US embassy cable - 04MANAMA1467

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAMA 001467 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2014 
TAGS: PREL, MARR, PGOV, BA 
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR COMBATANT COMMANDER CENTRAL 
COMMAND TRIP TO BAHRAIN 26 SEPTEMBER 2004 
 
Classified by Ambassador William T. Monroe for reasons 1.4 
(B) and (D). 
 
1.  (S) General Abizaid, we look forward to seeing you in 
Bahrain.  We have asked for calls on the King, Crown Prince, 
and the Defense Minister apart from your attendance at the 
Disaster Preparedness Conference.  Since your last visit 
here, the travel warning has been lifted and the DOD Bahrain 
School reopened, and the detention of the four key terrorist 
suspects has been extended into October.  On September 14, 
the United States and Bahrain signed a free trade agreement, 
only the third agreement we have with an Arab country and the 
first in the Gulf.  Bahrainis, both the government and 
private citizens, have been delighted by these events, but 
still apprehensive about the summer events and what they 
might portend.  The King views the NAVCENT presence as 
indispensable and our relationship has remained strong 
despite the departure of the Navy dependents. 
 
2.  (S) Looking to the period ahead, we continue to apply 
pressure to the GOB to make sure that the four terrorism 
suspects remain in jail.  There continues to be uncertainty 
about the future of the Bahrain School and what that means 
for U.S.-Bahraini relations.  Bahrainis worry about the 
future of the Navy presence and the continued departure 
status of Navy dependents.  They have questions about how the 
Naval Support Activity in Bahrain will fit into the overall 
U.S. military presence in the region.  They are aware of the 
global defense posture review, and that the Navy is 
evaluating issues such as the school, the status of 
dependents, and the U.S. military's future footprint in 
Bahrain and the region.  Minister of State for Foreign 
Affairs Mohammed Abdul Ghaffar expressed to the Ambassador 
September 22 his concern that any evaluation of the Navy's 
future in Bahrain should reiterate a commitment to Bahrain, 
and not represent a diminution of the U.S. presence.  The 
events of the summer generated uncertainty among the Bahraini 
government and Bahraini citizens about the strength and 
permanence of our commitment. 
 
3.  (S) Iraq.  The GOB is hopeful we will succeed in 
stabilizing Iraq and restarting its economy.  The Government 
understands the need to establish security in Iraq and fears 
the potential regional impact of any deterioration in the 
situation.  They fear above all massive instability in Iraq 
leading to a hasty American withdrawal and an Iranian-style 
Shia revolutionary government that might influence Bahrain's 
own Shia majority.  The government views the U.S. presence in 
Iraq as absolutely essential to their security.  Crown Prince 
Salman stated in a recent meeting with a visiting Codel that 
the U.S. must remain steadfast in supporting its troops on 
the ground so they can get the job done.  During your 
meetings, officials will be interested to hear your views. 
 
4.(S) Bahrain's Shia majority is satisfied that Saddam is 
gone.  Many Bahrainis outside of government are suspicious of 
American intentions in Iraq, but so far the Government has 
not taken any actions to indicate it feels particularly 
constrained in being publicly supportive of us.  Bahraini 
Shia feel an affinity for their fellow sect members in Iraq 
and are pained by U.S. military actions in Shia areas such as 
Najaf.  They publicly pledge their allegiance to Ayatollah 
Sistani.  At the same time, several Shia leaders have 
publicly condemned all violence in Iraq, whether by coalition 
forces or Iraqi elements.  Specifically, most Bahraini Shia 
do not support Muqtada Al Sadr, and many attribute his rise 
to prominence on his father's reputation and sacrifice. 
 
5.  (C) The GOB and the Iraqi Embassy signed a memorandum of 
understanding September 14 to train 4,000 Iraqis in civil 
defense.  The Bahrainis also have offered technical 
assistance to help rebuild Iraq's banking sector.  The 
Government does not perceive itself as wealthy enough to 
offer financial assistance. 
 
6.  (S) Bilateral Security Ties:  The GOB has accepted the 
departure of the Navy dependents and our desire for a smaller 
footprint, but remain hopeful they will return.  The decision 
to keep the DoDDs school open was very well received. 
However, we need to make a decision as soon as possible 
concerning the future status of the school's administration. 
The continued operation of military operations from the base 
and the presence of NAVCENT headquarters, including the DODEA 
Bahrain School, are ultimate indicators for the GOB of our 
military commitment here.  Should the basing of the Navy here 
ever come into doubt, it will have a significant impact on 
our relationship.  We have a Military Consultative Council 
meeting scheduled for Feb 2005.  This will provide a good 
forum to review our mil-to-mil programs and set a future 
course. 
 
