US embassy cable - 04ROME3792

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GDPR/ITALY: SCENESETTER FOR A/S BLOOMFIELD AND DELEGATION

Identifier: 04ROME3792
Wikileaks: View 04ROME3792 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Rome
Created: 2004-09-30 15:11:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL MOPS MARR IT NATO U
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ROME 003792 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPT. FOR A/S BLOOMFIELD, EUR/RPM AND EUR/WE; 
OSD FOR DASD HOEHN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2014 
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, IT, NATO, U.S FORCES IN ITALY 
SUBJECT: GDPR/ITALY: SCENESETTER FOR A/S BLOOMFIELD AND 
DELEGATION 
 
REF: A. STATE 207467 
     B. ROME 2631 
 
Classified By: DCM EMIL SKODON, REASONS 1.5 B AND D. 
 
1. (C) Summary. Embassy welcomes the visit of A/S Bloomfield 
and DASD Hoehn for consultations with Italy on the Global 
Defense Posture Review.  While the Italians have no major 
concerns regarding the changes underway at Naples/Gaeta and 
Vicenza, they will be eager to hear the latest U.S. thinking 
on placing Special Operations Forces (SOF) at Sigonella. 
Freedom of deployment will be the key issue here.  The 
Italians will listen carefully to any U.S. concerns about 
freedom of deployment but we expect they will be firm about 
sticking to the legal framework that allows U.S. forces to 
operate freely out of Italian bases for NATO purposes but 
requires Italian government approval for other missions. 
Embassy notes that historically Italy has almost always found 
ways to accommodate U.S. needs, and our most productive path 
in these talks may be to focus on a political understanding 
that allows for streamlined deicsion-making on non-NATO 
missions.  End summary. 
 
2. (U) Meetings for A/S Bloomfield and delegation have been 
scheduled with Defense Minister Martino and MFA DG for 
Multilateral and Political Affairs Massolo (a working lunch). 
 Post is also working on scheduling a meeting with CHOD Di 
Paola. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Favorable climate for Transformation 
------------------------------------ 
 
3. (C) With the Berlusconi government, the U.S. enjoys the 
most favorable political environment possible in terms of 
securing a positive reception to our basing needs.   Senior 
Italian military officials have told us that proposed changes 
to the U.S. military footprint in Italy make sense from an 
operational point of view and could increase opportunities 
for bilateral training.  However, they note that some issues, 
especially regarding operating conditions, are politically 
extremely sensitive 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Naples and Vicenza -- Smooth Sailing Ahead 
------------------------------------------ 
 
4. (C) The U.S. and Italy are in broad agreement on changes 
already underway with the U.S. Navy in Naples and with the 
U.S Army in Vicenza. In an August 31 meeting with outgoing 
NAVEUR Commander Admiral Johnson, CHOD Di Paola said he was 
well aware of (and appeared at ease with) the proposed 
changes in Naples (moving NAVEUR and Commander Navy Region 
Europe (CNRE) from London and consolidating Sixth Fleet 
headquarters).  Likewise, the relocation of the Sixth Fleet 
Command Staff to Naples -- leaving only the flag ship in 
Gaeta -- did not appear to be of major concern.  Di Paola 
noted that there was plenty of tourism and other activities 
to support economic growth in Gaeta. 
 
5. (C) Similarly, the Italians are well aware of the proposed 
changes to SETAF headquarters in Vicenza, including the 
planned increase in the numbers from the current 2,900 
ceiling to approximately 4,000 personnel and the related 
discussions regarding use of Dal Molin airport space to 
accommodate this increase.  Di Paola has told us that if the 
U.S. Army's intent is merely to increase personnel under 
existing operating conditions, this is a simple matter. If, 
on the other hand, the U.S. was looking to change the 
operating conditions from those in the 1954 Bilateral 
Infrastructure Agreement, including the right to deploy, as 
A/S Bloomfield had discussed during his June visit (Ref B), 
then we needed to reach a "political understanding" before 
any such changes take place. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Sigonella -- Careful Navigation Needed 
-------------------------------------- 
 
