US embassy cable - 04BRASILIA2428

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AMBASSADOR'S CALL ON PRESIDENTIAL FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISOR MARCO AURELIO GARCIA, 17 SEPTEMBER 2004

Identifier: 04BRASILIA2428
Wikileaks: View 04BRASILIA2428 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Brasilia
Created: 2004-09-24 14:10:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PGOV PARM BR Bilateral Relations with the US
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 002428 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PARM, BR, Bilateral Relations with the US 
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S CALL ON PRESIDENTIAL FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
ADVISOR MARCO AURELIO GARCIA, 17 SEPTEMBER 2004 
 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN J. DANILOVICH. REASONS: 1.4 
(B)(D). 
 
(C) 1. In a friendly and animated initial courtesy call by 
Ambassador on 17 September, President Lula da Silva's Senior 
Advisor on International Affairs, Marco Aurelio Garcia, 
reviewed a range of bilateral and international issues. 
Garcia observed that the bilateral relationship is positive 
and sound, characterized by efforts on both sides at "mutual 
understanding" and bolstered by the personal rapport between 
Presidents Bush and Lula.  Other high points of the 
discussion follow: 
 
REGIONAL ISSUES 
 
2. (C) Garcia affirmed his own role in stressing to Lula the 
centrality of South America to Brazil's foreign policy 
agenda.  Specifically, Garcia said GOB priorities in South 
America have included reinforcing Mercosul (which Garcia 
claimed had languished under the previous administration), 
building economic and political stability on the continent 
(Brazil's prominent presence in crisis management in 
Venezuela and Bolivia are examples of this effort), and 
strengthening relations with Chile.  Garcia further said that 
the GOB strategic toolbox for regional stabilization includes 
use of BNDES development bank funding for infrastructure 
projects, import substitution programs to increase Brazilian 
purchases from neighboring countries, and expansion of the 
investment presence in the region of major Brazilian 
industries, notably Petrobras. 
 
3. (C) The Ambassador asked for a readout of Lula's recent 
meeting in Manaus with Venezuelan President Chavez, and for 
Garcia's thoughts on the way forward in Venezuela in the wake 
of the referendum.  Garcia limited his response to the Manaus 
meeting, noting that its central importance was in refocusing 
attention on cooperation in the Amazon region, with new 
emphasis on the Amazon Treaty Organization, which is being 
re-energized and headquartered in Brasilia. 
 
NONPROLIFERATION 
 
4. (C) Ambassador raised the question of Brazilian adherence 
to the IAEA Additional Protocol.   He said that he believes 
the dialogue on nuclear issues between the GOB and IAEA will 
become "calmer" ("mais tranquilo") in coming months.  Garcia 
observed that Brazil's constitution of 1988 expressly 
prohibits national development of nuclear weapons; that 
Brazil's nuclear program is "totally transparent"; and that 
Brazil's regional and international non-proliferation 
credentials are strong (Garcia cited the success of the 
Brazil-Argentina ABACC mechanism for nuclear monitoring and 
confidence measures). 
 
5. (C) For those reasons, Garcia said the GOB believes Brazil 
deserves patience as it works through its concerns toward 
possible AP adherence, and he regretted media commentary that 
sometimes casts Brazil in the same suspicious company as Iran 
and North Korea.  Ambassador replied that no serious analyst 
would place Brazil in such a suspect category, but given the 
continued intense concern about nuclear security, Brazil's 
hesitation on the AP question fuels conspiratorial 
speculation among uninformed commentators. 
 
BRAZIL'S DEVELOPMENT 
 
6. (SBU) In conclusion Garcia opined that Brazil continues to 
face several fundamental challenges on its road to real 
development.  These include: (1) stimulating substantial and 
lasting growth of the economy; (2) encouraging much fairer 
distribution of income; (3) diminishing Brazil's 
vulnerability to external economic shocks; (4) achieving 
lasting macroeconomic stability, and (5) continuing to expand 
and institutionalize democracy.  Garcia opined that managing 
all the challenges effectively will require decades of 
competent and energetic governance. 
 
7. (C)  Comment: Garcia seemed to enjoy our conversation and 
expressed interest in further contact.  He was expansive and 
thoughtful, his academic pedigree from years of teaching and 
study in Brazilian and European universities much in 
evidence.  While Garcia's intellectual influence on Lula's 
foreign policy likely remains strong, speculation earlier in 
Lula's administration that Garcia would dominate foreign 
policy -- even edging out FM Amorim -- does not appear to us 
borne out by events.  While Garcia accompanies Lula on most 
foreign trips, drafts the president's international speeches 
and has undertaken sensitive missions to Bolivia and 
Venezuela, it is not at all apparent that his positions on 
policy are decisive.  Nonetheless, we intend to maintain this 
channel to"the professor" (as he prefers to be called); his 
access to and influence over a president who has also been 
Garcia's close friend for decades make such engagement 
uniquely useful. 
 
Danilovich 

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