US embassy cable - 04THEHAGUE2415

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 002415 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2014 
TAGS: PREL, TU, NL 
SUBJECT: TURKEY'S EU CANDIDACY AND DUTCH POLITICS 
 
REF: A. THE HAGUE 1290 (NOTAL) 
 
     B. USEU BRUSSELS 4009 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Sobel for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C)  Summary:  The recent defection of one member of 
parliament from the Liberal (VVD) party over the issue of 
Turkish accession to the EU is forcing the Dutch government 
to consider potential domestic repercussions of the Turkish 
EU debate.  So far, PM Balkenende has set the tone of the 
discussion by stressing that a "deal is a deal," and the 
coalition cabinet has demonstrated admirable discipline in 
toeing this line.  As several critical dates approach, 
however, domestic political debate is expected to heat up 
considerably. End Summary. 
 
2.  (C) The debate over Turkey is sharpening as a starting 
date for accession talks looms and opponents speak out. 
Recent think tank and panel reports and a public squabble 
between Liberal MP's in the Netherlands are making it harder 
for Prime Minister Balkenende's government to continue 
framing the issue as a neutral question of logic and fairness 
- "if" Turkey fulfills the political Copenhagen criteria, 
"then" the EU will fulfill its side of the bargain by opening 
negotiations on accession.  This strategy has been inherently 
strengthened by the Dutch government's efforts to portray 
itself as a neutral "honest broker" during the Dutch EU 
presidency. 
 
Domestic Politics in Flux 
------------------------- 
 
3.  (C)  In a major falling out, the VVD (conservative 
liberal party and junior partner in the coalition) recently 
expelled mid-level MP Geert Wilders for his vociferous 
anti-Turkey stance and refusal to toe the party line favoring 
Turkey.  It may have ended his mainstream career, however, 
recent polls suggest he could head a list of parliamentary 
candidates today and capture between four and nine seats in 
the second chamber.  Marnix Krop, Director General for EU 
affairs at the MFA, told the DCM recently that Wilders could 
springboard to prominence by arousing difficult-to-manage 
populist sentiments based on deeply held fears and 
prejudices.  This would repeat the experience of the late Pim 
Fortuyn whose far-right LPF, now in disarray, was founded on 
anti-immigrant feelings. 
 
4. (C) A more immediate concern for the Dutch government is 
the impact the Wilders' affair could have on the ruling 
coalition.  Interestingly, Wilder's challenge appears to have 
pushed the VVD -- traditionally Euro- and Turkey-skeptics -- 
to clarify its position on Turkey in favor of the 
Government's line.  While the cabinet remains united, the 
parties themselves are clearly worried about public 
anti-Turkish accession sentiments.  Following the Wilders' 
debacle, VVD Chief Jozias Van Aartsen publicly stated that 
the VVD "unanimously" supported the Government's position, 
but also left the door open to suggestions that the issue 
could be put to a referendum in the (distant) future.  A 
senior spokesman in the PM's own party confided recently that 
a majority of CDA members would vote against Turkish 
accession if given the opportunity "to vote their 
conscience." 
 
Opinion Makers Lining Up on Both Sides, 
with Public Opinion Still Coalescing 
--------------------------------------- 
 
5.  (C)  The Dutch government has not commented officially on 
any of the recently published think pieces and advisory panel 
reports that have come down on both sides of the Turkey 
question.  They await instead the October 6 Commission 
report, which will "actually have an impact" on EU decision 
making 
 
6.  (C)  At the September 8 presentation of the Ahtisaari 
Commission report in The Hague, European Ambassadors, senior 
diplomats and representatives from academia worried that the 
EU politicians and media have failed in their duty to build a 
solid public case for Turkey.  This is certainly the case in 
the Netherlands, where the leadership's "deal is a deal" 
argument has only limited resonance outside official circles. 
 The recent flap over Turkey's adultery law has not helped. 
Emboffs' recent informal discussions with Dutch colleagues, 
from a range of backgrounds and interests, reveal anger and 
frustration over Turkey.  Worry based on substantive issues 
seems equally matched by anger over being railroaded by 
politicians to accept a preset plan, come what may. 
 
Tie-in to the Constitutional Referenda 
-------------------------------------- 
 
7.  (C)  Several observers, including Krop, noted that Dutch 
voters could punish politicians by rejecting the Treaty of 
Constitution in the tentative March 2005 referendum if they 
feel an unpopular decision on Turkey was foisted upon them. 
If turnout is low -- as it generally is for EU-related votes 
-- then a small, motivated group could influence the result 
and use this "success" as a springboard for broader political 
ambitions.  (This is one of the scenarios some feel Wilders 
may be pursuing.)  The referendum is the first in Dutch 
history and its legal status remains somewhat vague. 
Nevertheless, the government would not be able to ignore an 
expression of public will on a vital issue 
 
The Commission Report 
--------------------- 
8.  (C)  At least until the recent set back of the penal code 
reform in Turkey, Dutch officials privately encouraged us to 
expect a "positive" EU Commission report on October 6.  Dutch 
FM Bot told Ambassador Sobel recently that the "impact 
statement" would be a important element in determining how 
the public approaches Turkish accession talks.  The impact 
statement would address central worries, such as how the EU 
will share structural, agricultural and solidarity benefits 
with Turkey, assuming these programs will look the same then 
as they do now.  Bot noted (based on his discussions with 
Commissioner Verheugen) that the impact statement might 
include some "surprises" that would help make it easier to 
deal with public fears.  On the main report itself, in a 
meeting on September 10 with EUR/ERA Director Peter Chase and 
the DCM, Jaap Werner said the question for the Dutch 
government is not just whether Turkey gets a "yes," but what 
extra "tools are put around it....  No new tests but what 
accompanying measures" to assuage public concerns.  He 
admitted that the EU is not above "temporization, including 
proposing a longer period to negotiate." 
SOBEL