US embassy cable - 04BRUSSELS4107

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 004107 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2014 
TAGS: PREL, UNGA, EUN, USEU BRUSSELS 
SUBJECT: EU IN UN: IO A/S HOLMES IN BRUSSELS 
 
REF: A. A) BRUSSELS 2292 
 
     B. B) STATE 167370 
 
Classified By: USEU POLOFF TODD HUIZINGA, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: In meetings with IO Assistant Secretary Kim 
Holmes on September 15-16, EU officials: 
 
--stressed EU commitment to "effective multilateralism with 
the UN at its core;" 
 
 --continued their push for enhanced status for the European 
Commission (EC) in UN bodies (EU additionality); 
 
--agreed that engaging the EU in the UN before EU positions 
had been decided was difficult but necessary; 
 
--stressed strengthening the African Union (AU) in Darfur; 
 
--were noncommittal on EU next steps in Iraq; 
 
--predicted the EU would agree to UNSC referral of Iran's 
nuclear program if no deal were made by November; 
 
--did not predict whether a WEOG rotation in the UN Human 
Rights Commission (UNCHR) could be worked out. 
 
The EU is determined to increase its influence in the UN -- 
one official's speculation about a future permanent EU UNSC 
seat, although long-range, reflects how far the ambition 
goes.  We must keep engaging the EU on these issues, 
including on additionality, to be sure U.S. interests are 
taken into account.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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The EU, the UN, and "effective multilateralism" 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
2. (C) Robert Cooper, EU Council Director-General for Common 
Foreign and Security Policy, expounded on the essence of EU 
policy toward the UN: "effective multilateralism with the 
United Nations at its core."  A world in which states are 
governed by law is an important EU aspiration, Cooper said, 
adding that, while law is nothing if not backed by power, 
power without law is barbaric.  Given this EU view of the 
world, Cooper said, the UN is key to providing legitimacy for 
international action, even if it is not always the best venue 
"for getting things done."  Here Cooper stressed EU consensus 
on the importance of the UN, noting that it was not just 
something that "idealists" (like Sweden) believed in -- even 
the UK, France, and Germany supported it.  Returning to the 
subject of power, Cooper also noted the occasional necessity 
of "multilateralism with muscle."  He said he expected most 
future EU military operations would be "UN-mandated."  Even 
exceptions to this rule would likely occur under some sort of 
UN context. 
 
3. (C) Holmes noted that "effective multilateralism" had 
originated as a U.S. concept.  He added that the U.S. defined 
"effective" as fulfilling a purpose.  He said it was not the 
process itself that lent legitimacy, but what was being 
accomplished.  Holmes said, and Cooper agreed, that the U.S. 
had done more productive work in the UN than it was often 
given credit for, and that the multilateralist-unilateralist 
debate over Iraq had produced more fog than clarity.  Holmes 
remarked that he had seen an improvement in relations among 
UNSC members, including on Iraq.  Cooper replied that, from 
an EU perspective, the wounds had not yet healed. 
Furthermore, he said, encouraging EU member states to get 
engaged in Iraq when it looked so risky and expensive was 
difficult work.  He added that the current Dutch EU 
presidency was pushing hard to that end, perhaps "harder than 
the market will bear," and that strong divisions remained 
among member states.  On a rational level, he said, everyone 
wanted Iraq to be a success--but politicians, and especially 
heads of state, were not always rational. 
 
