US embassy cable - 04ISTANBUL1459

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISTANBUL 001459 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PGOV, TU, Istanbul 
SUBJECT: THE FUTURE OF ORTHODOXY 
 
REF: A. ISTANBUL 381 
     B. ISTANBUL 843 
     C. ISTANBUL 1279 
     D. ISTANBUL 5141 
     E. VATICAN 2671 
     F. ISTANBUL 1183 
     G. HAVANA 1227 
     H. ISTANBUL 71 
     I. 03 ISTANBUL 760 
 
Classified By: Consul General David Arnett for Reasons 1.4 (b&d) 
 
1. (sbu) Summary: In addition to the struggle to maintain 
Istanbul as a viable seat for the Ecumenical Patriarchate, 
Bartholomew faces a rising challenge for moral and 
ecclesiastical authority within the Orthodox world from 
Moscow-based Russian Patriarch Alexy II.  End Summary. 
 
2. (sbu) Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, the first among 
equals among Orthodox leaders worldwide, faces two challenges 
that, left unresolved, threaten the very future of this 
venerable, 1500-year old institution.  The first is the 
viability of Istanbul as a patriarchal seat.  The Patriarch 
traces his religious authority back to when Istanbul (then 
Constantinople) was the capital of the Eastern Roman Empire 
and Christianity was adopted as the state religion.  Today, 
however, the Patriarch's once-vibrant flock of millions of 
Greek Orthodox has fled (less than 3,000 remain) the 
trappings of its historical legacy, including the Hagia 
Sophia (the physical seat of the Patriarchate for almost a 
millennium but now a museum), and the Halki Seminary (where 
several generations of Orthodox priests were trained), and 
countless other properties have been expropriated or shut 
down.  Patriarchate officials tell us that unless they reopen 
the seminary, regain properties, and break free from the 
burden of Turkish regulations (particularly the requirement 
that the Patriarch be a Turkish citizen), the institution 
will die along with the last dozen or so of its surviving 
septuagenarian Metropolitans (see refs a-d and previous 
cables for reporting on these issues). 
 
3. (sbu) Even assuming that the Patriarch can secure the 
viability of its Istanbul seat, however, Bartholomew faces 
another major challenge from Moscow-based Russian Patriarch 
Alexy II for ecclesiastical authority in the wider Orthodox 
world.  Styling itself as the "Third Rome," Moscow claims 
that it assumed authority within the Orthodox community 
beginning in the 15th century with the fall of 
Constantinople, the Byzantine Empire, and much of the 
Orthodox Balkans to the Ottoman Muslims and the subsequent 
elevation of Metropolitan Job of Moscow to the rank of 
Patriarch.  Although temporarily suspended by the Soviet 
regime's oppression of the Russian Orthodox Church for much 
of the 20th century, the Moscow church's efforts to extend 
its influence beyond its geographic jurisdiction have 
continued unabated.  With abundant sources of income among 
its vibrant community of over 100 million faithful, three 
seminaries in which to train new generations of clergy, and 
open political support from the Russian government, Alexy is 
well-placed to challenge Bartholomew on a number of fronts. 
 
Shot Across the Bow: Estonia 
---------------------------- 
4. (sbu) The first open dispute between Moscow and Istanbul 
in recent years was over Estonia, where 50,000 Orthodox 
Christians, mostly Russians, make their home.  Although the 
Estonian Church had placed itself under the jurisdiction of 
the Istanbul-based Ecumenical Patriarch during its brief 
independence from Russia between 1923 and 1944, Moscow had 
since reasserted its control.  After regaining independence 
in 1991, at the request of Estonian Orthodox activists, and 
with the approval of the Estonian government, Bartholomew 
reasserted his jurisdiction over the Orthodox community and 
installed an Archbishop in 1996.  Alexy, who had previously 
served himself as the Metropolitan for Estonia during the 
later Soviet period, responded by temporarily severing formal 
ties, or in Church parlance, "breaking communion" with 
Bartholomew.  After months of negotiation, both sides agreed 
to allow the Estonians to choose for themselves (most 
parishes chose Bartholomew, but most of the Russian Orthodox 
population remains loyal to Moscow). 
 
Struggle for the Heartland: Ukraine 
----------------------------------- 
5. (sbu) Looming large in comparison to the skirmish for 
influence over Estonia is the impending struggle for the 
loyalty of 40 million Ukrainian Orthodox faithful in Ukraine, 
the original heartland of Eastern Slavic Orthodoxy. 
Ukrainian Orthodox Christians are currently divided.  The 
Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) 
has the most parishes, followed by the Ukrainian Orthodox 
Church of the Kyivan Patriarchate (UOC-KP), and the Ukrainian 
Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC).  Poll sggest, 
howeer, tht most of the population islyal tothe smller 
UOC-KP.  (Note: In addition some 5 million Ukrainians 
identify themselves a members of the Ukrainian Eastern-Rite 
Catholic hurch, a church that is loyal to Pope John Paul II 
in Rome, but continues to maintain Orthodox tradiions (the 
existence of these churches remains a ajor source of 
friction between the Orthodox andCatholic Churches, see refs 
e-f)). 
 
