US embassy cable - 04ROME3681

UNCLAS  ROME 003681 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
UNCLASSIFIED BUT SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FROM U.S. MISSION IN ROME 
 
STATE FOR IO/EDA AND AFR 
INFO USAID FOR DCHA, OFDA GOTTLIEB AND AFR LAVELLE 
USDA FOR FAS HUGHES 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH/USAID 
BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER 
DAKAR PASS TO BISSAU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID, EAGR, AF, PREF, UN, FAO 
SUBJECT: Exchanging Letters with FAO over Locusts 
 
REF: Rome 3669 
 
1. (SBU) Per reftel, the text of Ambassador Hall's letter 
to FAO DG Diouf on September 16, 2004 follows: 
 
"I am writing to express the United States' concern over 
FAO's response to the locust plague in the Sahel.  While 
I know that other donors share aspects of this concern, 
these views are not shared on their behalf. 
 
As you know, the current desert locust situation 
continues to deteriorate across the Sahel.  Large-scale 
invasions of locusts have infested an estimated two 
million hectares in Mauritania, Mali, Senegal and Niger, 
while swarms have been reported in Burkina Faso, Chad, 
Gambia and Cape Verde.  Though there are no reliable crop 
assessments to date, OCHA and others predict this locust 
plague will have greater devastating effects than the 
last widespread locust plague of 1987  1989.  Action is 
needed now to prevent the situation from worsening. 
 
On Friday, September 10, I chaired a roundtable 
discussion on the crisis, which was attended by members 
of FAO and interested parties from the diplomatic 
community.   Experts from the U.S. and FAO briefed the 
attendees on the current situation, giving a rather 
gloomy prognosis for the region, and called for 
additional donor support.  I seconded that call. 
 
There was also a good and frank discussion among the 
participants of what is going wrong in providing 
assistance to the victims of this infestation.    Had our 
collective response been well organized and targeted from 
the beginning, it is conceivable that the crisis would 
not have reached its present magnitude.  The donor 
countries share part of the blame for our slow collective 
response and contributions to this emergency.  For 
example, we understand that a majority of the funds 
pledged were only recently made available in August and 
September.   The time between pledges and actual 
donations is unfortunately too long and requires 
improvements on our part.  Additionally, the affected 
countries have an essential role to play in responding to 
the crisis. 
 
However, stronger leadership on the part of FAO is 
required over the coming months.  FAO has a global 
mandate, nearly fifty years in existence, to provide 
emergency assistance to countries experiencing 
agricultural crises such as locust infestations.  We hear 
a chorus of concerns from the field that question whether 
that commitment is being fully met.  In examining some of 
the critical recommendations made in an after-action 
review of FAO's role in the last major outbreak of the 
1980s, it troubles us that too many of them still hold 
true.  The major critique then was FAO's slow response to 
the crisis; it remains our worry now. 
 
There are five particular areas of concern that I want to 
highlight from some of the observations and requests that 
we have been receiving from our embassies in the Sahel 
and from the larger donor community. 
 
1) Transparent and timely use of donated funds.  In last 
Friday's roundtable, the Ambassador of one of FAO's major 
donors articulated what we, too, have been hearing from 
various reports: FAO is facing a crisis in confidence in 
response to its handling of the current infestation. 
 
Donors want and need transparency before funding 
decisions are made, yet I am sorry to repeat that we feel 
there has been insufficient transparency in FAO's 
actions.  Donors are now beginning to question whether 
using a multilateral approach  one that is slow in its 
response  is the best and most efficient means to 
mitigate this crisis.  We are still unclear how long the 
process requires from receipt of funds to arrival of 
goods and services in the affected countries.  [In fact, 
it took more than six months for FAO to utilize fully a 
standing emergency grant, during the crucial early stage 
before the appeal was announced in February.] 
 
2) Delay in establishing a coordinating structure or 
process.  Though it is true funds from donors have come 
in late, we believe FAO could have done a much better job 
in organizing itself to confront this crisis.  I am glad 
FAO experts correctly predicted the crisis last October, 
some eleven months ago.    But in anticipation of this 
crisis, little seems to have been done internally, and it 
appears that FAO has employed inadequate means and tools 
to respond to the emergency. 
 
