US embassy cable - 04BRUSSELS4009

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 004009 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/16/2014 
TAGS: PREL, TU, EUN, USEU BRUSSELS 
SUBJECT: EU/TURKEY: ACCESSION TALKS NOT A DONE DEAL 
 
REF: A. LONDON 6824 
 
     B. THE HAGUE 2190 
 
Classified By: USEU/POL: Harry O'Hara, reasons 1.4 B/D 
 
1. (C) Summary: The current conventional wisdom in Brussels 
is that Turkey will get "yes-but" recommendations to start 
accession talks with the EU from the European Commission on 
October 6 and the European Council on December 17.  We expect 
the debate in both bodies to be contentious.   It would only 
take one dissenting vote in December to derail Turkey's 
prospects. End Summary 
 
Time-Line: Key Dates 
-------------------- 
 
2. (C) European debate on Turkey will be driven by two key 
dates:  October 6 and December 17. On October 6, the 
Commission will provide the Council with 1) an analysis of 
Turkey's performance when measured against the "Copenhagen 
Criteria," and 2) a recommendation on whether to offer a date 
for accession talks to Turkey. In addition, the Commission 
will also give the Council 3) an "impact statement" that will 
assess the impact on European institutions and budgets of 
possible Turkish membership.  On December 17, the European 
Council (heads of government from all 25 Member States) 
should take a decision on offering Turkey a date to begin 
accession negotiations based on the outcome of Commission 
discussions.  In between these two dates (on November 1), the 
current Prodi Commission will step down and be replaced with 
the new Barosso team.  Commission sources tell us that the 
current Commissioners are determined to finish their 
recommendation on Turkey on their watch, however, so it is 
unlikely the new Commission would play a major role in this 
process. 
 
October 6: Judged against what? 
------------------------------- 
 
3. (C) The Commission's recommendation should be based on 
whether Turkey has adequately met the EU Copenhagen 
"political criteria."  This means an assessment of Turkey's 
internal/domestic human rights reforms and practices in terms 
of laws passed and implementation of laws and reforms.  By 
design, other political issues that will figure prominently 
in European political debate over Turkey (relations with 
Cyprus, religion, NATO, the costs of membership on current 
members, or the impact on ratification of a European 
Constitution) have been excluded. Also not at issue in the 
Commission report is the question of Turkey's "suitability" 
or eligibility for membership.  For the Commission, Turkey is 
eligible, and the main question is whether or not Turkey's 
enormous political reforms and changes over the last five 
years are enough to offer a date to begin talks. 
 
Setting the goalposts 
--------------------- 
 
4.  (C) DG-Enlargement staffers who head the working-level 
effort on Turkey see the key question as follows: when 
compared with the last round of members and other current 
candidates, has Turkey done enough? Turkey, they say, should 
first be measured against "less than perfect" protections in 
other recently-admitted countries -- such as  Slovakia's 
treatment of the Roma or Latvia's treatment of ethnic 
Russians.  In addition, Turkey is to be considered in light 
of the situations in Croatia, Romania, and Bulgaria, all of 
whom have been offered negotiations despite flaws in their 
records.  What the Commission has told us is that it wants to 
avoid judging Turkey by a different standard than it did for 
the new 10 members or 3 current applicants.  The Commission's 
bottom line is that it will not ask that Turkey demonstrate 
"perfect" or "full" completion of the Copenhagen Criteria 
when some current member-states are also not perfect. 
 
October 6: the "yes-buts" 
------------------------- 
 
5. (C) Current Brussels conventional wisdom is that Turkey 
will get a "yes-but" decision o/a October 6 (Commission 
sources tell us that the date could slip a few days), 
although no one expects debate among the Commissioners will 
not be controversial. The key internal debate in 
DG-enlargement is how to word a conditional yes to get it 
through the College of Commissioners.  The Commission usually 
decides by consensus, although a final decision can, in 
theory, be taken by simple majority vote.  Under informal 
consideration in the Commission are two conditional "yes" 
recommendations: 
 
-- yes, but listing certain conditions that still must be met 
before accession talks start; or 
 
-- yes, but explicitly listing conditions that will be 
expected to be met during (not before) accession talks.  This 
latter is sometimes called the "Croatia model" (ref A). 
Within DG-Enlargement, there is a strong belief -- almost an 
article of faith -- that accession negotiations themselves 
provide a powerful vehicle for effecting political and 
economic reforms. 
 
