US embassy cable - 04BOGOTA9699

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 009699 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2014 
TAGS: EAID, MOPS, PINR, SNAR, CO 
SUBJECT: COLOMBIA MILITARY PROGRESS: SLOW BUT STEADY 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Milton K. Drucker for reasons 
1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
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Summary 
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1. (S) The Colombian Military (COLMIL) continues to make 
progress combating illegal armed groups.  The number of 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), National 
Liberation Army (ELN), United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia 
(AUC), and smaller illegal armed group members killed, 
captured, or deserting is on the rise.  COLMIL intelligence 
figures show that all but the AUC have been unable to 
replenish their forces at the same rate they are being lost. 
To replace troop depletions, the FARC and ELN are exhausting 
their strategic reserves of personnel, which the COLMIL 
anticipates could deal both groups a devastating blow in the 
long term.  End Summary. 
 
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Illegal Armed Group Membership Declining Gradually 
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2. (S) In August, the Colombian military (COLMIL) released a 
report outlining its progress against the country's three 
major terrorist organizations -- the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army 
(ELN), and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) 
-- and smaller illegal armed groups.  According to the 
report, in the first seven months of 2004 COLMIL forces 
captured, killed, or received as deserters 3,147 FARC 
insurgents (roughly 24 percent of total combatants), 605 ELN 
insurgents (roughly 16 percent of total combatants), 1,999 
AUC fighters (roughly 15 percent of total combatants), and 67 
insurgents from smaller illegal armed groups (roughly 16 
percent of total combatants).  Despite this apparent 
progress, data from the same period indicates that illegal 
armed groups replenished most of these losses through 
additional recruitment.  Taking replacement rates into 
account, FARC membership declined by only about 6 percent, 
ELN membership by about 3 percent, and smaller groups by 
about 3 percent.  In contrast, the AUC replaced troops faster 
than they were eliminated, growing by about 7 percent.  As 
the number of illegal combatants who desert or are captured 
increases, so does the financial burden on the GOC to 
imprison or reinsert them.  Illegal armed groups, on the 
other hand -- particularly the FARC and ELN -- recruit with 
few financial obligations. 
 
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AUC Growth 
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3. (S) The COLMIL attributes paramilitary expansion to 
aggressive recruitment.  The AUC is boosting its numbers to 
gain leverage in negotiations with the GOC and increasing 
combat operations against the FARC, ELN, and dissident 
paramilitary groups in struggles over lucrative drug 
production territories.  Many new AUC recruits are attracted 
by the potential benefits of a reinsertion program, and 
paramilitary recruiters have succeeded in downplaying the 
dangers of joining by pointing to the COLMIL's focus on the 
FARC in its Plan Patriota Phase IIB operation in southeastern 
Colombia. 
 
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Long-Term Damage to the FARC and ELN 
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4. (S) The COLMIL maintains that the FARC and ELN are 
exhausting their strategic reserves to replenish blocs 
depleted by COLMIL offensives.  FARC reserves include Popular 
and Bolivarian militias that provide logistics, 
communications, and re-supply support, primarily from urban 
areas.  The FARC is replacing casualties and deserters with 
Bolivarian forces, which, unlike the popular militias, have 
some military training.  COLMIL leadership does not believe 
the FARC and ELN have sufficient recruiting and training 
assets to replenish strategic reserve forces at the same rate 
they are depleted, a trend that could deal a devastating blow 
to both groups in the long term.  Although the FARC continues 
to forcibly recruit from the rural population, increased 
security and COLMIL civic action projects have hindered its 
freedom to do so.  The new police presence in municipalities 
that historically lacked a government security presence is 
also eliminating sources of recruitment.   The COLMIL asserts 
that, in contrast with a year ago, the ELN can no longer 
maintain a positive recruitment rate and cannot effectively 
combat AUC or FARC fronts without opportunistic assistance 
from one or the other. 
 
5. (C) The COLMIL continues to aggressively target FARC 
leaders, further weakening the insurgency.  Less experienced 
leaders have replaced skilled mid- and upper-level combat 
commanders, finance chiefs, and general staff members.  Since 
the beginning of the year, the COLMIL has killed the 52nd 
Front Commander, two 22nd Front Deputy Commanders (both 
replacements to previous commanders who were killed in 
action), the 27th Front Finance Chief, the Amazonas Front 
Finance Chief, a Northwestern Bloc General Staff Member, and 
Ricardo Morantes, alias "Pacho Arenas," a member of the 
General Central Staff and son of deceased FARC ideologue 
Jacobo Arenas.  The FARC has lost almost 50 mid-level combat 
leaders and financiers since July 2003.  While the FARC can 
replace the rank-and-file with strategic reserve forces and 
some forced recruitment, the loss of these mid-level combat 
commanders has had a significant adverse impact on the FARC. 
 
 
6. (S) Among the FARC leaders captured this year, three will 
be especially difficult to replace given their longevity, 
experience and organizational knowledge.  General Staff 
member and key financial adviser Ricardo Palmera, alias 
"Simon Trinidad," was captured in Ecuador on January 2.  He 
was a former combat commander in Caribbean Bloc and served as 
one of five designated FARC negotiators and spokesmen during 
peace negotiations with the Pastrana Administration. 
Captured on February 10, the 14th Front's Finance Chief and 
20-year FARC combatant Nayibe Rojas Valderrama alias "Sonia," 
has extensive knowledge of FARC Southern Bloc finances, 
plans, and operations and valuable insight into FARC 
Secretariat plans and intentions, possibly including 
 
SIPDIS 
information about the U.S. hostages.  Her arrest likely 
created a void in the Southern Bloc's operations and 
logistical network.  On August 29, FARC 56th Front Commander 
Jorge Eliecer Jimenez, alias "Geronimo", was captured in 
Casanare Department.  Geronimo is believed responsible for 
the 1999 murders of three American Indian activists and the 
execution of at least 69 Colombian soldiers and a local mayor. 
 
7. (C) We believe COLMIL operations in 2004 have weakened 
FARC and ELN forces, but a continued decline depends on 
sustainability of the military offensive and the ability of 
the GOC to hold territory after it has been cleared of 
illegal armed groups.  The FARC and ELN appear to be trying 
to wait out Government forces, engaging in minimal direct 
combat, and drawing from their strategic reserves to keep 
their principal blocs in operation. 
DRUCKER