US embassy cable - 04THEHAGUE2448

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 002448 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2024 
TAGS: PREL, TK, NL, EUN 
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/EU/TURKEY:  PM ADVISOR ON ACCESSION 
STRATEGY 
 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR CLIFFORD SOBEL FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D). 
 
1. (S) SUMMARY:  The Dutch PM's chief foreign policy advisor 
(and point man for Turkey during the Dutch presidency) 
believes that Verheugen's report will set the stage for a 
positive EU decision on setting a date for Turkish accession. 
 He anticipates, however, that the decision will contain 
additional elements -- a "to do" list, a "handbrake" 
mechanism, and a front-loaded negotiation schedule -- to 
satisfy European skeptics.  Picking an actual date that 
avoids linkage to national referenda on the EU constitution 
will also be tricky, but July 2005 and January 2006 are 
possibilities.  The U.S. can play a helpful role by 
encouraging the Turks to "play by European rules."  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
2. (S) Rob Swartbol (protect), Dutch Prime Minister 
Balkenende's senior foreign policy advisor, told Ambassador 
Sobel on September 24 that the apparent resolution of the 
Turkish penal code question opened the way for the European 
Commission to recommend in its October 6 report that Turkey 
be given a date for starting accession negotiations. 
Swartbol cautioned, however, that the report was not the last 
word -- getting from the report to a positive European 
Council decision in December would still require a lot of 
hard work from the Dutch presidency.  Swartbol also noted 
that while Verheugen tends to view the Turkey question as a 
"black and white" issue, others involved in the drafting of 
the report are likely to take a more nuanced view. 
 
3. (C) Speaking candidly and "off the record," Swartbol 
predicted that while the Turks would probably get a date in 
December, the Council's decision would also contain three 
unusual elements:  1) a "to do list" of areas where the Turks 
needed to do more work to ensure that legislative decisions 
are properly implemented (he noted torture, religious 
freedom, and minority rights as examples; 2) a "handbrake" 
mechanism that would allow negotiations to be suspended in 
response to Turkish backsliding (he suggested that the 
Commission would have responsibility for monitoring Turkish 
progress in this regard); and 3) a "front loaded" schedule of 
negotiations in which tough issues -- like immigration and 
agriculture policies -- were dealt with early on. 
 
4. (C) Swartbol also noted that countries like France and 
Austria would not accept a Council decision on starting 
negotiations that appeared to prejudge the outcome. 
Therefore, he said, the decision would probably have to 
include language stating that negotiations were beginning 
"with the ultimate goal of Turkish EU membership" or a 
similar formulation.  He acknowledged that the Turks might 
find such language difficult to swallow -- particularly if it 
appeared noticeably different from previous Council 
formulations -- but argued that Ankara should "accept the 
yes."  The Turks, he added, understand perfectly well that 
they are a unique case (in fact, he said, they are proud of 
it), so expectations of exactly equal treatment are 
unrealistic.  At the same time, he stressed that he is 
personally studying the Rome Treaty carefully to find 
precedent language to use when referring to sensitive issues 
such as the "handbrake" mechanism.  Swartbol said that he had 
found language normally used with regard to the question of 
starting negotiations that might also be applicable for 
monitoring ongoing talks. 
 
5. (C) In addition to the issues mentioned above, Swartbol 
suggested that setting the date to begin negotiations would 
be a difficult topic for the EU.  For domestic political 
reasons, he said, none of the states having referenda on the 
EU Constitution want them to occur close to the start of 
Turkish accession negotiations.  Two window he suggested 
might be possible were July, 2005 -- since it fell between 
the spring and fall referenda, and January 2006. 
 
6. (C)  According to Swartbol, the EU would try not to tip 
its hand until very close to the December 17 Council meeting. 
 Negotiations within the EU could well last until the day of 
the Council itself, he added, but the GAERC prior to the 
Council meeting would probably be the key decision point in 
the next few months.  (He noted, however, that the October 1 
meeting between Schroeder and Chirac also bore close watching 
on this issue.)  In response to a question from the 
Ambassador, Swartbol suggested that the U.S. could best help 
the Turks during this period by encouraging Ankara to "play 
by European rules."  He stressed that after the Commission 
report was released in October, the anti-accession movements 
in Europe would become even more energized, and would seek to 
exploit any Turkish missteps.  Swartbol also noted that it 
was important for the U.S. to recognize the delicacy of this 
issue within the EU.  When the October 6 report comes out, 
for example, it would not be helpful for the U.S. to suggest 
that the report forced a decision on the EU; on the other 
hand, statements recognizing that the report provided a good 
basis for the EU to consider the issue would not be unwelcome. 
 
SOBEL