4. (C) On the effect of Iraq on transatlantic relations, 
Cooper did not think Europe would ever take a unified stand 
against the U.S.  Cooper said the U.S. could usually find 
numerous EU allies ("at least 10") to support its positions. 
He dismissed the possibility of the EU's becoming a 
"counterweight" to U.S. influence. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Additionality: EC Push Continues, US Stance Clear 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
5. (C) Holmes raised EU additionality (the European 
Commission's push for enhanced status in international 
organizations and UN conferences) in meetings with Fernando 
Valenzuela, Deputy Director-General for External Relations in 
the European Commission (EC), and Christoph Heusgen, Director 
of the EU Council's Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit. 
Valenzuela, who is slated to take up his new appointment as 
EC Ambassador to the UN in New York in early 2005, said 
traditional observer status for the EC in the UN was no 
longer adequate.  While stressing several times that the EC 
did not dispute that voting rights belong only to UN member 
states, he said  "full participant" status (on which he did 
not elaborate) "below the level of voting member" would best 
fit the EC's international weight in areas in which the EC 
shares EU decision-making power with EU member states. 
Valenzuela said he was not pushing for any change in UN rules 
-- he wanted a "pragmatic solution for better results in the 
UN."  Raising the current dispute regarding the World 
Conference on Disaster Reduction (WCDR -- see reftels), 
Valenzuela maintained that EC know-how on dealing with 
international disasters eclipsed that of the EU member 
states, thus pragmatically justifying full WCDR participation 
short of voting. 
6. (C) Holmes explained that, while the U.S. welcomes EC 
expertise and does not want to stifle EU participation in UN 
agencies and conferences, the UN Charter defines the UN as an 
organization made up of member states, with only member 
states having the right to be represented in decision-making. 
 Going beyond that for the EC would pose not only a legal 
problem but also give the EU an unjustified additional voice, 
thus putting the U.S. and other UN member states at a 
disadvantage compared to the EU.  In addition, it would set a 
precedent that would open the way for other regional 
organizations to request similarly advantageous status. 
Holmes emphasized that the issue was not whether the EC could 
contribute its input in EU deliberations but whether a non-UN 
member should have a role in UN decision-making. 
 
7. (C) Expressing a different view than that of the EC and 
Valenzuela, Heusgen said EC status was not a top concern for 
the EU Council.  Heusgen echoed Valenzuela's arguments about 
the EC's "special competence" in many areas, but said that 
when the EU gains a "legal personality" under the new EU 
constitutional treaty, the EU should be represented as one 
unit.  Therefore, he said, this issue should be put off until 
after the treaty enters into force.  (NOTE: if approved by 
voters in the EU member states that are holding referenda and 
ratified by member-state parliaments, the constitutional 
treaty would probably enter into force in early 2007.  END 
NOTE.)  Looking ahead, Heusgen predicted an eventual 
permanent EU UNSC seat, but declined to specify whether this 
would supplement or replace the British and French P-5 seats. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Coordinating with EU Before Positions are Set 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
8. (C) Holmes stressed to Heusgen the U.S. desire to engage 
the EU in international bodies before the EU has decided on 
positions it is unwilling or unable to change.  Heusgen 
agreed that it was difficult for the EU to take outside input 
into account, remarking that it had been hard to coordinate 
among the EU-15 and would be even harder with 25 member 
states.  However, he said, EU positions on most issues were 
now evolving earlier due to the increasing development of 
EU-wide perspectives among member states and better 
member-state coordination.  The establishment of a unified EU 
external relations service under the constitutional treaty 
would enhance this process, he predicted, and make the EU 
much easier to deal with than under the current six-month 
rotating presidencies. 
 
----------------------------- 
Sudan: EU Wants to Bolster AU 
----------------------------- 
 
9. (C) On Darfur, Holmes expressed hope for an agreement at 
the UN on an expanded monitoring force.  Cooper said the EU 
wanted to get the AU to function and to make use of the EU 
military planners waiting in Addis Ababa.  Holmes said 
continued pressure was needed on Khartoum to allow access for 
the international community -- maintaining the threat of 
sanctions was important to keeping the pressure on.  Outside 
the UNSC, the international donor community and NGOs must 
follow through on their commitments to provide needed 
logistical and financial support.  Underscoring the depth of 
U.S. concerns, Holmes summarized a recent State Department 
report in which some 1,700 interviewees painted a 
"devastating" picture.  Heusgen said that the EU Council had 
gotten a mandate from EU FonMins to consider sanctions; a 
working group was examining the matter.  In his view, the 
most important next step would be to increase the number of 
observers -- adding to the 150 observers could do more than 
inserting a poorly trained protection force.  Heusgen added 
that the EU would be happy to help with training, but that 
nothing had been decided. 
 
