US embassy cable - 04AMMAN7862

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 007862 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ECON, KISL, JO 
SUBJECT: KING FACES IN TWO DIRECTIONS AS HE PROCEEDS WITH A 
CABINET RESHUFFLE 
 
REF: AMMAN 7336 
 
Classified By: CDA David Hale for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d) 
 
1.  (C)  Summary.  The King will proceed with a cabinet 
reshuffle and new government mandate in October, but in two 
contradictory directions:  reinforcement of the cabinet 
reformists while redoubling efforts to silence Islamists and 
troublesome political activists in the professional 
associations.  End summary. 
 
2.  (C)  Royal Court Minister al-Rifai reconfirmed to Charge 
on September 22 that the King planned a cabinet reshuffle 
that would retain Fayez as Prime Minister but reinforce the 
powers of the key reformists.  The changes will come 
following a cabinet retreat, in which the current government 
would review their accomplishments (a short session, Rifai 
quipped), and the new team, once announced, would also go on 
a retreat to set its new mission.  Rifai said the reformed 
cabinet would dispense with a deputy prime minister, in favor 
of a set of "team leaders" who could organize activities 
across line ministries.  He cited three such teams -- 
administrative reform, economic development, and 
socio-economic reforms.  This change almost certainly signals 
the departure of Deputy PM/Trade and Economy Minister 
Halayqa, whose title and theoretical power as DPM were 
conditions for membership in the current government.  As the 
at times vicious frenzy of maneuvering over the impending 
cabinet shuffle accelerated, Halayqa appears to have become 
the scapegoat of many of his cabinet rivals, who say his 
lackluster performance demonstrates the irrelevance of the 
whole concept of a deputy prime minister.  The "team leaders" 
approach appears tailor-made for the aggrandizement of 
Planning Minister and leading reformist Bassam Awadallah, who 
-- whether leader or not of each team -- can be counted on to 
have the loudest voice and greatest energy level in any group 
setting. 
 
3.  (C)  Rifai said the flip side of reinforcing reforms 
would be cracking down on opposition elements that have 
"crossed the line."  He said the King is determined to have 
the Islamic Action Front (IAF) and the secular professional 
associations "stop attacking us, our policies, and our 
friends."  If the new Fayez team fails to achieve that aim, 
and to move the government's bills through parliament, its 
tenure would be short.  Rifai acknowledged that this course 
of action would be tricky, given the IAF's strong profile in 
the country.  But as the government moved forward on a new 
parties law (which Rifai did not expect to occur within the 
life of the next parliament), a level playing field was 
needed.  The IAF could not be the only party with access to 
charitable funds, nor could professional associations 
continue to play politics.  While clipping the wings of 
Islamic oppositionists, Rifai said the Hashemites would be 
promoting a more moderate, tolerant message and identifying 
the extremist rhetoric and activism as being outside Islam. 
 
4.  (C)  While pleased with Jordan's robust growth this year 
of over seven percent, Rifai described the King as concerned 
that the growth of income was distributed unevenly.  He said 
few would support needed tax increases if more was not done 
to spread the wealth -- hence a renewed public focus by the 
leadership on poverty alleviation and job creation. 
 
5.  (C)  Comment:  Rifai inadvertently cast a spotlight on 
the irony of the King's approach: strengthening government 
reformists (including FM Muasher, who, rumors to the 
contrary, still appears secure in his job) while cracking 
down on oppositionists.  The public generally accepts both 
the IAF and the associations as part of Jordan's political 
furniture.  The public is also generally receptive to some of 
their messages, particularly when it comes to government 
nepotism, corruption, and foreign policy issues.  Many 
Jordanians, even if they do not support the IAF, see it as a 
moderating and basically stabilizing factor, as it has been 
in alliance for years with the Hashemites as a bulwark first 
against the leftists and now against some more extreme 
Islamic tendencies.  Rifai's suggestion that the GOJ is 
moving nowhere fast on the political parties law (and 
presumably the elections law) reinforces a widely-held belief 
among Jordanians that the GOJ only pays lip-service to 
political reform.  There is an irony (and danger) in the 
government's approach.  By strengthening reformers, but 
failing to implement key political reforms to facilitate 
active popular participation and create viable alternatives 
to the IAF, the GOJ will find it hard to create the "level 
playing field" Rifai says the King is looking for. 
 
6.  (U)  Baghdad minimize considered. 
 
Visit Embassy Amman's classified website at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman/ or access the site 
through the State Department's SIPRNET home page. 
HALE