US embassy cable - 04SANAA2489

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 SANAA 002489 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR DS/IP/ITA, DS/IP/NEA, S/CT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2014 
TAGS: ASEC, PTER 
SUBJECT: SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSE 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 185263 
 
Classified By: DCM Nabeel Khoury for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
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POLITICAL VIOLENCE 
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1.  (S/NF)  Demonstrations 
 
A. Are there any ethnic or religious communities in country 
that are capable of carrying out significant anti-American 
demonstrations? 
 
There are not organized, clearly defined communities as 
such, but ad hoc groupings of Yemeni fundamentalists and/or 
some members of the Zaidi sect are predisposed to oppose 
U.S. policy in Palestine/Israel, Iraq and elsewhere, 
and occasionally demonstrate to express their views. 
 
B. Have there been anti-American demonstrations in the 
country within the last 12 months? 
 
On May 29th, 2004 a demonstration took place at Tahrir 
Square protesting U.S. involvement in Iraq.  Between 1500 
and 2000 individuals took part in the demonstration. 
 
There were small demonstrations at mosques in Sanaa to 
protest al-Moayad's extradition to the U.S. in Fall 2003. 
 
Since September 2003, there have been regular reports, in 
the press and from other sources, of arrests following 
clashes between police and worshippers at the Grand Mosque 
in Sanaa. The disturbances during sermons include 
protesters shouting "death to America death to Israel" 
and other anti-American and anti-Jewish slogans.  Many of 
these mosque-based demonstrations have been associated 
with a sect led by Zaidi scholar al-Horthi killed in 
September 2004 by ROYG forces during an insurection. 
 
On March 21, 2003, a march of 5-7,000 people protesting the 
war in Iraq was stopped by police approximately 1/4 mile 
from the U.S. Embassy; the demonstrators initiated 
violent confrontations that resulted in the death of 
several police and protesters. 
 
On March, 2003, Yemenis held several demonstrations 
opposing war in Iraq, most near the UN headquarters complex 
in Sanaa, Tahrir Square and Old Airport Road, all several 
miles from the Embassy. 
 
In Winter 2002 - 2003, Yemeni women held demonstrations in 
front of the German Embassy protesting the arrest of Sheikh 
al-Moayed in Frankfurt, Germany, on terrorism charges. 
 
C. Have these demonstrations taken place near or in front 
of U.S. diplomatic facilities? 
 
The usual sites for anti-American gatherings are in areas 
of Sanaa away from the Embassy; however, the 
above-mentioned March 21, 2003 event took place nearby. 
 
D. What is the average size of an anti-American demonstration? 
 
Depending on the location, up to several hundred people. 
Peaceful demonstrations protesting the war in Iraq have 
ranged from approximately 1,000 to 100,000, by some media 
accounts.  Local press routinely carry inflated estimates 
ranging from half a million to one million-plus. 
 
E. Are these anti-American demonstrations usually triggered 
by U.S. foreign policy initiatives, military actions, or by 
domestic issues? 
 
U.S. foreign policy initiatives and military/law 
enforcement and counter-terrorism endeavors, as well as 
ROYG cooperation with same. 
 
F. Are these demonstrations generally violent or peaceful? 
 
Generally peaceful.  Demonstrations must be coordinated and 
approved by ROYG in advance; consequently, the vast 
majority are peaceful.  If not approved in advance, ROYG 
forces will forcibly disband a demonstration. 
 
G. If violent, have any demonstrations resulted in damage 
to USG property or injuries to USG employees? 
 
No; however, Yemeni police and protester fatalities 
in March 2003 were due in large part to the intervention of 
host government security protecting the U.S. Embassy. 
 
H. If violent, have any demonstrations ever penetrated our 
perimeter security line? 
 
No. 
I. Have there been anti-government demonstrations in the 
country within the last 12 months? 
 
Yes, directed at specific policies, including child labor, 
education and bringing mosques under government control. 
Several anti-government demonstrations occurred in Sanaa 
and Aden. 
 
J. Have these demonstrations taken place near or in front 
of U.S. diplomatic facilities? 
 
No. 
 
