US embassy cable - 04HARARE1600

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 001600 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/23/2009 
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, EAID, ZI, MDC 
SUBJECT: MDC SHADOW MINISTER OF JUSTICE RECOUNTS PARTY 
TACTICS, CONSTRAINTS 
 
REF: (A) HARARE 1562 (B) HARARE 1157 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Chris W. Dell under Section 1.5 b/d 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY: In a September 20 discussion with the 
Ambassador and USAID Director, MDC MP and Shadow Minister for 
Justice, Parliamentary and Legal Affairs David Coltart urged 
the USG to exert strong pressure on the international 
community to engage the GOZ meaningfully on its election 
administration.  Dismissing GOZ electoral reforms as largely 
superficial, Coltart maintained that the opposition was 
strongly united in its support for an election boycott should 
conditions not improve.  He reaffirmed the opposition's hope 
that the boycott would yield international condemnation of 
the GOZ's sham election and force the ruling party to the 
negotiating table.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Ruling Party's Lies and Dishonesty 
------------------------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) Over dinner in his parliamentary district of 
Bulawayo, Coltart excoriated the ruling party for "the five 
lies" on which it tried to sell itself to domestic and 
international audiences: (1) the economy is getting better, 
(2) land reform has been a success, (3) ZANU-PF is combating 
corruption, (4) ZANU-PF is invincible, and (5) the MDC is 
dead.  Coltart expressed concern that relentless official 
propaganda was beginning to exact a toll on domestic and 
international audiences.  Growing engagement with the GOZ by 
Canada and Nigeria, for example, signaled their conclusion 
that ZANU-PF was going to win the election regardless of 
international efforts.  He urged the USG to coordinate with 
others, including SADC, to keep the pressure on the GOZ and 
not to re-engage.  In the same vein, he urged the USG to use 
the UN Security Council or UNGA to increase pressure on the 
GOZ.   Coltart predicted that ZANU-PF would not relent in 
repressive trends even after winning a rigged election. 
 
3.  (C) Central to the ruling party,s campaign to legitimize 
its rule was the dishonesty of its "election reforms," which 
Coltart dismissed as superficial.  He acknowledged that 
reducing the voting period from two days to one day was a 
potential boon to the MDC, but maintained that the partisan 
alignment of the new electoral commission and the 
delimitation commission were clear indications of the ruling 
party,s disingenuousness.  He expected the delimitation 
commission to weight redrawn districts heavily in favor of 
rural constituencies in contradiction of the clear urban 
drift of the population.  Recent high-level front-page 
admonitions against violence targeted only intra-party 
violence and were in no way meant to stem violence directed 
against the MDC.    He maintained that the judiciary was 
&completely compromised8 and he had little positive to say 
about the MDC,s experience in running the majority of 
Zimbabwe,s cities in the face of relentless ZANU-PF 
interference. 
 
Best Case Scenario: Forcing Negotiations 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
4.  (C) According to Coltart, the best realistic scenario the 
MDC could hope for under the circumstances was that a massive 
stay-away by voters in March would delegitimize the elections 
sufficiently to provoke resounding condemnation by the 
international community, including regional players.  This 
would force Mugabe to come to the negotiating table.  Coltart 
stressed the likely difficulty of evaluating the fairness of 
the upcoming elections if it were contested, especially in 
view of the isolation and remoteness of many rural 
constituencies.  He urged donors to support local election 
observation efforts with funds for cameras and video 
equipment. 
 
5.  (C) Coltart reported that, although he had initially had 
doubts himself, he now joined in the remarkably united 
consensus within the MDC backing the leadership,s decision 
to boycott the elections.  The decision further burnished the 
party,s credibility with civil society.  Nonetheless, 
limited access to media constrained the party,s ability to 
exploit the boycott and associated issues with the 
electorate.  Coltart predicted that publicized GOZ plans to 
afford the MDC access to the media would stall or yield 
insubstantial access. 
 
Assistance Needed 
----------------------- 
 
6.  (C) Responding to the Ambassador's inquiry on how the USG 
could be helpful, Coltart expressed gratitude for USG 
generosity to democratic forces in Zimbabwe and lamented the 
relative parsimony of others, including the UK.  He urged the 
USG to broaden its support for civil society, singling out 
the Amani Trust, the Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights, the 
Legal Resources Foundation, Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, and 
the Zimbabwe Election Support Network as particularly worthy 
aid recipients. 
 
Comment 
------------ 
 
7.  (C)  One of the MDC's most intellectual and energetic 
interlocutors, Coltart has been hardened by years of human 
rights representation in the courts and bitter legislative 
combat in the Parliament.  He may overestimate the influence 
of international pressure on the ruling party and probably 
sells the judiciary and MDC municipal administration short. 
His strict rejectionist line on GOZ electoral reforms mirrors 
the MDC,s public posture but makes little allowance for the 
potential opportunities or nuance recently articulated by 
Tsvangirai aide, Gandhi Mudzingwa (ref A).   Indeed, the 
 
SIPDIS 
GOZ,s mixed bag of projected electoral reforms - more 
opposition access to official media, sharing of voter rolls, 
one-day voting, high-level public speaking against partisan 
violence - will continue to vex the MDC tactically and may 
require additional adjustments in the party's approach.  For 
now, the opposition leadership will feel obliged to 
accentuate continuing shortcomings and abuses to fuel 
international pressure on the GOZ, even as it tries to 
exploit openings afforded by reforms to energize the 
electorate.  Within the leadership, Coltart's role will 
likely continue to revolve around efforts to stimulate 
international pressure while others engage the ruling party 
and press on the domestic front. 
 
Dell