US embassy cable - 04ANKARA5587

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 005587 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PLEASE PASS TO EUR/SE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2029 
TAGS: PREL, MARR, MASS, OVIP, PGOV, MOPS, TU 
SUBJECT: DASD BRZEZINSKI'S SEPTEMBER 22 MEETING WITH 
TURKISH DCHOD BASBUG 
 
REF: ANKARA 5266 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Eric Edelman, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (S) Summary: In a wide-ranging discussion on the 
U.S.-Turkish security cooperation relationship during their 
September 22 meeting, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 
(DASD) Ian Brzezinski and Deputy Chief of Turkish General 
Staff (DCHOD) Ilken Basbug agreed on the need to elevate the 
level of our bilateral dialogue and to move beyond recent 
strains over Iraq to strengthen our traditionally close 
relationship.  DCHOD Basbug confirmed Turkey's acceptance of 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) VII command 
responsibilities in Afghanistan and expressed a open mind 
regarding the potential unification of Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF) and ISAF.  Basbug registered the GoT's 
unhappiness with U.S. handling of recent U.S. military action 
in Talafar, Iraq and raised concern over a perceived Kurdish 
effort to change the demographics of Kirkuk.  Regarding the 
U.S. request to establish a Cargo Hub at Incirlik Air Base, 
Basbug said that TGS had submitted its response to the 
government and was awaiting an answer.  He also noted that 
TGS was ready to discuss the U.S. proposal for weapons 
deployment training.  Basbug complained that USG restrictions 
on the transfer of military technology hampered military 
purchases and said that the tenders for attack helicopters, 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and main battle tanks, which 
were canceled in May, would be re-issued. End Summary. 
 
2. (U) Additional participants in the meeting included 
Ambassador Eric Edelman, Chief of the Office of Defense 
Cooperation MG Peter Sutton, OSD Turkey Desk Officer Lisa 
Heald, Embassy Deputy Pol-Mil Counselor Maggie Nardi, Turkish 
J-5 Strategy Division Chief, MG Cengiz Arslan. 
 
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STRENGTHENING THE STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP 
--------------------------------------- 
 
3. (C) DCHOD Basbug shared DASD Brzezinski's view that our 
two countries should elevate the level of our bilateral 
dialogue beyond discussions of day-to-day issues, to develop 
a strategic partnership on issues of mutual importance based 
on our shared values and goals.  He added that Turkey was 
open to re-negotiation of the DECA if the U.S. desired, but 
had no specific interest in doing so.  DASD responded that 
DECA reform wasn't needed as much as stimulating U.S. and 
Turkish companies to get together.  The U.S. had facilitated 
the EXIM Bank and IMF loans and reinvigorated the Defense 
Industry Cooperation (DIC) process.  The American Turkish 
Council (ATC)-sponsored conference on September 28-29 was 
also a good step in the right direction. 
 
4. (C) Noting that it took five years to negotiate one side 
letter to the DECA, DASD stated that one should define what 
objectives were to be served before beginning negotiations on 
the DECA.  He added that U.S.-Turkish cooperation extended 
beyond the confines of DECA and NATO and that previous 
dialogue on a DECA had been unproductive and divisive.  It 
would be best to avoid this issue if we can move forward on 
other issues.  This could include joint exercises and 
training, Turkish efforts within the Middle East Peace 
Process (MEPP) and a GoT response to the U.S. request to 
establish a Cargo Hub at Incirlik and to the question raised 
by PM Assistant Secretary Lincoln Bloomfield and Hoehn in 
June (Note: Whether the GoT would consider a request to 
permanently station 48 F-16s at Incirlik. End Note) would 
expand our ties and comprise a partnership.  Basbug confirmed 
his agreement. 
 
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INCIRLIK 
-------- 
 
5. (S) DCHOD Basbug noted two outstanding U.S. requests that 
required a GoT response.  He said TGS had submitted its 
response to the government on the Cargo Hub request and was 
awaiting an answer.  On Weapons Training Deployment, Basbug 
said that TGS was ready to begin talks at U.S. convenience. 
Despite a prompting, Basbug did not comment on the 
Bloomfield/Hoehn question whether Turkey would consider a 
proposal to permanently base F-16s at Incirlik if such a 
request was to be made. 
 
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AFGHANISTAN 
----------- 
6. (C) Basbug confirmed GoT plans to assume command of ISAF 
VII in February 2005.  He emphasized that Turkey would not be 
able to stay beyond August, when its six month commitment 
would end.  In response to a question on Turkey's view of the 
potential for unifying OEF and ISAF, Basbug claimed no 
particular position.  In his view the question was command of 
the unified structure.  He wondered if NATO would have the 
resources or interest to take on this responsibility.  DASD 
inquired how Turkey would adjust its Rules of Engagement for 
the ISAF VII command, noting Turkish caveats on the use of 
force outside of Turkey's AoR and prohibitions against 
engaging in crowd control.  Basbug recognized this issue and 
agreed that Turkey's constraints needed to be considered. 
 
