT PALLADINO 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC, KMDR, KPAO, TW, Foreign Policy 
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, 
TAIWAN'S ARMS PROCUREMENTS, KEYSER CASE 
 
 
1. U.S. Presidential Election 
 
A) "The United States Needs to Re-organize Its 
Relations with [Its] Asian Allies" 
 
Lai I-chung, International Affairs Director of the 
Taiwan Think Tank, said in an op-ed in the centrist, 
pro-status quo "China Times" (10/1): 
 
"Judging by the strategic traits of the two U.S. 
presidential candidates' staff specializing in Asia- 
Pacific policy, this November's U.S. presidential 
election can be basically viewed as a race between the 
`Pan Asia' faction whose Asian strategic focus lies in 
the `U.S.-Japan alliance,' and the `China Hand' faction 
whose Asian policy centers on the `U.S.-China strategic 
partnership.'   The `Pan Asia' faction not only has 
dominated the U.S. government's Asia policy for the 
past four years, but its source can also be traced back 
to the strategic views adopted by former Secretary of 
State George Schultz of the Reagan administration.  The 
`China Hand' faction, however, refers to former U.S. 
President Bill Clinton's senior staff members during 
his second term of office.  No matter who is elected 
U.S. president [in November], he will face an Asian 
strategic environment that has been fundamentally 
changed.  As a result, it has become a key issue as to 
how to deal with the United States' relations with its 
allies in Asia. . 
 
"Some people might think that Washington will not have 
to go through much hardship in dealing with its 
relations with its Asian allies if it views `U.S.-China 
relations' as the core of its Asian policy.  Such an 
argument is basically wrong.  If Washington lacks a 
stable relationship with its Asian allies, it will 
diminish Beijing's needs regarding Washington, which 
will, in turn, lose a powerful bargaining chip when 
dealing with Beijing.  Such a development, as a result, 
will add more variables to Washington-Beijing ties. 
Thus, for either the `Pan Asia' faction or the `China 
Hand' faction, it is very important [for the United 
States] to maintain strong and powerful alliances in 
Asia. 
 
"The escalating nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula 
has put the question of whether the current regime in 
Pyongyang is sustainable under the spotlight.  The 
impact of Taiwan's democratic development versus 
China's swelling nationalism and its military expansion 
have also made it really difficult to maintain the 
`status quo' across the Taiwan Strait.  All these 
indicate that the next U.S. president may be required 
to face and deal with problems such as the unification 
on the Korean Peninsula and conflicts across the Taiwan 
Strait.  Thus, re-identifying [the United States'] 
Asian alliances will be a top priority for the new U.S. 
president ." 
 
B) "Revelations [from the] U.S. Presidential Election: 
Fair Competition Is the Bottom Line for Democratic 
Rule" 
 
The conservative, pro-unification "United Daily News" 
observed in an editorial (10/4): 
 
". U.S. society is indeed experiencing an atmosphere of 
confrontation because of the heated presidential 
election; some people even believe that a dividing 
crisis rarely seen over the past few decades is 
happening in the United States.  However, as was shown 
in the debate by [U.S. President George W.] Bush and 
his rival [Senator John] Kerry, the democratic rules of 
the game that have been built up gradually since the 
founding of the United States are still the bottom line 
governing each presidential candidate. . 
 
"A president who seeks to expand the hegemonic power 
[of his nation over] the world is still bound by the 
domestic system of his country, from accepting 
criticism of the Congress in its investigative reports 
to signing an agreement before the presidential debate. 
All these indicate the check and balances of democracy 
and the spirit of fair competition honored by a society 
ruled by law.  Watching the U.S. presidential race from 
across the Pacific Ocean, [we hope] Taiwan . could also 
reach a consensus on the rule of fair competition." 
 
C) "Keeping Kerry's Asia Policy on Track Is Vital to 
Taiwan" 
The conservative, pro-unification, English-language 
"China Post" noted in an editorial (10/3): 
". While Bush and Kerry did not mention anything about 
the Taiwan Strait [in their first debate], the exchange 
clearly showed that both men have placed East Asia high 
on their list of priorities and take Asian issues very 
seriously.  That is another reason why will have to be 
active and adamant in getting our positions 
communicated to both sides as they continue to expand 
on issues dealt with in the first debate over the 
coming days and weeks. 
 
"This task may not be as urgent for dealing with the 
incumbent administration, since we already have strong 
channels of communication with officials currently in 
power. 
 
