US embassy cable - 04DJIBOUTI1250

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IMPACT OF AHMED DINI'S DEATH ON DJIBOUTIAN POLITICS

Identifier: 04DJIBOUTI1250
Wikileaks: View 04DJIBOUTI1250 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Djibouti
Created: 2004-09-27 12:07:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PGOV DJ
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DJIBOUTI 001250 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, DJ 
SUBJECT: IMPACT OF AHMED DINI'S DEATH ON DJIBOUTIAN POLITICS 
 
REF: DJIBOUTI 1196 
 
Classified By: Pol/Econ Erinn C. Reed for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (U) Summary: The death of Ahmed Dini Ahmed on September 
12, figurehead of the political opposition coalition Union 
for Democratic Alternance (UAD) and president of the 
Republican Alliance for Democracy (ARD) opposition party, 
will have significant impact on Djibouti's upcoming regional 
and presidential elections, as well as on the future of the 
opposition movement.  The question of who will succeed Dini 
as head of UAD is certain to create contention among the 
opposition, however the official decision will not be made 
until at least after the ARD congress in October. The results 
of this congress will impact opposition approaches to 
upcoming elections. End Summary. 
 
IMPACT ON THE OPPOSITION 
------------------------ 
2. (U) In the January 2003 legislative elections, the UAD won 
36.9 percent of the vote.  This was the most significant gain 
for the opposition since the beginning of Djibouti's 
democratization in 1992. The main factor behind this 
percentage was the union of the opposition behind the 
charismatic leader, Dini, who was effectively the glue 
between the opposition parties.  The looming question is 
whether the next leader of UAD chosen will be Afar or Somali. 
 
 
3. (C) A secondary question that must be asked is: Will the 
opposition coalition hold together or splinter? In theory, 
whoever heads the UAD will be the opposition candidate for 
the presidential elections next spring. In reality, there are 
several paths for the opposition to take. Rumors about town 
suggest that opposition parties MRD (Movement for Democratic 
Renewal) and UDJ (Union for Democracy and Justice) might want 
to break the Afar hold on the lead of the opposition 
coalition. If an opposition member of Somali ethnic origin 
were to be placed as the presidential candidate opposite 
Guelleh, there is a potential for more Somali votes to go to 
the opposition. In this case, the Afar vote will only go to a 
Somali opposition candidate if he has a truly national vision 
and stays far from partisan politics. On the other hand, if 
the Afars maintain their hold on the opposition leadership, 
the ruling parties will depend on the Somali vote to tip the 
scales. In a third scenario, where the opposition presents 
two candidates - one Afar and one Somali, the opposition will 
most likely garner the majority of the Afar votes.  The 
Somali voters in this instance be split along tribal or clan 
lines, which could result in a decrease in the ruling party's 
margin. 
 
4. (C) Dini was the last big name in terms of opposition 
leaders for the Afars. The Afar community will feel a void 
where Dini once sat as there is not yet a credible 
personality that can argue the Afar interests as convincingly 
as did Dini with the ruling Issa majority.  There are other 
candidates but all lack the ease and eloquence of Dini. 
 
WHO'S WHO OF DINI'S HOPEFUL SUCCESSORS 
-------------------------------------- 
5. (C) At the moment, there are two camps vying for 
succession to Dini: those that claimed they fought political 
battles with him during his exile, and Dini's family and 
party cohorts. The most active are Kassim Ahmed Dini, Ahmed 
Dini's son, and Ahmed Youssouf, vice-president of ARD. In 
addition, Mohamed Daoud Chehem, president of PDD (Djiboutian 
Party for Democracy), Kassim Ali Dini, nephew of Ahmed Dini 
and member of ARD, Daher Ahmed Farah, president of MRD, and 
Ismael Guedi Hared, president of UDJ (Democratic Union for 
Justice) are vying for succession. 
 
6. (C) Kassim Ahmed Dini is known to possess great 
determination, however, he is not a likely candidate because 
of his youth and extreme tendencies in arguing for Afar 
interests.  Some feel that Kassim Ahmed is too focused on the 
Afar plight and ignores the other communities. Kassim Ahmed 
is also the editor-in-chief of La Realite, ARD's opposition 
journal. 
 
7. (C) Ahmed Youssouf, former Minister of Port in the late 
80's, is viewed as hot tempered and quick to react. He is the 
more likely candidate than Kassim Ahmed, but projections on 
how well he will do outside the ARD party cannot be made at 
this time. 
 
8. (C) Mohamed Daoud Chehem, is fairly balanced in terms of 
integrity and background. He has not displayed any tribal or 
clan favoritism, nor views that might qualify as extremist. 
Chehem served as Finance Minister from 1987 to 1991 before 
becoming an active leader in the armed rebellion by the FRUD 
party during the civil war in 1991-1993. Chehem announced 
last Monday his candidacy for President of Djibouti in the 
coming elections.  He said that his candidacy only speaks for 
his party and not the entire opposition coalition. Chehem 
stated the priorities of PDD's candidacy in a press release 
to Agence France Press as being "the re-establishment of the 
authority of the State and the introduction of the rule of 
right, the democratization of the public life, the 
installation of an independent justice, the fight against 
corruption and nepotism and the restoration of public 
finances." 
 
9. (C) Daher Ahmed Farah is well-known in the Djiboutian 
political scene.  Farah was arrested several times in 2003 
for comments made against government officials in his party's 
journal (MRD), La Liberte.  Former military turned 
journalist, Farah has no experience in public affairs.  MRD 
is comprised mainly of Issa sub-clan Fourlaba ethnic 
Djiboutians.  The Fourlaba do not have a wide spread base 
throughout Djibouti, so a Fourlaba candidate may not garner 
many votes outside the sub-clan. 
 
10. (C) Ismael Guedi Hared, Issa sub-clan Saad Moussa, was 
known to be very generous towards his sub-clan, but very 
partisan against the other communities during his tenure in 
public office. If chosen as opposition candidate, only his 
sub-clan will be 100 percent supportive. 
 
11. (C) Comment: The key point in a discussion of the impact 
of Dini's death on Djiboutian politics is whether the 
opposition coalition will remain intact or the four parties 
go their own direction. The motivation behind PDD President 
Chehem's declaration of candidacy is a linchpin to 
deciphering this particular mystery.  If Chehem's declaration 
was done in collaboration with and the consent of the other 
three opposition parties, we might safely project that the 
opposition will present an Afar candidate and a Somali 
candidate.  Chehem's press release to AFP indicated that, in 
the event of a second round tie-breaking vote he would defer 
to the opposition candidate who gained the most votes.  This 
could indicate that the other parties were well aware of this 
action.  If the opposite holds, this could indicate that PDD 
is breaking from the coalition but leaving a loophole in case 
of success. 
RAGSDALE 

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