7. (S) Coalition Force Contribution:  The King offered some 
naval support to provide security in the Northern Arabian 
Gulf to Iraq.  However, the GOB still awaits a formal request 
from the IIG before they will deploy their ship(s).  The USN 
has provided an ops/intel brief to the BDF to prepare them 
for the mission and the BDF now has an LNO at NAVCENT HQ. 
The GOB decided not to participate with airpower because they 
did not see a need, and did not offer ground forces in Iraq 
because they have no deployment or sustainment capabilities. 
Further, the GOB have indicated they will need a GCC decision 
supporting ground troops in Iraq before they even consider 
this option. 
 
8. (S) Foreign Military Financing:  Bahrain received USD 
24.85 million FMF grant from the FY04 DoS budget. This now 
brings their FMF total over the past two years to USD 145 
million.  They have used these funds to purchase a TPS 59 
radar (due to arrive late 2006), an infrared countermeasures 
suite for the head of state's new 747-400 (due in 12 months), 
the refurbishment of 14 Cobra helicopters and multiple spare 
cases for all services.  Due to the BDF,s equipment age 
increasing and the growing maintenance costs, the BDF sees 
FMF as an important means to bridge their budget deficits to 
sustain their readiness. 
 
9.  (S) Security: The King and Prime Minister are adamantly 
determined to maintain security for Americans here.  Whenever 
we make requests for extra security at an event, the police 
respond immediately and appropriately.  As you know, of the 
six Bahraini extremists who were re-arrested in mid-July, 
four continue to be held in custody and two of the less 
threatening subjects were released on September 11.    The 
four men still in custody will have another court hearing on 
October 16 regarding the case against them.  The GOB has kept 
us informed on the continuing status of this case.  They have 
committed to working with the USG to establish a 
Counter-Terrorism Operations Center (CTOC) and a 
Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Center (CTIC) along with 
openly accepting specialized training for CTOC operators.  In 
addition the Parliament is expected to consider a 
counter-terrorism law for passage when it reconvenes in 
mid-October.  The law will apply stiff penalties for 
conspiracy to commit terrorist acts. 
 
10. (S) Democratic Development:  Bahrain is a monarchy that 
in 2002 adopted a constitution reinstating a legislative body 
with one elected chamber, the first since the early 1970,s. 
The majority Shia mostly adhered to the call by the Al Wifaq 
Shia political society to boycott the 2002 parliamentary 
elections.  As a result, those Shia present in the elected 
lower house of parliament, the Council of Deputies, do not 
necessarily represent the views of their constituents. 
 
11. (S) During the 2003-04 parliamentary session, the process 
of presenting and passing legislation ground to a halt.  The 
constitution is unclear about whether the government or the 
parliament should take the lead role in proposing 
legislation, and differing interpretations led to a 
constitutional crisis.  In response to protests and a 
petition drive, the government decided to launch a 
constitutional dialogue led by the Minister of Labor and 
Social Affairs with leaders from four opposition political 
societies.  In early September, the oppositionists submitted 
proposed constitutional amendments for the government's 
consideration.  The Minister of Labor announced he would 
present the government's response in early October.  The 
Government is also encouraging the societies that previously 
boycotted elections to participate in the 2006 parliamentary 
elections. 
 
12. (S) Economy:  The United States and Bahrain signed a free 
trade agreement (FTA) on September 14, marking a new level of 
commitment in our bilateral economic relationship.  Bahrain 
is the first country in the Gulf region to have an FTA with 
us, and joins Jordan and Morocco as the only Arab states with 
FTAs.  We hope to use the Bahrain FTA as a springboard to 
promote economic reform, openness, and transparency in the 
region, and as an important step in realizing the President's 
vision of a Middle East Free Trade Area by 2013.  Bahrain 
will cite the FTA as the United States, endorsement of its 
economy and to market Bahrain as a regional center for 
finance, insurance, banking, business services, education, 
and health care. 
 
13. (S) Middle East Peace:  The Bahraini government is deeply 
troubled by the continuing violence in Israel and the 
Palestinian territories.  Though far from the conflict, 
Bahrainis identify with the Palestinians.  The Crown Prince 
has told us that he would like to work with the Israeli 
government, in particular in fending off threats from Iran, 
but he cannot do so in the absence of some sort of settlement 
between Israel and the Palestinians.  The Crown Prince 
appreciates that the President has gone far to promote the 
establishment of an independent, viable Palestinian state, 
but he has asked that the Administration make a gesture to 
relieve the suffering of the Palestinian people.  Flare-ups 
in violence in the territories transfer directly into 
heightened emotions among average Bahrainis. 
 
MONROE