------------------------ 
EU Noncommittal on Iraq 
------------------------ 
10. (C) USEU PolMinCouns asked for Cooper's views on the 
timeline for elections in Iraq and whether the EU would 
provide any support for the UN protection force.  Cooper 
replied that the EU was "scrambling around" for funding, but 
he thought it would work out in the end.  There had been a 
discussion in the Council about EU funds to support the UN, 
but the Community budget could not legally be used for 
military operations.  External Relations Commissioner Patten 
was casting around for alternatives, but Cooper did not think 
it would be possible to get around this legal prohibition. 
The amount of money--25 million euros, or only one million 
per member state--was so small that Cooper expected the EU to 
find a way to provide the support.  He felt that police 
training would be "on the margins" of what may be possible 
for the EU, however.  The Council Secretariat was interested 
in police or judicial training, but this would require 
member-state backing.  There was also the additional question 
of physical security, Cooper noted.  But his organization was 
continuing to pursue these possibilities. 
 
------------------------------- 
November Turning Point on Iran? 
------------------------------- 
 
11. (C) On Iran, Cooper said that the EU-3 (France, Germany, 
UK) had each briefed him after most meetings with Iranian 
representatives.  Cooper's impression, based on all three 
countries' read-outs, was that they really did want to bring 
the rest of the EU along with their efforts.  Ensuring the 
backing of all 25--which Cooper would continue to work 
toward--would be important in the run-up to what he foresaw 
as "crunch time" later this fall.  If a deal could not be 
worked out with Iran by November, he expected the nuclear 
issue to be referred to the UNSC.  In response to Cooper's 
question about the likely content of a UNSCR, Holmes said 
that an IAEA Board of Governors (BOG) report recommending 
IAEA referral to the UNSC would assume advance support or at 
least non-opposition at the UN from reluctant members (China 
and Russia)-- who would have had to have agreed to the IAEA 
referral.  Meaningful Council action would require more than 
a technical referral; the details of the IAEA referral would 
form the basis for the UNSCR and would outline the areas in 
which Iran needed to take action.  Holmes sketched likely 
next steps, and said that the threat of sanctions would 
probably be the most severe option a UNSCR would contain. 
Judging from his reading of the EU mood, Cooper said that he 
had the impression that November's BOG meeting would be 
different than previous ones, re-emphasizing that "we are 
coming to a crunch."  "But the Iranians are clever at evading 
at the last minute," he noted. 
 
-------------------------------- 
EU Noncommittal on WEOG Rotation 
-------------------------------- 
 
12. (C) Holmes also raised U.S. interest in changing the WEOG 
rotation at the Human Rights Commission.  Explaining that the 
U.S. now accepted remaining off for two years out of 21, it 
was up to other WEOG members to agree to the same 
limitations.  Heusgen did not predict how the EU would 
respond, but did say that there had been lengthy debates when 
reform had come up several years ago.  At that time, 
countries did--after tough discussions--agree to sit out 
terms. 
 
13. (C) COMMENT:  The 25-member-state EU's commitment to 
"effective multilateralism" and to increasing its influence 
in a strengthened UN have considerable implications for U.S. 
ability to pursue its interests multilaterally.  Heusgen's 
speculation about an eventual permanent EU UNSC seat, 
although long-range, reflects how far the EU's ambition may 
go.  We must keep engaging the EU, including on EU 
additionality, to be sure U.S. interests are taken into 
account.  Our persistence is paying off -- Valenzuela's 
approach to Holmes on additionality was more conciliatory 
than EC officials have been in previous meetings, indicating 
the Commission is realizing that U.S. red lines will have to 
be taken into account.  END COMMENT. 
 
14. (U) A/S Holmes has cleared this message. 
 
MCKINLEY