I also question why FAO's ECLO (Emergency Center for 
Locusts Operations) was reconstituted so late in the 
crisis, on August 25.  This coordinating body would have 
helped bridge, much earlier on, the internal gaps among 
technical, operations, and contracting departments.  The 
appointment of one person with overall responsibility for 
overseeing FAO's response could have highlighted 
weaknesses within the organization and resolved them 
earlier on.  Even if the declaration of an ECLO were only 
a formality, an earlier and more timely declaration would 
have been another way of signaling the urgency of the 
crisis. 
 
I urge you to give serious consideration to the idea of 
FAO's setting up a regional operations and coordination 
center in the Sahel.  The center should be established 
within one of the affected countries and staffed by 
technical experts and operations personnel.  Without 
well-planned coordination among countries, donors, and 
organizations, it would be rather difficult to tackle a 
problem that transcends international boundaries. 
 
3) Inadequate staffing in the field.  I understand that 
until the end of August, FAO had just two experts working 
in the region to assist host governments.  From the 
beginning, this small presence generated concerns over 
FAO's commitment and leadership.  While more personnel 
are deploying currently, the cumbersome and time- 
consuming hiring process has delayed this crucial 
component in responding to the emergency.  Many reports 
also indicate that the FAO representatives have not 
responded well to the crisis. 
 
Reports from Mali, Senegal, and Mauritania are that FAO 
has not taken the lead in organizing the locust 
campaigns.  WFP has had to step into the void in Dakar to 
perform donor coordination functions.  At a recent locust 
coordination meeting in Burkina Faso, frustrations also 
surfaced about the role that FAO has played during the 
locust crisis, both in the country and regionally. 
Donors noted that FAO had repeatedly said that it had 
monetary and in-kind contributions, but that it has not 
so far been able to give a good accounting for the 
distribution of these contributions.  The local FAO 
representative could not answer questions as she lacked 
 
even basic information about what had been pledged, 
purchased, and delivered.  Donors across the board have 
been "sorely disappointed" with the performance of FAO's 
offices in Burkina Faso and Mali. In Mali, FAO recently 
fielded an excellent logistics officer to work with the 
government, but he arrived very late and more like him 
are needed. 
 
4) Lack of quick response mechanisms.  When staff from my 
mission inquired why so few experts had been deployed, 
they were told that FAO's personnel practices delayed the 
quick hiring of outside experts.  An emergency response 
unit should have the capability to respond nimbly to 
crises.  In the view of donors and affected countries, 
FAO lacks sufficient quick-response mechanisms.  For 
example, FAO should have a roster of pre-selected experts 
whom it can tap the moment a crisis develops.  FAO should 
have "indefinite quantity" contracts for services, 
supplies, and equipment with a broad range of companies. 
Terms could be revisited on an annual basis or sooner if 
needed.  This would likely have reduced FAO's delivery 
time in purchasing pesticides and leasing sprayer 
aircraft.  At the roundtable discussion, an idea of 
creating a pesticides bank was proposed, something that 
could have merit.  Clearly, innovation is needed. 
 
One consequence of these delays is that donors have had 
to act independently.  In Mali, for example, the U.S. 
Ambassador directed $50,000 in disaster relief funds to 
USAID instead of FAO because FAO had been unable to 
provide any effective response to the crisis there.   In 
five-days time, USAID purchased all the equipment and 
products needed to spray in two of the most severely 
impacted regions: the Gourma and Timbuktu.  When the 
equipment and products arrived in the Gourma, the whole 
town celebrated because no spraying was occurring. 
 
5) Lack of a comprehensive information system.   Another 
criticism common among the donors is the lack of shared 
information.  Information on pledges, recipient 
countries, procurement, etc, was infrequently 
disseminated.  FAO representatives, whether in Rome or in 
the Sahel, often could not answer basic questions about 
FAO's response or the regional perspective. 
 
In fact, we received three different figures for overall 
contributions to FAO as recently as last week.  I 
understood an information system would soon be in place, 
but to date that does not appear to be the case.  FAO 
should have created such a system back in February when 
it started making appeals for funds. 
 
In the past, you and I have had frank discussions about 
the possibility of opening up FAO to an outside 
evaluation or assessment.  This is something I plan to 
continue to pursue.  In addition to that assessment, I 
would like to propose having an outside assessment of 
FAO's response to the desert locust crisis, once we have 
turned the corner.  Its purpose is not to point fingers 
and place blame on individuals or institutions, but to 
make bold recommendations as to how FAO can respond in a 
more nimble way to such crises in the future.  If there 
are bureaucratic and regulatory obstacles that limit 
FAO's ability to respond, then those obstacles should be 
identified and, to the extent possible, they should be 
removed.  We believe there is much to learn from this 
emergency operation.  It is essential that we learn from 
this, given the increase in complex humanitarian 
 
emergencies.  We also need to look closely at the 
recommendations on FAO emergency operations from the 
Independent Evaluation of FAO's Decentralization. 
 