K. What is the average size of an anti-government 
demonstration? 
 
Fairly small, approximately 50 to 200 individuals, similar 
to anti-U.S. protests. 
 
L. Are these demonstrations generally violent or peaceful? 
 
Generally peaceful. 
 
M. If violent, have any demonstrations resulted in damage 
to USG property? 
 
No. 
 
 
2.  (S/NF)  Macro Conflict Conditions 
 
A. Is the host country currently engaged in an interstate 
or intrastate conflict? 
 
Yes, Yemen is engaged in an internal conflict.  Host 
country is cooperating with U.S. efforts to identify 
and stop/attack terrorist targets within Yemen. 
The ROYG is concluding large-scale military 
operations against supporters of Shi'ite (Zaidi) scholar 
al-Houthi in Sa'da, killed in September 2004 by ROYG 
military forces.  Pockets of resistance remain around 
Sa'da. 
 
B. If an intrastate conflict, is it an insurgency that is 
limited to a specific region or a country-wide civil war? 
 
Yes, Sa'da Governate 
 
C. If limited to a specific region, are any U.S. diplomatic 
facilities located in this region? 
 
There are no diplomatic facilities in this region. 
 
D. Have any of the factions involved in these intrastate 
conflicts signaled or demonstrated an anti-American 
orientation? 
 
Yes, al-Houthi criticized Sunni scholars for ordering 
people to obey cruel rulers who cooperate with America. 
(Sanaa 1686) 
 
3.  (S/NF)  Host Country Capabilities 
 
A. Are law enforcement agencies professional and well-trained? 
 
U.S. assistance has enabled Yemen to develop a competent 
counter-terrorism strike force (see below), but regular 
police/law enforcement are often corrupt, poorly trained 
and underpaid.  For example, an average officer earns 60 
USD per month.  A captain with 20 years experience earns 
only 120 per month.  A Brigadier General earns 300 USD 
per month.  This economic condition -- reflecting Yemen's 
widespread poverty (average per capita income is less than 
USD 400 countrywide) -- fosters widespread corruption that 
possibly could be diminished with increased remuneration. 
 
Further, law enforcement agencies face numerous challenges 
regarding planning, coordination and execution of complex 
counter-terrorism operations.  Reliance on manpower is 
emphasized over the use of technology.  Agencies have 
difficulty maintaining operations security and have 
difficulty operating in a nighttime environment. 
On the other hand, Yemeni law enforcement agencies have 
shown a willingness to cooperate with U.S. and Western 
law enforcement agencies -- e.g. in the relatively 
proficient forensic investigation of the M/V Limburg attack 
in October 2002.  The United States has provided equipment 
and extensive training to the Central Security Forces 
(CSF), a para-military unit of the Ministry of Interior. 
In mid-September 2003, the ROYG disrupted an 
al-Qa'ida-affiliated cell operating in Sanaa targeting 
Western interests.  The cell was headed by Afghanistan- 
trained Amral-Sharif.  The government provided further 
information on the ROYG's investigation into the cell's 
activities and members, particularly information on several 
arrests in Yemen and Saudi Arabia.  (Note: see answer to 
Transnational Terrorist Indicators question 6B for 
additional information). 
In cooperation with Yemeni officials, the FBI actively 
participated in the investigation of the December 30, 2002 
shootings of three American health care workers in Jibla. 
The perpetrators -- Abed Abdulrazak al-Kamel, the shooter, 
and Ali Ahmed Mohamed Jarallah, the planner -- were tried, 
convicted and sentenced to death in separate trials in 
2003.  On December 1, 2003, a three-judge panel affirmed 
the death sentence of al-Kamel, who will appeal the 
decision to the Yemen Supreme Court.  Court officials 
expect that the conviction will be upheld and passed to 
President Saleh, who is likely sign off on the order 
to carry out the sentence.  Post representatives attended 
al-Kamel's trial and appeal proceedings, which were 
relatively transparent and openly reported in the local 
media. 
 
Al-Kamel coordinated the attack with Ali al-Jarallah, who 
was convicted of both the Amcit murders and the 
assassination of Yemeni Socialist Party Deputy 
Secretary-General Jarallah Omar in a separate trial 
 
SIPDIS 
in Sanaa in October 2003.  Al-Jarallah is also expected 
to appeal his conviction and sentence. No specific date 
has been set for the executions. 
 