6. (sbu)The UOC-KP and the UAOC have appealed to Bartholomw 
to help unite the fragmented Ukrainian Church ad help it 
obtain independence from Moscow.  Motivated by a combination 
of altruism and a desire to regain authority assumed by 
Moscow in the 17th century (but never recognized by 
Istanbul), Bartholomew has dispatched envoys to mediate 
between the various Churches.  Moscow, meanwhile, is 
reluctant to surrender its authority over a jurisdiction 
which includes as many as a quarter of its total parishes and 
has provided up to two-thirds of its clergy.  Bartholomew's 
point-man on this issue, Metropolitan Meliton of 
Philadelphia, the Secretary of the Holy Synod of the 
Ecumenical Patriarchate, told poloff that the negotiation 
process will likely take years, but that he hopes some 
formula can be found whereby a unified Ukrainian Church is 
granted autocephalous status under Istanbul, perhaps with an 
understanding that Moscow will select or vet the appointments 
of the senior-most clergy. 
 
Orthodox in Havana? 
------------------- 
7. (sbu) The most recent chapter in this ongoing rivalry took 
place far from Moscow and Istanbul earlier this year in 
Havana, Cuba.  In a deliberate snub to his former superpower 
patron, Fidel Castro offered to donate a church to the 
Ecumenical Patriarchate and invited Bartholomew to visit to 
celebrate the occasion.  Despite considerable pressure from 
the U.S. government (and this Consulate) to refuse the 
invitation, Bartholomew told us that his ongoing struggle 
with Alexy for influence in the Orthodox world compelled him 
to accept; if he refused, Castro would simply offer the 
Church to Alexy instead.  Despite the small size of the 
Orthodox community and the likely prospect that Castro would 
seek to manipulate the visit to his own advantage, 
Bartholomew visited in January, spent four days with Castro, 
and gladly accepted the new church (see ref g-h). 
 
Worldwide Battle for Hearts and Souls 
------------------------------------- 
8. (c) The Russian Patriarchate has not confined its 
ambitions to its immediate neighbors and one-time client 
states.  In a much more conciliatory fashion, Moscow has 
reached out to Orthodox communities in Western Europe, the 
United States, and, most recently, in Asia.  The Russian 
Orthodox Church has long had a presence in Western Europe, 
but has moved to open new churches and parishes throughout 
the region.  Last year, Alexy wrote to several Orthodox 
Bishops in Europe offering them more autonomy if they were to 
forsake Constantinople's authority for his own (ref i) and 
has opened new churches throughout Europe.  According to 
Metropolitan Meliton, Moscow's established dioceses in 
Austria, Belgium, France, Great Britain, Germany, Hungary, 
and the Netherlands are in direct violation of the Ecumenical 
Patriarchate's authority.  Metropolitan Meliton told poloff 
that he is also increasingly alarmed by similar moves into 
India, Japan, Korea, Singapore, Australia, and even the 
Seychelles.  The Patriarchate believes that these 
expansionary efforts have the full support of the Russian 
government.  As Bartholomew himself told the CG earlier this 
year, "the Russians constantly pursue political ends through 
religion."  Meliton told poloff that he has heard reports 
that the Russian Foreign Ministry had concluded an agreement 
with Alexy to allow the Russian Orthodox Church to open 
chapels in its Embassies and Consulates around the world. 
Meliton even expects Russian President Putin, who postponed 
an official trip to Turkey earlier this month, to petition 
the Turkish government for permission to open one or more of 
their own churches under the very nose of the Ecumenical 
Patriarchate (Note: Currently, Bartholomew permits Russian 
priests to perform services in churches under his control, 
but the Russians have long sought their own churches). 
 
Comment 
------- 
9. (sbu) Although these venerable religious institutions are 
primarily engaged in providing spiritual services and 
guidance to millions of devoted followers, much of their 
institutional tension and international rivalries center on 
more mundane issues, such as possession of churches and 
control of territory.  As recently as mid-August, 
Metropolitan Meliton and Metropolitan Demetrios of America 
traveled to Jerusalem in n ffot o rsolve a dispute over 
control of soe arihe inCaifonia.  The fact that the 
Patriarchate spends considerable time on such issues is an 
indication that t clearly sees its very survival as 
depending ona successful defense of its canonical privileges 
and moral authority in the Orthodox world. 
 
10 (c) This rivalry may also have unfortunate implicaions 
for the Patriarchate's continuing efforts t secure its 
status here in Istanbul.  Erol Muterimler, an influential 
academic, suggested to us ecently that resistance among the 
Turkish militay and bureaucracy to acknowledging the 
Patriarch' ecumenical status nd eopening the Halki 
seminry ay ste from  desir to move closer to Russiaand 
aoid an involement in what they see as a roxy rivalry 
between Washington and Moscow.  A psitive Turkish response 
to a Putin request for Rusian churches to be opened in 
Turkey (see para 7 might be an indication that such thinking 
has sme currency in Ankara. 
 
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