The concerns I have listed above are not contingent on 
the timing of donor contributions.  They are questions of 
basic management and leadership inadequacies that plague 
the delivery of assistance at whatever resource levels. 
 
Much is at stake in the Sahel.  The potential 
ramifications of a large-scale locust infestation on the 
lives and livelihoods in the affected countries are 
grave.  FAO has already warned of severe food insecurity 
if control operations are not increased to combat the 
swarms, which are interrupting the current planting 
season.  The combination of loss of employment and food 
insecurity could lead to rural migration to urban 
centers.  Although the impact of the present locust 
upsurge on malnutrition levels cannot be determined at 
present, many children in the region are already 
suffering from malnutrition, making the potential impact 
life-threatening.  We must work to do better. 
 
I look forward to working with you and your staff to do 
all we can to alleviate this current crisis and improve 
all of our responses for the next time a similar 
emergency occurs.  Accept my best wishes and commitment 
to work together for a world where we accomplish the goal 
of cutting hunger in half." 
 
2. (SBU) The text of DG Diouf's letter in response to 
Ambassador Hall's letter to FAO DG Diouf on September 16, 
2004 follows: 
 
"I have the honour to refer to your letter of 16 
September 2004, in which you raise a number of important 
issues with regard to FAO's handling of the current 
Desert Locust invasion in North-West and West Africa. 
 
I wish to express my sincere appreciation for the keen 
interest in this matter that your concerns demonstrate, 
and for your willingness to support FAO's efforts to 
tackle the crisis and to improve our collective response 
to an extremely worrying situation for the food security 
situation of the affected populations. I had the 
opportunity to address some of the points mentioned in 
your letter during the donors' meeting which I convened 
on Friday, 17 September 2004, at FAO' s headquarters, but 
I am pleased to provide you herewith with additional 
information. 
 
As you rightly point out, action is needed immediately to 
curb the locust invasion before the winter. In this 
regard, however, I would to stress once again that FAO 
did not wait for the situation to deteriorate before 
acting. The Organization issued alerts to the 
international community as early as 17 and 20 October 
2003. The developments and forecast of the crisis led me 
to launch an appeal to several donors, on 23 February. 
The seriousness of the situation was again brought to the 
attention of the donors in a meeting on 10 March. On 8 
April 2004, another donors' meeting was convened at FAO 
which I personally chaired. I also wrote to the Heads of 
State and Government of the countries most affected in 
West Africa (Algeria, Chad, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, 
Morocco, Niger, Senegal, and Tunisia) to stress the need 
for collective and coordinated action in the fight 
against the locust plague. 
 
 
On 7 July 2004, I sent another letter to the Heads of 
State and Government of donor countries to solicit more 
funds. At that time, the financial resources required to 
tackle the Desert Locust invasion were estimated at US$30 
million. Three weeks later, the deterioration of the 
situation made it necessary to revise this estimate, with 
funding requirements ranging between US$58 and US$83 
million, according to the projections of the acreage to 
be treated. Current estimates amount to US$100 million if 
the locust's threat is to be contained before the winter. 
 
As you acknowledge in your letter, despite these repeated 
appeals, very little funds have been received from donors 
in FAO's account and a significant time lag has occurred 
between pledges and actual transfers of funds. As of 14 
September 2004, only US$2 million had been received from 
donors, including US$800 000 from the USA. An additional 
US$2 million from the USA were received on 15 September 
and a further US$ 500 000 on 17 September. On the other 
hand, signed agreements with donors for which funds have 
not yet been received represent, at present, some US$21.7 
million. Taking into consideration the urgency of the 
situation, and despite not being a funding agency, FAO 
has allocated US$5 million of its own resources toward 
the fight against the Desert Locust, in favour of the 
North-Western Region (Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Chad, 
Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Senegal, 
Tunisia) and the Central Region (Eritrea, Sudan and 
Yemen). 
 