B. Have they been trained by U.S. agencies? 
 
Some officers have received DS/ATA training, however, the 
full impact of this training will be manifest only over the 
long term.  The Regional Security Office does maintain 
high-level contacts within the Ministry of Interior who 
received ATA training. 
 
In July - August 2003, 24 host government police 
investigators from across the country participated in a 
two-week DS/ATA Terrorist Crime Scene investigation course 
taught by Evidence Response Team FBI special agents. 
 
The CSF is the counter-terrorism (CT) arm of the Central 
Security Organization (CSO).  The CSF has been equipped by 
the U.S. and trained by U.K./U.S. personnel for the past 
year and will continue into the next fiscal year.  They 
are ROYG's intended primary CT force. 
 
In June 2003, the newly-formed CSF CT unit was dispatched 
to the Hattat mountains in Abyan province ostensibly to 
hunt down and bring to justice those responsible for an 
attack on a Red Crescent medical convoy the week before. 
However, this was a cameo appearance.  In fact, front-line 
CSO troops were actually engaged.  CSO troops were at the 
lead of this effort when Ministry of Defense forces became 
bogged down by harassing gunfire from the surrounding 
hills. Over a three day period, CSO troops engaged those 
responsible and completed their mission.  CSO was sent 
out the following week to complete mop-up operations. 
 
Beginning in early March 2004, Yemeni counter-terrorism 
operations were conducted by the CSF and Ministry of 
Defense forces in the Abyan region for approximately 
one week.  Yemeni authorities informed Post of the 
capture of al-Qaeda element Raouf Naseeb on March 3, 2004. 
The Minister of Interior and Yemen Special Operations 
Forces commander noted on March 8,2004, the capture of 
four USS Cole escapees from Aden prison. 
 
In August 2004, ATA funded attendance of 18 senior ROYG 
officials to attend the Senior Crisis Management Seminar 
in the United States.  Also, ATA sponsored a Terrorist 
Interdiction course for 24 mid-level ROYG officials in 
Sanaa. 
 
In September 2004, ATA sponsored an Airport Security 
Seminar in Sanaa for 27 ROYG officials. 
C. Are law enforcement agencies confronted with serious, 
widespread corruption inside their agencies? 
 
Yes, see question 3A. 
 
D. Are the intelligence services professional and capable 
of deterring terrorist actions? 
 
The intelligence services are moderately professional. 
Despite ongoing engagement and considerable CT successes, 
they have limited capability. 
 
E. Have the intelligence services been cooperative with 
U.S. Embassy requests or information and support? 
 
Yes, but often grudgingly.  Intelligence services rarely 
volunteer information.  Yet on some occasions the ROYG takes 
the initiative to inform the USG of CT developments -- e.g. 
in the case of ROYG success in September 2003 in disrupting 
a Sanaa-based al-Qaeda cell. 
 
F. Assuming there have been significant terrorist threats 
in recent years, have host country security services been 
able to score any major anti-terrorism successes? 
 
Yes. 
 
G. Has host country been responsive (re: timeliness and 
allocation of resources) to Embassy requests for protective 
security? 
 
Yes. 
 
H. How does the Embassy assess the overall security at 
major airports in the country? 
 
Poor, but the ROYG is receptive to additional U.S.-funded 
equipment and security training.  This view is corroborated 
by an October 2003 visit to Sanaa by a two-person 
Transportation Security Administration assessment team. 
 
I. How effective are customs and immigration controls 
agencies? 
 
Ineffective but improving.  Since February 2002, Somali and 
Ethiopian refugees have been entering Yemen at a reported 
rate of approximately 1,500 per month, adding to the 60,000 
refugees previously registered.  They are settling on the 
southern and western coasts, forming criminal and 
prostitution rings along clan lines.  Criminal related 
violence is on the rise.  With USG assistance, the customs 
and immigration services are attempting to standardize and 
modernize equipment and coverage. 
 
J. How effective are border patrol forces? 
 
In the recent past ineffective; however, a current surge of 
more than 7,000 troops from MOI/MOD resources and increased 
cooperation by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (to include 
collaboration on intelligence and smuggling information) 
has generally improved the effectiveness of border patrol 
forces. 
 