6. (C) The Italians will be eager to hear the latest U.S. 
thinking regarding the future of Special Operations Forces 
(SOF) at Sigonella.  Di Paola has told us that consolidating 
 
 
SOF at Sigonella will certainly require some sort of 
political agreement, especially regarding freedom to deploy, 
since the existing Base Infrastructure Agreement (BIA) 
governing the presence of U.S. forces in Italy foresees their 
use only for NATO-related purposes.  He repeated the Italian 
government's view that trying to renegotiate the BIA would 
spark a political controversy.  Even under the current 
pro-Bush Italian government, a renegotiated BIA would 
probably leave the U.S. worse off. Di Paola reiterated his 
hope that Italy could find a way under existing agreements to 
accommodate U.S. rapid-response type movements when necessary. 
 
------------------------------ 
"Flexibility" v.s. Sovereignty 
------------------------------ 
 
7. (C) Di Paola's views have been echoed by others.  In a 
Sept. 28 meeting with DATT and POLMILCOUNS, Italian Defense 
General Staff (IDGS) J-3 General Giuseppe Marani underscored 
the sovereignty/deployment issue, stating that "no one could 
accept agreement in advance for direct intervention without 
host government approval." Imagine, he said, trying to manage 
the public and press reactions the next day.  However, he 
confirmed that Italy would support the U.S. if given the 
opportunity to do so; if the U.S. were ever to make a request 
that was impossible for Italy to agree to, the Italians would 
let us know right away and work with us to find another 
solution.  Marani added that, with understanding derived from 
long experience, Italy and the U.S. could accomplish anything 
together. 
 
8. (C) Giovanni Brauzzi, Director of NATO Affairs at the MFA, 
shares Marani's views.  He told us Sept. 27 that Italy will 
firmly adhere to the NATO provisions of the BIA and was 
willing to explore processes to guarantee rapid 
decision-making for non-NATO deployment requests.  Rome, 
however, would have difficulty with a U.S. request for 
unlimited flexibility, which to Italy sounded like a 
surrender of sovereignty that would be politically 
unacceptable to any government.  Brauzzi said Italy is 
considering recommending that the question of stationing U.S. 
SOF at Sigonella be referred to military-to-military talks as 
a next step. 
 
9. (C) A/S Bloomfield and DASD Hoehn also need to be aware 
that in recent months the Italians have been pushing the U.S. 
to finalize the Sigonella Technical Arrangement (TA), which 
is designed to regularize day-to-day modalities but not to 
address policy issues.  That ball now is in Italy's court. 
Italy has not yet responded to written proposals on the TA 
that we provided in April 2004.  The negotiating teams are 
set to meet Oct. 22 in Rome, one week prior to the next Joint 
Military Commission meetings. 
 
10. (C) Begin comment.  Under the 1954 BIA, Italy permits 
U.S. forces to use its installations on Italian soil for NATO 
purposes -- and other purposes that the government agrees to. 
For non-NATO-related purposes, the Italians will insist on 
retaining the right to decide whether U.S. forces may deploy 
from sovereign Italian territory. They will not be willing to 
grant us carte blanche, but are willing to consider 
establishing a process that streamlines decision-making on 
non-NATO deployments on a case-by-case basis.  In the past, 
Italy has almost always found a way to get to "yes" 
regardless of the political leanings of the Italian 
government of the day, though the process has not always been 
easy. 
 
11. (C) This visit is timely and much anticipated by the 
Italian side.  They are anxious for more clarity about U.S. 
plans for Sigonella and see great value in further 
consultation on flexibility/usability of force issues.  We 
recommend, however, that the U.S. delegation avoid using the 
term "flexibility," which the Italians may interpret as 
seeking to wrest away from Italy the prerogative of approval 
for non-NATO missions.  A focus on processes for rapid 
decision-making and a recognition of General Marani's theme 
that Italy will support U.S. requests if given an opportunity 
to do so strike us as valuable areas of focus.  End comment. 
 
 
SEMBLER 
 
 
NNNN 
 2004ROME03792 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL 


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