US embassy cable - 04RANGOON1268

Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.

RAZALI'S HOPES FOR BURMA MEETINGS IN NEW YORK

Identifier: 04RANGOON1268
Wikileaks: View 04RANGOON1268 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Rangoon
Created: 2004-09-24 10:27:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PGOV BM
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001268 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV; PACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, BM 
SUBJECT: RAZALI'S HOPES FOR BURMA MEETINGS IN NEW YORK 
 
REF: A. RANGOON 914 (RAZALI REP SAYS UNSYG WILL PURSUE 
        BURMA MTG) 
     B. KUALA LUMPUR 3400 (ENVOY PROPOSES CONSULTS IN NY) 
     C. RANGOON 1237 (NEW FOREIGN AFFAIRS TEAM) 
 
Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  According to UN Special Envoy Razali's 
Rangoon-based liaison, broad consultations on the margins of 
the UNGA at the end of September will be a difficult 
undertaking, but are essential in order to achieve a greater 
consensus on "what is absolutely necessary for the (Burmese) 
regime to gain credibility" with their road map.  However, 
the regime's declining regard for a UN or international 
community role means that the New York meetings are unlikely 
to produce meaningful results inside Burma.  Nonetheless, a 
tighter international consensus would be a helpful outcome. 
End Summary. 
 
2. (C) COM and P/E chief met on September 21 with Leon de 
Riedmatten, Rangoon-based liaison for UN Special Envoy 
Razali.  De Riedmatten will join Razali for a round of 
Burma-related meetings in Washington and New York September 
27-October 1.  According to de Riedmatten, Razali has made 
"six or seven" unsuccessful requests to visit Burma since his 
March trip, but the regime has declined "because they have 
nothing to offer and fear subsequent criticism" should Razali 
visit and leave empty-handed. 
 
3. (C) De Riedmatten said that UNSYG Kofi Annan will chair 
consultations on Burma in New York on September 29, in a 
session "restricted to fourteen or so countries," including 
the United States.  Senior UN official Danilo Turk will chair 
a larger Burma session the following day, September 30, as a 
reinvigoration of the International Consultative Group on 
Myanmar (ICGM).  Prior to the New York meetings, de 
Riedmatten said, Razali plans to consult at the Department 
with Deputy Secretary Armitage, EAP A/S Kelly, and others as 
well as officials at the NSC, although he plans to limit his 
time in Washington "in order to avoid drawing too much 
attention to his Burma dialogue with the United States." 
 
4. (C) Although Burma is not invited to the UNSYG-chaired 
meeting, de Riedmatten said the session will be difficult 
because countries in the Southeast Asia region believe their 
participation "will jeopardize relations with the regime." 
De Riedmatten said there were already indications that China, 
which prefers the "safer" Bangkok process, might decline the 
New York invitation. 
 
5. (C) De Riedmatten said that Razali would approach the New 
York meetings as a way to achieve a greater consensus on 
"what is absolutely necessary for the (Burmese) regime to 
gain credibility" with their road map.  He added that it 
would be important for the Western countries and the Asian 
countries to reach some agreement on how to approach the 
regime.  "It will be helpful if the neighborhood agrees on 
the fundamentals," said de Riedmatten, "which Razali can 
bring to the table with the SPDC."  De Riedmatten emphasized 
that, from his and Razali's perspective, the outcome of the 
New York meetings depends entirely on the interest and 
engagement of the international community.  "At the moment, 
Burma is far from a top priority," de Riedmatten said, "but 
we need to pull together" on this issue. 
 
6. (C) The COM observed that the regime will never agree to 
even the most minimal steps necessary for forward movement, 
such as releasing ASSK and allowing the NLD to operate 
freely.  De Riedmatten agreed, and added that the SPDC is 
squarely focused on concluding political arrangements with 
the ethnic cease-fire groups and "has no intention" of giving 
space to the pro-democracy movement. 
 
7. (C) Comment: De Riedmatten has had low expectations for 
several months that the New York meeting(s) will produce 
meaningful results inside Burma (ref A).  The recent 
appointment of two active duty military officers, with 
absolutely no foreign affairs experience, as Foreign Minister 
and Deputy Foreign Minister (ref C) are additional signs of 
the regime's declining regard for a UN or international 
community role in helping to achieve an inclusive political 
dialogue.  However, a tighter international consensus would 
be helpful and perhaps the UNSYG's August 17 statement on 
Burma, criticizing the National Convention process, can 
create a framework for the New York discussions and efforts 
to define what would make a legitimate political transition. 
Martinez 

Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04