 
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INDIGENOUS TERRORISM 
-------------------- 
 
4. (S/NF)  Anti-American Terrorist Groups 
 
A. Are there indigenous, anti-American terrorist groups in 
country? 
 
Yes. 
 
B. If yes, how many? 
 
Four are known: Aden-Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA); Yemen 
Islamic Jihad; al-Qaeda Sympathizers; Yemen Hizballah. 
The Shi'a Shabab al-Mou'urineen (Believing Youth Group) 
(Sad'a), is considered anti-American but not classified 
as a terrorist group. 
 
C. Have these groups carried out anti-American attacks 
within the last 12 months? 
 
No. 
 
D. Were any of these lethal attacks? 
 
N/A. 
 
E. Have these groups attacked U.S. diplomatic facilities? 
 
N/A. 
 
F. Have these groups attacked U.S. business, U.S. military, 
or related targets? 
N/A. 
 
G. Have these groups limited their attacks to specific 
regions or do they operate country-wide? 
 
N/A. 
 
H. If their attacks are limited to regions, are there any 
U.S. diplomatic facilities located in these regions? 
 
N/A. 
 
5.  (S/NF)  Other Indigenous Terrorist Groups 
 
A. Are there other indigenous terrorist groups (not 
anti-American) in country? 
Yes. 
 
B. If yes, how many? 
Two: National Liberation Front (MAWJ) and the Right to 
Self-Determination Movement (HATM). 
 
C. Have these groups carried out attacks in the capital 
or in areas where U.S. diplomatic facilities are located? 
 
No known incidents of this type. 
 
D. Were these attacks lethal and/or indiscriminate? 
 
None known. 
 
E. Have any Americans ever been killed or injured in these 
attacks? 
 
No. 
 
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TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM 
----------------------- 
 
6. (S/NF)  Transnational Terrorist Indicators 
 
A. Are there any foreign terrorist groups that have a 
presence in country? 
 
Yes.  Al-Qaida, Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), al-Gama'a 
al-Islamiya (AKA: The Islamic Group), Libyan Islamic 
Fighting Group (LIFG), Algerian Islamic Group GIA), Salafi 
Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), Hamas, Palestinian 
Islamic Jihad, PFLP, Hizballah.  The Iraqi Intelligence 
Service maintained a presence in Yemen prior to Operation 
Iraqi Freedom. 
 
In late February 2004, information indicated that the 
militant wing of PLO faction al-Fatah was at a 
meeting/seminar hosted by Kan'an, a charity organization 
headed by President Saleh's nephew that supports 
Palestinian causes. 
 
B. How does the EAC assess this presence? Is it an 
operational cell?  Financial cell?  Support cell? 
Propaganda cell? 
 
Al-Qaida: all of the above.  Other groups may have links or 
cooperate with al-Qaeda. 
 
On 09/28/2003, the ROYG Minister ofInterior held a meeting 
with the U.S. Ambassador and various other Western 
ambassadors to discuss ROYG's disruption of a Sanaa-based 
al-Qaida cell targeting U.S, other Western and Yemeni 
objectives.  Highlighted was the targeting of the U.S. 
Ambassador's motorcade and the British Embassy in Sanaa. 
 
Per reftel F, on 02/14/2004, ROYG Minister of Interior held 
a meeting with the U.S. Ambassador to advise that ROYG 
officials were investigating a possible plot to attack the 
Ambassador. 
 
C. Is the host government sympathetic to these groups? 
 
The Yemeni government is an active partner of the USG in 
the GWOT.  ROYG officially supports Palestinian groups, 
including Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Lebanese Hizballah, 
but support is mainly rhetorical and does not extend to 
operational activities. 
 
D. Are there suspect non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
in the country that may have a relationship with any of these 
groups? 
 