It is the time taken in releasing the donors' funds that 
has resulted in delays in delivering the inputs to fight 
the Desert Locust. In this regard, as you point out, FAO 
must respect the rules and regulations which have been 
decided and agreed upon by its Governing Bodies, of which 
donors and affected countries alike are parties. Under 
these rules, the Organization is not authorized to commit 
funds to purchase equipment or supplies, or to recruit 
experts for the operations, if these funds have not been 
received at its bank account. There may be a need to 
revisit these rules and regulations in the light of the 
experience gained from the current emergency locust 
control operations, but such a review would have to be 
decided by the Member States of the Organization. In this 
connection, I welcome your suggestion to conduct in due 
time an evaluation of the response to the crisis, taking 
into due consideration the internal and external factors 
which bear on it. Such an evaluation would certainly shed 
light on both positive and negative outcomes, 
constraints, potential for innovative approaches. 
 
Besides the issues of a lack of resources, I also wish to 
mention that limits imposed by donors for the use of 
their funds can also create constraints for the 
implementation of field activities. Earmarking of funds 
for specific countries, and for the US funding in 
particular, the prohibition to spend funds on pesticides, 
make it necessary to secure resources from other sources 
with no such limitations. In a situation of locusts 
upsurge as is witnessed at present in West and North-West 
Africa, the use of pesticides is essential. While funds 
are also needed to purchase sprayers, vehicles and to pay 
for flying hours for aerial spraying, the bulk of the 
funds are to be spent on pesticides, and financial 
resources must be available for this purpose. To put it 
roughly, for every US $l million provided for spraying 
equipment and vehicles or for every US$1 million provided 
 
for flying hours, an estimated US$3 million are needed to 
procure the corresponding amount of pesticide to be 
sprayed. 
 
With regard to your specific mention of the absence of an 
FAO counterpart in Dakar this summer, I wish to clarify 
that the FAO Representative had, a long time before, 
requested to take the annual leave to which he was 
entitled. In accordance with the normal procedures of the 
United Nations, I myself designated the representative of 
another UN institution (WPP) to ensure the interim 
arrangements. He did not on his own "step into the void 
in Dakar". I brought back the FAO Representative for the 
Ministerial Meeting of CLCPRO members on 31 August 2004 
in Dakar and when the evolution of the situation 
warranted it, I immediately called him back from his 
leave, which he had not even completed. 
 
As to procurement, the issue has not been one of advance 
planning as FAO did conduct advance tenders and market 
research. The issue was confirmation of the timely 
availability of resources as pointed out in your letter. 
 
While I recognize the usefulness of the information that 
your Country Representatives can provide you, I wish to 
point out that I have received a somewhat different 
feedback during the visits that I undertook myself, on 
several occasions, to the countries affected by the 
locust invasion, including, in mid-August, Senegal and 
Mauritania jointly with the President of the African 
Union, H.E. Alpha Oumar Konare, and Burkina Faso early 
September. I also had the opportunity to discuss 
personally with several Heads of State and Government of 
the region and have regular phone contacts with the 
Ministers of Agriculture. These field visits and 
discussions provided me with first-hand knowledge of both 
the damage caused by the locusts' plague and the 
perception, by the countries concerned, of the actions 
taken by FAD and the responsiveness of the FAD 
Representatives. 
 
This being said, I acknowledge the need to improve the 
flow of information between Headquarters and the field, 
and I can assure you that steps have been taken over the 
past weeks to establish a consistent and regular exchange 
of information regarding the planning and conduct of the 
locust fight operations on the ground, and to be shared 
with representatives of donors and the government in the 
country. This is being done through various means of 
communication, including daily phone calls, emails and 
the use of interactive monitoring and implementation 
systems through the Internet. 
 
With respect to staffing, it is demand driven and is 
adapted to the volume of operations. That is why FAO is 
taking further action to strengthen its field staff and, 
more specifically, the Secretariat of the Commission for 
the Control of Desert Locust in the Western Region to 
support further emergency operations. 
 
Once again, I am grateful for your genuine wish to 
improve the response to the Desert Locust crisis so that 
it can be tackled as quickly and as efficiently as 
possible, with the view to protecting food security. I am 
most willing to consider and further discuss with you any 
suggestions that you may have to strengthen the capacity 
of the Organization to tackle the present and other 
similar emergency operations, and that could be brought 
 
to the attention of the Governing Bodies concerned, 
should the need arise. 
 
Accept, Excellency, the assurance of my highest 
consideration." 
 
3. (U) MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. 
Cleverley 
 
 
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	2004ROME03681 - Classification: UNCLASSIFIED