US embassy cable - 04COLOMBO1632

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001632 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2014 
TAGS: PTER, PGOV, PREL, CE, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA:  TIGERS HEARING A TOUGHER LINE 
 
Classified By: AMB. JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD.  REASON:  1.4 (B,D). 
 
1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  Norwegian Ambassador Brattskar delivered 
an unambiguous message to Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) political chief Thamilchelvan:  Tiger violence is 
jeopardizing the peace process, undermining the Norwegians' 
credibility as facilitators, and angering the international 
community.  Ambassador Lunstead  underscored the same message 
to a visiting delegation of pro-LTTE MPs.  While it is always 
difficult to tell how faithfully these unpleasant messages 
are conveyed to the Tiger leadership, the chorus of voices 
from the international community is getting too loud for the 
LTTE to ignore.  End summary. 
 
2.  (C) NORWEGIANS TALK TOUGH:  Norwegian Ambassador Hans 
Brattskar September 29 described to Co-Chair Chiefs of 
Mission (US, Netherlands, Japan, EU) his discussion the 
previous evening with Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
Political Chief Thamilchelvan. (Thamilchelvan was in Colombo 
departing for Europe with the LTTE delegation heading to 
Switzerland for consultations with Tamil diaspora figures and 
visits to European capitals.) Brattsker said he had decided 
to talk to Thamilchelvan "only about political killings" in 
order to give an impact to his comments.  The talks, he said, 
"started pleasant, but ended strained." 
 
3.  (C) Brattskar told Thamilchelvan that the LTTE needed to 
consider three points regarding the recent spate of political 
killings of LTTE opponents:  a)  the influence on the peace 
process; b) the effect on the perception of the LTTE in the 
outside world; and 
c) the effect on the roles of Norway and the Sri Lanka 
Monitoring Mission (SLMM).   On the first point, Brattskar 
told Thamilchelvan the violence was causing difficulties in 
the South and was encouraging sub-groups to become active. On 
the second, the image of the L:TTE around the world was 
suffering. Brattskar drew Thamilchelvan's attention to a 
recent move by some Danish opposition parties to have the 
Tigers declared a terrorist organization.  Brattskar also 
told him that it was increasingly difficult for the 
Norwegains to arrange meetings for the LTTE delegation with 
foreign governments, and that the group should be prepared to 
receive some strong messages. Finally, the violence was 
making life difficult for the Norwegians and the SLMM. (See 
below for details.) The two parties--the Government of Sri 
Lanka (GSL) and the LTTE--had given defined roles to Norway 
and the SLMM in the Cease Fire Agreement. The Tigers were not 
respecting that agreement and making it impossible for the 
Norwegians and the SLMM to carry out their work. 
 
4.  (C) Thamilchelvan seemed "taken aback" and had little to 
say in response to his, according to Brattskar. He feebly 
tried to blame some of the violence on activities of the 
Eelam People's Democratic Party (EPDP), but Brattskar told 
him that the general perception was that the LTTE was seen as 
responsible for the great majority of the violence. 
 
5.  (C) Brattskar told COM's that Norway would not go public 
with this criticism, since they had to preserve openness with 
the LTTE.  He said that he had also told Thamilchelvan that 
the Norwegians would like to meet with LTTE supremo 
Prabhakaran. Acknowledging that this might not be possible 
for security reasons, he made the point that what he had said 
should be transmitted to Prabhakaran. He told COM's that the 
Government of Norway was considering sending a letter to 
Prabhakaran to ensure that he received the message. He said 
the LTTE group intended to travel to Oslo, Helsinki, Berlin, 
Vienna, Dublin, Copenhagen and the Hague after their Geneva 
meeting. 
 
6. (U) Brattskar had discussed with Ambassador the day 
before, and repeated for group, his continuing troubles with 
the EPDP. (EPDP was a Tamil insurgent group which joined the 
political process in the late 1980's. Its leader, Douglas 
Devananda, is a leading Tamil opponent of the LTTE, and is a 
Minister in the ruling UPFA government. He was the target of 
the LTTE suicide bomb attempt in July.) EPDP members have 
been the victims in a number of recent LTTE assassinations. 
After the most recent assassination, EPDP members staged an 
almost-hysterical demonstration in front of the Norwegian 
Embassy, placing the coffin of the most recent EPDP victim in 
front of the Embassy gates, where it remained for several 
hours.  Devananda also sent a letter to Brattskar (a copy of 
which he sent to Ambassador), in which he accused Norway and 
the SLMM of "turning a blind eye to the terrorism of the 
LTTE," and concluding that Norway and the SLMM "must give 
assurances that such political killings by the LTTE would not 
be permitted in the future. Otherwise the consequences would 
be dire." Devananda had made similar comments to the local 
press. 
 
