US embassy cable - 01MANAMA3641

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAMA 003641 
 
C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y - ADDED DUSHANBE 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL: 10/29/11 
TAGS:  PGOV, PREL, AF, BA 
SUBJECT:  AMIR TO SECRETARY POWELL ON AFGHANISTAN'S 
          FUTURE: GET A GOVERNMENT ON THE GROUND 
 
REF:  A) STATE 187567     B) MANAMA 3624 
 
(U) CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR RONALD E. NEUMANN.  REASONS 
1.5 (B)(D) 
 
1.  (S) SUMMARY. BAHRAIN'S AMIR WELCOMES THE U.S. FOCUS 
ON REPLACING THE TALIBAN AND FORMING A BROAD-BASED 
GOVERNMENT.  HE URGED THAT WE GET SOME FORM OF 
GOVERNMENT ON THE GROUND QUICKLY TO BECOME A LEGITIMATE 
SPOKESMAN FOR AFGHANISTAN AND TURN THE TALIBAN INTO 
INSURGENTS.  WITH SUCH A STEP HE THINKS THE LENGTH OF 
THE WAR WILL BECOME LESS IMPORTANT, AND WITHOUT IT THE 
PUBLIC PROBLEM WILL GROW.  HIS PS: CAN'T YOU DO 
SOMETHING ON PULLING THE PLUG ON AL JAZEERA? WE DO NOT 
RECOMMEND THIS.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (S) DURING THE CALL BY SECRETARY OF THE NAVY GORDON 
ENGLAND ON BAHRAIN'S AMIR SHAIKH HAMAD BIN ISA OCTOBER 
29, THE AMBASSADOR REVIEWED SECRETARY POWELL'S ORAL 
MESSAGE ON AFGHANISTAN (REFTEL A).  THE AMIR AGREED WITH 
THE THRUST OF CREATING A BROAD-BASED GOVERNMENT KEEPING 
THE UN IN THE LEAD ON ASSISTANCE, AND THE REMOVAL OF THE 
TALIBAN ("ESSENTIAL").  HOWEVER, THE AMIR FOCUSED HIS 
ATTENTION ON THE NEED TO MOVE SPEEDILY TO PUT AN AFGHAN 
GOVERNMENT ON THE GROUND.  HE MADE CLEAR THAT IT IS THE 
SYMBOLISM AND NOT THE REALITY OF CONTROL THAT HE 
BELIEVES IS ESSENTIAL. 
 
3.  (S) HIS RECOMMENDATION IS, ESSENTIALLY, TO GET AS 
BROAD BASED A GROUP AS POSSIBLE, AND GET THEM ON TO THE 
GROUND, AND CALL THEM A GOVERNMENT.  HE DOES NOT BELIEVE 
IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THEY BE IN KABUL.  THEY COULD BE 
CLOSE TO THE BORDER AND DEALING WITH REFUGEE ISSUES. 
ALTERNATIVELY, THEY COULD BE IN MAZAR-I-SHARIF IF THE 
TOWN CAN BE SEIZED.  THE AMIR'S POINT IS THAT ONCE A 
GROUP CALLING ITSELF THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT CAN BEGIN TO 
SPEAK FROM THE SOIL OF AFGHANISTAN THEY CAN RAPIDLY TAKE 
ON THE MANTLE OF AUTHORITY, AND PUSH THE TALIBAN INTO 
THE ROLE OF INSURGENTS FIGHTING IN THE HILLS.  THIS WILL 
ALLOW A COUNTERPOINT TO THE POPULAR VIEW THAT THE U.S. 
IS WAGING WAR ON, RATHER THAN TO LIBERATE AFGHANISTAN. 
 
4. (S) SUBSIDIARY POINTS MADE BY THE AMIR INCLUDED THE 
NEED TO PROTECT THE NEW GOVERNMENT WITH ISLAMIC, NOT 
U.S. FORCES, AND THE RECOMMENDATION THAT SITES FOR 
DISCUSSING AND LAUNCHING SUCH A GOVERNMENT INCLUDE 
CONSIDERATION OF SAUDI ARABIA, PREFERABLY MECCA, TO GIVE 
IT A HOLY CAST.  HE THOUGHT TURKEY, AND PERHAPS, 
PAKISTAN WOULD BE HELPFUL. 
 
5.  (S) THE AMIR ALSO LAID INTO AL JAZEERA WITH EVEN 
MORE THAN HIS USUAL GUSTO.  HE DECLAIMED AT LENGTH ON 
HOW DANGEROUS THIS STATION IS, HOW IT IS ESSENTIALLY 
ONE-SIDED PROPAGANDA, AND ALLEGED THAT THE AL JAZEERA 
CORRESPONDENT IN KABUL (HE WAS SOME UNCERTAIN HERE, IT 
COULD HAVE BEEN KANDAHAR) IS ACTUALLY NOT A JOURNALIST, 
BUT AN "AFGHAN ARAB."  HIS BASIC THRUST WAS TO ASK 
WHETHER THE UNITED STATES AND SAUDI ARABIA COULD NOT 
SOMEHOW PULL THE PLUG OF ARABSAT AND MAKE AL JAZEERA 
OCCASIONALLY DISAPPEAR FROM THE AIRWAVES. 
 
6.  (S)  COMMENT:  THE AMIR IS FIXATED WITH THE NEED TO 
SHOW POLITICAL MOVEMENT ON THE GROUND IN AFGHANISTAN. 
THE FIXATION IS AN ACTION-ORIENTED MANIFESTATION OF THE 
GENERAL PUBLIC FRUSTRATION THAT THE BOMBING IS NOT BEING 
LINKED, IN WAYS THEY CAN SEE, TO AN ARTICULATED 
POLITICAL STRATEGY EXTENDING BEYOND ANTI-TERRORISM.  THE 
AMIR AND THE PUBLIC HERE WANT TO KNOW ALSO THE 
CONDITIONS WHICH WOULD SHAPE AN END TO THE CURRENT PHASE 
OF THE WAR.  IN THE ABSENCE OF BENCHMARKS TOWARDS WHICH 
WE CAN BE SEEN TO BE PROCEEDING, THE MILITARY CAMPAIGN 
BECOMES MORE DIFFICULT TO EXPLAIN.  AS TO AL JAZEERA, 
THERE IS NO LOVE LOST BETWEEN THE BAHRAINIS AND THE 
QATARIS AND THE GOB HAS NEVER FELT MORE THAN CORDIAL 
DISTASTE FOR AL JAZEERA, EVEN AT THE BEST OF TIMES.  WE 
WATCH AL-JAZEERA REGULARLY.  SOME OF THE COVERAGE -- BUT 
NOT ALL -- IS BIASED.  BUT WHAT IS HURTING US BADLY IS 
THE VISUALS, WOUNDED CIVILIANS AND DESPERATE REFUGEES, 
NOT THE COMMENTARY.  IF AL JAZEERA WAS TURNED OFF, WE 
SUSPECT ITS POPULARITY WOULD SIMPLY PASS TO THE EVEN 
WORSE HIZBALLAH SATELLITE STATION AL MANAR, WHICH IS 
ALSO BROADCASTING CURRENTLY FROM AFGHANISTAN. FINALLY, 
ASSAULTING THE MEDIA WOULD DAMAGE OUR OWN CREDIBILITY. 
IN SHORT, WE ARE REPORTING THIS VIEW, NOT ADVOCATING IT. 
 
MINIMIZE CONSIDERED 
 
 
NEUMANN