"But we will have to strengthen our efforts toward the 
Kerry campaign, as thy are still in the early stages of 
putting together a policy. 
 
"Now that we have `established a beachhead' with 
advisers to the would-be American president, we hope 
that our diplomats will build on these efforts and take 
our causes deep into the heart of the Kerry camp." 
 
2. Taiwan's Arms Procurement 
 
"China's Double Play Strategy toward Taiwan: Anti-Arms 
Sales at the United States and Anti-Arms Procurement in 
Taiwan" 
 
The pro-independence "Liberty Times" editorialized 
(10/2): 
 
". Beijing is coming to realize that the United States' 
one-China policy is different from its own one-China 
principle and that Washington will give almost 
unreserved support to its commitment to Taiwan's 
security.  Beijing's understanding is that Washington's 
cross-Strait policy will meet the `dream of the one 
China empire;' namely, Washington is only interested in 
maintaining peace [in the Taiwan Strait] and will not 
`push for unification.'  Based on such a policy, the 
United States will naturally express serious concern 
and respond to China's use of force against Taiwan, as 
demonstrated by U.S. determination during cross-Strait 
tension in 1996.  To prevent the cross-Strait situation 
from getting out of control, the United States' 
emphasis on keeping a balance of military strength 
across the Taiwan Strait and Taiwan's purchase of 
weapons from the United States based on its needs to 
defend itself against China's threats have become a 
very important interaction that safeguards Taiwan's 
security. 
 
"Getting to understand the significance of the U.S. 
arms sales to Taiwan, Beijing has put its focus while 
dealing with the United States over the past few years 
on demanding that Washington stop arms sales to Taiwan. 
.  The United States of course would not do whatever 
Beijing tells it to.  But what is worth noticing is 
that China has shifted its focus to Taiwan since it 
discovered that it could not ask Washington to stop 
arms sales to the island.  Beijing's plan is evident: 
even though the United States refuses to stop arms 
sales to Taiwan, it could still reach the goal of 
[retarding] Taiwan's defensive capabilities by urging 
people in Taiwan to stop arms procurements from the 
United States.  Those who voice opposition to arms 
procurements in Taiwan thus must realize their roles in 
China's anti-arms sales strategy." 
 
3. Keyser Case 
 
"US-Taiwan ties need patching up" 
 
Edward Chen, Director of the Graduate Institute of 
American Studies at Tamkang University, said in an op- 
ed in the pro-independence, English-language "Taipei 
Times" (10/4): 
 
". There are four respects in which the Keyser affair 
is likely to affect Taiwan.  First, Keyser, who was in 
line to be the next chairman of the American Institute 
in Taiwan, will now certainly not be taking up that 
post. 
"It is questionable whether another nominee will be as 
favorable to Taiwan. 
"Second, revelations of a `national security' leak will 
make US officials less forthcoming and more secretive 
in their regular meeting with Taiwanese officials and 
academics at Taiwan's US representative office. 
 
"Third, the official counterpart of Taiwan's National 
Security Bureau (NSB) is the CIA but on the insistence 
of high officials in the US government, the matter is 
being handled by the State Department. 
 
"As the case has affected regular diplomatic and 
intelligence-gathering operations, it is possible that 
there will be friction between the diplomatic and 
national security units within Taiwan's representative 
office in the US. 
 
"Fourth, in the short term at least, the morale of 
intelligence agents working with the US will take a 
blow, and their freedom of action may also be more 
constrained. 
 
"In the investigation of the Keyser case, Taiwan may be 
able to minimize the damage to Taiwan-US relations and 
trust if it faces the matter truthfully, cooperates 
fully with the US, rewards and fairly punishes those 
involved and - most of all - maintains clear lines of 
diplomatic communication. . 
 
"The Keyser case is different from conventional cases 
of diplomatic or intelligence personnel breaking the 
rules.  Strictly speaking, it is a political case.  Its 
significance depends on how it is considered. 
 
"I believe the best way to resolve the Keyser case is 
to discover its root cause. 
 
"That is to say, we should look at the big picture, and 
seek to reverse the decline in Taiwan-US relations of 
the last few years. 
 
"For example, in meeting the US demand that Taiwan not 
alter the status quo, we must do what we say and not 
try to play word games with the Americans.  In the 
context of US-China-Taiwan relations, we should 
probably take a new tack, implementing policies that 
benefit the US, but also meet our own interests. 
 
"We must build on our commercial and technical 
strength, seek security assurances from the US and at 
the same time seek parity in our commercial dealings 
with China. ." 
 
PAAL