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IRAQ 
---- 
 
7. (C) Basbug stated that, as a neighboring country and a 
U.S. ally, Turkey wanted the coalition effort to be 
successful, but added that both U.S. interventions in Iraq 
had had a devastating impact on Turkey.  He raised a host of 
issues on Iraq: 
 
8. (S) Talafar: Basbug complained that the Turkish LNO chief 
assigned to Mosul had been unable to tour Talafar until 
September 9 or 10, after the operation had ended.  Up until 
that time, TGS was unaware of the action taking place and 
unable to make an adequate assessment of the situation.  Even 
now, he said, he still didn't know the true number of 
casualties.  In Basbug's opinion, while the military didn't 
question the operation, the U.S. handling of it created 
negative feelings within the Turkish military, which was 
working hard not to let the situation affect our bilateral 
relationship.  The Military had to take into account public 
sensitivities to the concerns of Turkmen, who comprised 80-90 
pct. of the Talafar population.  Basbug expressed discomfort 
with the misstatements in the press that implied Turkish 
awareness of the operation before it took place and therefore 
Turkish participation in the action.  Ambassador Edelman 
reminded Basbug of the Embassy's actions to correct the press 
reporting and enumerated the steps taken by the Embassy to 
advise the USG at every level of the GoT's concerns, and to 
provide the GoT with up-to-date information, including 
satellite imagery.  DASD Brzezinski said that GoT concerns 
about the Turkmen population were foremost on the USG mind 
and that particular care was taken during the operation.  He 
underscored that GoT statements about the indiscriminate use 
of force were unhelpful and that inaccurate GoT statements to 
the press only fueled public outrage. 
9. (S) Kirkuk: Basbug called Kirkuk the real issue in 
northern Iraq.  He characterized Kirkuk as very volatile, "an 
explosive bomb" with the potential to become the Kosovo of 
Iraq.  Basbug underlined that the "special status" of Kirkuk 
should be maintained and noted that contradictions in the 
Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) confused the situation. 
 While the TAL linked Kirkuk to the central government, one 
particular article calls for a decision on Kirkuk's status to 
be made in the future while another said the current status 
should be maintained.  Noting the census scheduled to be 
conducted in November, Basbug suggested that Kurds were 
making a concerted effort to shift the demographics of Kirkuk 
back to its pre-Saddam status, before Arabs were forcibly 
moved into the city and Kurds expelled.  According to Basbug, 
around 2,000 Kurdish families were forced to leave Kirkuk in 
the late 1950's, but recently 14,000 Kurdish families have 
moved in, suggesting this was an attempt to register an 
increased Kurkish population in the census.  At the same 
time, the cancellation of the property rights law meant that 
anyone with Iraqi citizenship could make a property claim, 
which would facilitate the perceived Kurdish resettlement 
effort.  At the same time, he claimed that almost 50 thousand 
Arabs have left Kirkuk since spring 2004.  Basbug recommended 
following the last census taken in  using the demographic 
numbers contained in the last census taken in 1957.  He 
warned that anything serious that transpired in Kirkuk would 
impact the rest of the country and that the U.S. was the only 
country that could keep an eye on the situation. 
 
10. (S) Turkish Truck Drivers: According to TGS accounts, 80 
Turks have been kidnapped, of which 29 had lost their lives. 
Turkey had the highest number of citizens abducted.  He 
asserted that he did not want the information to become 
public as it would have a devastating impact.  He urged 
special measures to protect drivers traveling south from 
Mosul.  Ambassador outlined USG proposed measures for 
increased contact between the Interim Iraqi Government (IIG), 
the Iraqi military, U.S. military and private companies. 
 
11. (C) Iraqi National Army:  Basbug said that, according to 
TGS information, 35-40 pct. of the INA is comprised of Kurds. 
 The entire population should be proportionally represented. 
An imbalance today could create problems for tomorrow. 
 
12. (S) Iranian Activity:  Basbug said he was unsure about 
the level of Iranian activity in Iraq.  He had read that a 
150-person VIP assassination team may have official Iranian 
backing, and thought that individual Iranians could be among 
the insurgents.  In response to DASD's question regarding 
Turkish pressure to discourage Iran from engaging in Iraq, 
Basbug was ambiguous. 
 
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TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
------------------- 
 
13. (C) Basbug expressed frustration with the restrictions on 
the transfer of U.S. technology.  Limitations on the use of 
such technology after a project was completed often denies 
Turkey full potential benefit out of its investment.  Basbug 
added that, despite repeated requests, U.S. companies have 
not provided line item costs for technology inputs, making it 
difficult for TGS to make the necessary cost/benefit 
comparison.  Turning to the canceled attack helicopter 
tender, Basbug noted the Turkish request for mission computer 
source codes.  He questioned the value of having the source 
codes if they could not be incorporated into new products. 
Turkey would like to build onto U.S. technology in order to 
advance other projects.  Basbug said Turkish needs for the 
attack helicopters, as well as the main battle tanks and UAVs 
remained and that a new tender, with different terms, would 
be issued, possibly this year.  He was unsure whether U.S. 
companies would participate given the certification and 
guarantee requirements that will be requested.  DASD stated 
that the cancellation of the three contracts in May was 
frustrating.  If Turkey had engaged in more consultation with 
the U.S. the process may not have been so drawn out or the 
cancellation such a surprise. 
 
14. (U) This cable was cleared by Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of Defense Ian Brzezinski. 
EDELMAN