US embassy cable - 04BRUSSELS4144

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 004144 
 
SIPDIS 
 
EUR FOR PDAS BRADTKE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/28/2014 
TAGS: MOPS, MARR, PREL, BK, NATO, EUN, USEU BRUSSELS 
SUBJECT: EUMS THOUGHTS ON REMAINING SFOR HANDOVER ISSUES 
 
REF: STATE 195305 
 
Classified By: Political-Military Officer Jeremy Brenner for reasons 1. 
5 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (C)  Summary: Some issues related to the end of SFOR and 
the beginning of Operation Althea remain to be resolved, but 
planners in HR Solana's secretariat are confident that the 
transfer will go smoothly. The transfer date has been largely 
resolved among commanders on the ground, but the EU political 
decision-making apparatus must still agree to a December 1 
date. The designation of DSACEUR as the successor to 
COMIFOR's final authority under Dayton is a more significant 
sticking point. EUR PDAS Bradtke raised many of these issues 
with the PSC Troika September 27. (See Septel.) End summary. 
 
2. (C) Mission polmiloff recently spoke with Didier Lenoir, a 
defense policy planner on the Military Staff within CFSP High 
Representative Solana's Secretariat General.  We raised the 
outstanding SFOR handover issues contained in reftel in order 
to gauge the latest thinking on the Military Staff.  We found 
areas of agreement in principle, and subjects that may 
require further discussion. 
 
Date of Handover 
---------------- 
3. (C) Lenoir reiterated what he has told us previously 
concerning the date of the Transfer of Authority. The PSC, in 
its early political discussions of the mission, has been 
using December 16 as the target date for the TOA.  This is an 
unofficial date, since Operation Althea will only take place 
following a high-level decision to launch the mission. The 
date will be set at that time.  As a practical matter, the EU 
planners understand the U.S. requirements regarding the 
scheduling of withdrawal of its forces, and on the ground, 
there is a recognition that the U.S. withdrawal will be 
phased.  Lenoir said there are a number of ways to resolve 
the discrepancy in working dates, but that the resolution 
must be arrived at in discussions between NATO and the EU, 
not on a bilateral basis.  He said the PSC could opt to adopt 
an earlier date, the EU and NATO could agree that there would 
be a two week lapse in coverage in Task Force North, or the 
Finns could agree to operate under NATO for those two weeks 
until the TOA. In any event, he did not anticipate any 
problem in reaching an understanding and observed that on the 
military side, things will be largely in place by December 1. 
 
SOFA 
---- 
4. (C) Lenoir had just received a paper from his legal 
services on the issue of whether or not a new SOFA would be 
needed for the new mission.  The paper was inconclusive, and 
Lenoir said there remained two schools of thought on the 
subject within the EU. The first school, headed up by the UK, 
holds that there is no need -- or desire -- for a new SOFA. 
The second school argues that under the rubric of increasing 
Bosnian "ownership" of its own affairs, discussion, and 
perhaps renegotiation of a SOFA is desirable.  Lenoir's 
conclusion was that the SOFA would be the product of 
consultations rather than imposition even if its terms 
remained unchanged. 
 
COMIFOR 
------- 
5. (C)  Lenoir agreed completely on the need for a 
coordination mechanism to manage potential areas of 
overlapping or unclear responsibilities between the NATO HQ 
and EUFOR. He said he has been making precisely such an 
argument since planning began for the Althea mission.  He 
declined to endorse DSACEUR as the appropriate mechanism, 
arguing that such an arrangement created the impression that 
EU forces were somehow being "chopped to NATO."  Still, he 
insisted that there is a need to find a way for NATO to call 
upon EUFOR for assistance or support if needed.  The issue of 
who will exercise the overarching authority ascribed to 
COMIFOR is one of the difficult questions that Lenoir said 
have been "kicked down the road" by EU political 
decisionmakers. 
 
Reserves 
-------- 
6. (C)  The EU planner was adamant that ambiguity in the 
decision chain for deploying reserves was "no way to plan a 
military operation." He agreed with the U.S. call for 
agreement on the procedures between NATO and the EU, even 
though difficult discussions might ensue.  (Note: Other more 
senior officials, such as DG Robert Cooper, express comfort 
with the ambiguity and "parallel decision-making."  End Note) 
 
POLAD and UNSCR 
--------------- 
7. (C) After conferring with colleagues, Lenoir assured us 
that Bruce Maclean's nomination as POLAD to NATO HQ in 
Sarajevo would be welcome. High Representative Ashdown looks 
forward to working with Maclean again we were told. On the 
issue of an exchange of letters between NATO and the EU to 
codify arrangements established by a new UNSCR, Lenoir 
expressed his personal view that such an exchange would be 
unnecessary, but if it were needed for political reasons, he 
saw no disadvantage. 
 
McKinley