US embassy cable - 04CARACAS3032

C O N F I D E N T I A L  CARACAS 003032 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
NSC FOR CBARTON 
HQSOUTHCOM FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, MOPS, PTER, VE 
SUBJECT: GOV MAKES BORDER AMBUSH LATEST CRISIS 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ABELARDO A. ARIAS FOR 1.4 (D) 
 
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Summary 
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1.  (C)  Five Venezuelan soldiers and an oil worker died on 
September 17 near the Colombian border in an apparent ambush 
by unidentified irregular forces.  Speculation about the 
identity of the attackers includes the range of armed groups 
operating in the area.  President Hugo Chavez deployed 
additional military units to the region and visited the area 
on September 22.  The GOV has exploited the incident to 
criticize the US and Colombia for "warlike policies," to 
rationalize a planned acquisition of Russian helicopters, and 
even to explain Chavez's absence at the UN General Assembly. 
End summary. 
 
2.  (C) An ambush of a PDVSA exploration group by 
unidentified combatants killed six, including a petroleum 
engineer and five military escorts, and wounded two on 
September 17 in Apure State near the Colombian border. 
According to press reports, such attacks have claimed the 
lives of 51 troops since July 1983.  Promising an 
"overwhelming" response to the attackers, President Hugo 
Chavez scrambled troops, helicopters, and fighter jets after 
the incident, according to press and local police.  MILGROUP 
confirmed that a Venezuelan Mirage jet that the press 
reported had crashed on 17 September was returning from the 
region; the pilot survived by ejecting. 
 
3.  (U) Since the attacks, eight more corpses with wounds 
suggesting their recent execution have been found.  The press 
has speculated that six of these victims were members of the 
group responsible for the ambush. 
 
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The Blame Game 
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4.  (U) The Colombian Government quickly cited "reliable 
intelligence" implicating the FARC in the attacks, and 
Colombian Vice President Santos charged that more kidnappings 
occur on Venezuela's side of the border than on Colombia's. 
(Comment:  Santos's comments may not be far off the mark, 
according to a University de los Andes professor, who cited 
weekly death tolls and kidnapping notices in the local press. 
 End comment.) 
 
5.  (U) GOV spokespersons initially mentioned the possible 
involvement of the Bolivarian Liberation Forces (FBL), a 
leftwing Venezuelan armed group loyal to Chavez.  The FBL 
quickly denied any link to the incident with a full-page 
advertisement in the pro-government tabloid "Diario Vea." 
The Apure State police commissioner confirmed that the FBL 
had been clashing with Colombian ELN guerrillas in the area 
for several months.  The national investigative police 
(CICPC) on September 21 accused the FARC 10th front, but the 
CICPC chief in Tachira state claimed the following day that 
the press had misquoted him and that CICPC investigations 
remained inconclusive. 
 
6.  (U) Chavez did not discount the thesis of FARC 
involvement during his September 19 Alo Presidente program 
and warned Colombian guerrillas they would become his enemies 
if they violated Venezuelan sovereignty.  Alluding to the 
FBL, he rejected the support of Venezuelan armed groups and 
urged them to disarm and meet with him at Miraflores. 
 
7.  (C) On a September 22 visit to the border region, Chavez 
bristled at Bogota's "suspicious" quickness to blame the 
FARC.  He charged Colombia to assume its responsibility for 
the incident and mused that the attackers probably had 
returned to Colombian territory.   In an apparent reference 
to Plan Colombia, Chavez faulted the United States' "policy 
of war" for the region's instability.  He also harped on the 
importance of officers maintaining high morale among their 
subordinates and promised greater logistical support as the 
media speculated about the troops' discontent. 
 
8.  (C) Not baited by Chavez's invective, Colombian President 
Uribe the following day publicly expressed confidence that 
Venezuela would work with Colombia to overcome the border 
problem, according to press reports.  Colombian and 
 
Venezuelan foreign affairs ministers, meanwhile, agreed in 
New York to look for new ways to avoid border violence. 
 
      9.  (U) Chavez took advantage of the incident to 
announce he had bought Russian helicopters to protect the 
border from such attacks (SEPTEL).  MVR Deputy Nicolas 
Maduro, hatching an international conspiracy theory, used the 
attack to explain the cancellation of Chavez's September 
20-22 trip to the UN General Assembly in New York. 
 
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Comment 
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10.  (C) After years of allowing guerrillas to operate with 
impunity, Chavez has been forced to focus on the subject only 
in part by the media storm surrounding the Apure killings. 
Blaming Colombia and the US, a hollow effort, momentarily 
masks the true reasons for Chavez's direct involvement in the 
matter.  We suspect, but do not have solid evidence, that the 
incident has shaken the military, and Chavez wants to take no 
chances in letting things get out of control.  In effect, 
Chavez has had to face up to the question of whether his FARC 
policy has now cost the lives of Venezuelan soldiers.  This 
is the second incident in less than a year (the first being 
the burn deaths at Fuerte Mara) where Chavez has intervened 
quickly and personally to calm the military.  The 
government's willingness even to entertain the possibility of 
left-wing guerrilla culpability marks a slight shift in the 
party line. 
Brownfield 
 
 
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      2004CARACA03032 - CONFIDENTIAL