 
Organization, Nationality. 
-- Al-Haramain al-Sharifain Foundation, Saudi Arabia 
-- Al-Ihsan Association, Saudi Arabia 
-- World Assembly for Muslim Youth, Saudi Arabia-- 
Dar al-Arqam Stationary for Printing and Publication, 
Saudi Arabia 
-- Islamic Relief Organization, Saudi Arabia 
-- Dubai Charitable Association, Saudi Arabia 
-- Abu-Baker Salem Al-Sa'ari Foundation, Saudi Arabia 
-- Supreme Authority for Muslims of Bosnia, Saudi Arabia 
-- Tibah Foundation, Saudi Arabia 
-- Saeed Qahtan Foundation, Saudi Arabia 
-- International Islamic Relief Organization, Saudi Arabia 
-- League of the Islamic World, Saudi Arabia 
-- Charitable Association in Fujaira, Saudi Arabia 
-- Al-Bir Islamic Committee, Saudi Arabia 
-- Zahra Al-Khalidiah Foundation, Saudi Arabia 
-- Salem Omar Ba'ashem and Omar Badahda, Saudi Arabia 
-- Mecca Association, Saudi Arabia 
-- Al-Emir al-Khairiyah Committee (Al Haramain), Saudi Arabia 
-- Islamic Union (Quebec), Saudi Arabia 
-- Hamoud al-Hayyawi Foundation, Saudi Arabia 
-- Al-Noor Charitable Foundation, Saudi Arabia 
-- Bin Saynoon Foundation, Saudi Arabia 
-- Bin Mahdi Foundation, Saudi Arabia 
-- Bayelghoum Foundation, Saudi Arabia 
-- Al-Fittrah Foundation, UAE 
-- Al-Islah And Tawhid Social Association, UAE 
-- Kuwait Joint Committee for Relief of the Global Islamic 
Charitable Organization, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait 
-- United Arab Emirates Association, UAE 
-- Bayt al-Shariqa al-Khairi (Sharja Charitable House), UAE 
-- Omar Bin Yousuf, UAE 
-- Qatar Charitable Association, Qatari 
-- Islamic Relief, UK 
-- Dubai Charitable Association, UAE 
-- Al-Fikrah Center, UAE 
-- Al-Islah Association, Kuwait 
 
E. Are there any ethnic or religious communities in country 
that are sympathetic to these groups? 
 
Yes, Salafi groups and mosques.  Public sympaty for pro- 
Palestinian/anti-Israeli groups is widespread. 
 
F. How does the EAC assess the level, intent, and scope of 
hostile intelligence services (Iran, Iraq, Syria, Serbia, 
Sudan, et. al.) in country relative to potential 
anti-American terrorist acts? 
 
Foreign hostile intelligence services, e.g. Syria, Egypt, 
Sudan and Iran. Primarily focused on information gathering 
for their own countries' interests, not to assist 
anti-American groups in country with terrorist activity. 
Iran however is believed to be supporting the Shi'a 
Believing Youth. 
 
G. How does the EAC assess the availability of weapons and 
explosives in country or from nearby countries for hostile 
terrorist elements? 
 
Yemen likely has among the highest number of weapons per 
capita in the world, with easy access to varieties of 
explosives.  Weapons and explosives are easily attainable. 
Gun markets are large and well stocked. 
 
Though Yemen is awash in numerous types of weapons, the 
Yemeni cabinet approved a series of amendments to a 1992 
gun control law intended to bolster regulation of weapons 
possession and trafficking.  These amendments must gain 
approval by the Yemeni Parliament before becoming law. 
Parliamentary opposition to the amendments remains 
significant; more than 150 MPs have reportedly signed a 
petition to quash the gun control law that is still under 
discussion.  Accordingly, Speaker of the Parliament Sheikh 
Abdullah al-Ahmar has publicly described possession of 
weapons as a Yemeni symbol of manhood. 
 
In a separate effort, the ROYG has initiated a weapons 
buy-back program, at a reported cost of 38 million USD 
to include rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) and a variety 
of other heavy weapons from civilian weapons markets. 
ROYG also intends to sign a Man Portable Air Defense 
Systems (MANPADS) buy-back agreement with the U.S. 
Citing the acquisition of over 1,400 MANPADS from January 
to June 2003, ROYG says the program is a success.  There 
are problems, however, such as: 1) cataloguing weapons; 2) 
ROYG paying over market value; and 3) the sustainability of 
the weapons buy-back program. 
KRAJESKI