7.  (C) Brattskar said he had spoken to Devananda and told 
him the atmosphere which he was whipping up was dangerous and 
that the last sentence in his letter seemed to be a threat. 
He also questioned how a member of the ruling Government 
would issue statements at odds with the official government 
position. Devananda (who is as weaselly as they come) 
admitted that the Norwegians/SLMM had no ability to enforce 
the ceasefire or prevent the killings.  He claimed that he 
had not intended to threaten anyone. Finally, he said that he 
had spoken as the leader of the EPDP, not as a member of the 
Government.  Brattskar also called Foreign Secretary 
Palihakkara to complain. Palihakkara was rather dismissive of 
the issue, stating that Devananda was under severe pressure 
from within his party. Ambassador met Palihakkara on the 
evening of September 29 and stressed to him that we also saw 
this as a serious issue, and that implied threats to 
diplomats and supporters of the peace process were extremely 
disturbing. Paliihakkara seemed to take the matter more 
seriously, and said that the Government was trying to put 
some pressure on Devananda to tone down his rhetoric. 
Devananda subsequently sent a follow-on letter to Brattskar, 
stating that his mention of "dire consequences" in his first 
letter referred to the danger to the peace process if the 
Norwegians/SLMM did not "take effective measure to put an end 
to the killings by the LTTE." 
 
8.  (C) TNA MEETS THE AMBASSADOR:  On September 30 the 
Ambassador met with Tamil National Alliance (TNA) 
representatives Joseph Pararajahsingham, Gajendrakumar 
Ponnambalam and S. Gajendran.  (Note:  The pro-LTTE TNA holds 
22 seats in Parliament.  Ponnambalam and Gajendran are MPs 
from Jaffna; Pararajahsingham is a National List MP from 
Batticaloa.)  The TNA representatives blamed President 
Chandrika Kumaratunga for the stalled peace process, claiming 
that her preoccupation with her own political future was 
diverting her attention from the peace process.  The MPs 
recited their familiar, if factitious, mantra of the LTTE 
having already demonstrated sufficient flexibility by 
declaring itself ready to come back to the table as soon as 
the President announces she accepts its proposal for an 
interim administration as the basis for resumed dialogue. 
All other problems, including the violence in the East, will 
subside as soon as talks recommence, they claimed.  While not 
denying that political assassinations continue, the MPs 
lamented "uneven" criticism from the international community, 
which, they claimed, castigated LTTE violence while turning a 
blind eye to purported GSL complicity in EPDP-orchestrated 
killings.   The international community, including the U.S., 
should put pressure on the President to resume dialogue as 
soon as possible, they concluded. 
 
9.  (C)  Everyone agrees that dialogue should resume, the 
Ambassador replied; that has consistently been the USG 
position, both in its public statements and in its private 
dealings with the GSL at the highest levels.  Both sides need 
to be flexible and work to create a conducive environment for 
talks, he said, adding that some of the LTTE's recent public 
pronouncements have been particularly unhelpful.   For 
example, the LTTE has not done enough to dispel the popular 
perception in the south that the Tigers refuse to consider 
any GSL counter-proposals for an interim administration--that 
their "proposal" for the Interim Self-Governing Authority 
(ISGA) is essentially an ultimatum.  While President 
Kumaratunga's personal commitment to the peace process does 
not seem to be in doubt, she is politically hobbled by her 
dependence on the Sinhalese nationalist Janatha Vimukti 
Peramuna (JVP), he noted.   Realizing that, the LTTE should 
be willing to give her a little political maneuvering room by 
being more visibly flexible on the ISGA and by ceasing 
violence, he said. 
 
10.  (C)  The LTTE's continued campaign of political 
assassinations is absolutely unacceptable and is 
jeoopardizing the entire peace process, the Ambassador 
stressed.  The Tigers' persistent violence raises real doubts 
about their legitimacy as a negotiating partner on a par with 
the GSL, as well as their ability to run any administration 
in a just manner, he warned.  "How can we accept the Tigers 
as the head of an (interim) administration when their method 
of dealing with political opponents is to murder them?" he 
asked.   Moreover, he emphasized, child recruitment and other 
human rights violations by the LTTE persist.  The Tigers will 
remain on the Foreign Terrorist Organizations list as long as 
they continue terrorist tactics like the July 7 suicide 
bombing, he reiterated.  Only once they renounce violence in 
word and deed can they begin to enter the political 
mainstream. 
 
11.  (C)  THE GSL VIEW:  Presidential advisor Mano Tittawella 
told DCM September 30 that President Kumaratunga remains very 
interested in getting back to the peace table as soon as 
possible.  Mano said he had communicated this indirectly to 
LTTE political chief Thamilchelvan while he was in Colombo 
this week enroute to Europe.  Tittawella noted, however, that 
the President is hesitant to make a bold announcement or take 
a bold step since she is not convinced that the LTTE is ready 
to resume.  Thus, Tittawella commented, "She does not want to 
get everything lined up on this, get the JVP on board and all 
that, and then have the LTTE decide it's not ready.  She 
needs a green light from the Wanni (LTTE headquarters)." 
 
 
12.  (C)  Comment:  The LTTE appears to believe that it can 
get away with systematically violating the ceasefire--and 
eliminate its remaining political opposition along the 
way--because the peace process is too important to the 
international community and the GSL for them to jeopardize by 
complaining too vigorously about LTTE assassinations. 
Brattskar's frank words, coupled with the Ambassador's own 
tough message, should put the Tigers on notice that they are 
gravely miscalculating if this is their assumption.  We will 
continue to urge our colleagues in the diplomatic community 
to reinforce this message. 
LUNSTEAD