US embassy cable - 04TASHKENT2609

C O N F I D E N T I A L  TASHKENT 002609 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/CACEN AND INR 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/14 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PBIO PINR PTER UZ 
SUBJECT: AFTER THE BOMBINGS: KARIMOV'S DECISION-MAKING 
DICHOTOMY 
 
REFS:  A) Tashkent 385  B) Tashkent 1052  C) Tashkent 726 D) Tashkent 2603 
 
CLASSIFIED BY AMB. JON R. PURNELL, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B, D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary.  This is the second of two cables, which 
provides insight into President Karimov's decision-making 
process.  The first of which looked at Karimov's possible 
succession plans (ref D).  Although Uzbekistan was rocked 
twice this year by terrorist bombings, little has changed 
for President Islom Karimov.  The terrorist attacks have 
had little impact on either the population or Karimov's 
policies but have highlighted an apparent dichotomy in his 
decision-making and policy formulating ability:  he is a 
keen analyst of regional security issues, but curiously 
passive about confronting domestic challenges.  His hold on 
power, a number one concern, remains unchallenged, reducing 
his impetus to make any kind of change.  End summary. 
 
DICHOTOMY OF VISION 
------------------- 
2.  (C) When President Karimov makes decisions regarding 
policy for Uzbekistan, he most likely considers their 
impact on his own position first and foremost.  Minister of 
Defense Gulomov (protect) indicated as much in confidence 
during a recent DOD visit when he told DCM (then Charge) 
that Karimov cares only about security and his position, 
and sometimes the two do not coincide.  What is good for 
the country in the longer term is presumably also a factor 
in his calculations, since his legacy is inextricably 
linked to the success or failure of Uzbekistan as a state. 
However, short-term security concerns and maintaining his 
hold on power still remain top priority. 
 
3.  (C) Karimov is capable of strategic vision, especially 
regarding regional security.  In this realm, his decision- 
making appears shrewd and rational; he readily acknowledges 
the U.S. role in Afghanistan as beneficial to Uzbek and 
Central Asian security.  His concerns about internal Afghan 
politics and Russian influence in the region are well 
founded and clearly articulated.  It is in this well 
defined area of security that we find a reasonable, 
intelligent partner in Karimov and Uzbekistan. 
 
4.  (C) By contrast, Karimov can appear remarkably short- 
sighted in other areas, such as macro-economic reform and 
democratic development.  Karimov's horizon seems to be only 
three or four months down the road and no further.  He has 
exhibited this tendency at least since the mid-1990s.  Many 
of these policies, however, have outlived their usefulness 
and only serve to hamper economic growth and democracy 
building.  Karimov clings to his Soviet command-style 
economic background, apparently believing that his populace 
can survive without cash as the National Bank starves the 
market of local currency. 
 
A DEER IN THE HEADLIGHTS 
------------------------ 
 
5.  (C) When faced with unexpected threats, however, 
Karimov's response appears to be retrenchment.  In certain 
cases, like after the 1999 Tashkent bombings and the Rose 
Revolution in Georgia, Karimov has had a knee-jerk reaction 
that abandons much rational explanation.  In the wake of 
Uzbekistan's worst terrorist attacks since 1999, Karimov 
has curiously done very little in the policy realm.  He has 
placed the blame on his neighbors and Western countries 
like the U.K.  He has shown no interest in innovation or 
new policies that could lead to loosening the Govenment's 
firm control over what is said in Uzbekitan's mosques.  He 
also likely fears that any tye of loosening would provide 
an opening for Hizb-ut Tahrir (HT) or other etremists. 
Additionally, Karimov sees no profit fr himselfin 
adopting major new economic policies  Elites, including 
members of Karimov's own famly, are doing very well under 
current economic cnditions.  There is no incentive for 
these elite to make changes that might threaten their 
wealt.  And he so thoroughly controls bank functions that 
virtually the entire inancial system is nder his thumb. 
 
6.  (C) In he past, Karimov has used distinctive occasions 
lke the opening of an Oliy Majlis (legislature) sesion to 
make some sort of policy statement (ref A.  On April 29, 
Karimov addressed the opening sesion of the Oliy Majlis 
(ref B), during which hefocused on terrorism and laid the 
blame on the Western media, HT, and outsiders.  While he 
did address the nation on Uzbek TV on March 30 after the 
first spate of suicide bombings (ref C), he did not do so 
after the July 30 events.  In fact, in August, Karimov 
attended the opening session of the Oliy Majlis but chose 
not to make an address.  He had perfect opportunity during 
the official Independence Day commemoration on August 31 to 
present a policy address, but he did not. 
 
7. (C) Karimov's curious pause on the policy front at this 
time could simply be due to a lack of ideas and vision.  He 
is a Soviet-era hold over, as is most of his government, 
who is focused on his position and ways to keep it.  His 
lack of a vision for Uzbekistan's future is severely 
limited by his experiences as well as his preoccupation 
with security.  Other leaders might have fired the top 
police chief, Interior Minister Almatov, or the 
intelligence czar, NSS Chair Inoyatov, for failure to 
prevent terrorist attacks.  Such moves here, we expect, 
would only rock the political boat and upset Karimov's 
prized balance.  In the meantime, he does little to address 
the question of why terrorists have found Uzbekistan 
fertile ground for recruiting people willing to die to 
oppose his regime. 
 
PURNELL