The Commissioners: How They Line Up 
----------------------------------- 
 
6. (C) Importantly, DG-Enlargement officials preparing the 
reports have virtually ruled out a "flat no" as an option. 
For many Commissioners, led by Enlargement Commissioner 
Verheugen and President Prodi, EU enlargement is a legacy 
issue.  Turkey is the last piece in the puzzle that they 
began to assemble at the Helsinki Summit of December 1999. 
Still, among the 30 Commissioners, there remains a wide range 
of views on Turkey, and no consensus on whether to offer a 
date.  Already, Commissioners Bolkestein (Netherlands) and 
Fischler (Austria) have spoken out not only against offering 
a date, but also questioning Turkey's suitability for 
membership at all.  The Bolkestein argument asserts that 
Islamic Turkey is not European, and therefore should not even 
be considered.  His arguments run counter to the entire 
dynamic on Turkish membership over the last few years, and 
will likely fall flat.  Fischler's key points are that taking 
on Turkey is too expensive for current members.  These 
arguments may carry more weight with Commissioners who must 
juggle a budget, or political leaders looking for an out if 
this issue is moved to the Council in December.  Spanish 
Commissioner De Palacios also reportedly opposes offering 
Turkey a date. 
7. (C) In favor, among others, are RELEX' Chris Patten, 
Verheugen, and Prodi.  Not all Commissioners are equal in the 
debate, and the views of the latter three Commissioners will 
likely carry more weight than the opinions of other 
Commissioners.  There are a number of Commissioners who are 
likely to go with the consensus -- or if consensus is 
impossible then with the majority opinion. 
 
NGOs: All Over the Board 
------------------------ 
 
8. (SBU) As we entire the waning days of the debate, a number 
of NGOs have released reports designed to influence and shape 
the debate.  Some recommend kicking the issue down the road 
(again), others question Turkey's democratic and cultural 
credentials to join the Union, while still others strongly 
endorse membership for strategic reasons.  None are likely to 
change the outcome in the Commission. 
 
The European Council "Wild Card" 
-------------------------------- 
 
9. (C) The heads of state and government at the December 17 
European Council will have the final say.  They meet behind 
closed doors.  The leaders will be under enormous pressure to 
make a decision, and strange deals have been known to emerge 
as a result.  Decision-making requires consensus: it takes 
only one country ready to vote against Turkey to derail the 
process. 
 
10. (C) Political leaders will weigh their previous 
commitments to Turkey and the enlargement process against 
broad skepticism among their voting publics about Turkish 
membership and the EU in general.  Greece, Germany, the UK, 
and Poland have all pronounced in favor of a date for 
accession talks December 17.  France's position is more 
complex, but President Chirac has come out in support of 
giving Turkey a date.  We expect that some/all the Balts will 
swing behind membership for Turkey also, but Turkish FM Gul's 
recent trip to the region was aimed at shoring up Baltic 
support.  Cyprus and Austria are reportedly most skeptical 
about membership, with Denmark also said to be wavering, and 
the Hague facing strong public opposition.  Other 
member-states appear to have no strong views, and could go 
with a consensus either way. 
 
The Triumph of Inertia Over Politics? 
------------------------------------- 
 
11. (C) The arguments in favor of Turkish admission are 
strong.  Recent progress has been laudible, and the strategic 
arguments for bringing a moderate Islamic democracy into the 
European fold are compelling.  European leaders have also 
made so many promises to Turkey over the years that pulling 
back at this time would be viewed as a colossal breach of 
faith.  For much of the European voting public, however, 
these arguments have not proved convincing.  Less than one 
third of Europeans polled recently believe that Turkish 
membership in the EU is a good thing.  For many of Europe's 
political leaders, who were pummeled in this summer's 
European Parliament elections, the pressures to pander to 
voters at home by standing firm on Turkey could prove 
appealing.  The poorer new members, hoping to reap benefits 
of EU programs, will fear that Turkish membership could come 
at their expense.  Another potential dividing line could come 
over religion, especially if the Vatican weighs in more 
forcefully.  A number of Christian Democrats have already 
expressed variations of this theme, including Commissioners 
Bolkestein and Fischler.  Some leaders, worried about the 
possible impact on referenda on the European Constitution to 
be held next year, could argue for postponement.   In 
European politics, these are all powerful arguments against a 
yes vote for Turkey in December. 
 
Cyprus?? 
-------- 
12. (C) One critical difference between the Copenhagen 
decision in 2002 and the situation today is that Cyprus is 
now a member of the EU.  The conventional wisdom in Brussels 
is that Cyprus would not dare block Turkish membership, 
especially since Greece has staked a strong strategic 
position in favor.  But Brussels orthodoxy has already been 
flummoxed by Cypriot President Papadopoulos on two occasions 
-- first in opposing the April referendum, and then by 
blocking the EU's aid/trade package for Northern Cyprus. 
Nicosia has proven it is willing to stand firm, even in 
isolation, on matters directly related to its dispute with 
Turkey.  And if they hold firm in December on Turkish 
membership, it won't matter how the other 24 countries line 
up. 
 
Will they flinch in December? 
----------------------------- 
 
13. (C) EU heads will make the final determination on Turkey 
this year -- not Foreign Ministers and not the Commission. 
The Dutch Presidency will be key in shaping and guiding the 
debate, particularly as the European Council approaches. 
Nonetheless, the deciding factor will be the political 
calculations that 25 leaders make at the European Council. 
As they weigh public opinion, North Cyprus, the role and 
place of Islam in Europe, fears about job losses, the costs 
of Turkish membership, uncontrolled internal migration, and 
lower agricultural and regional subsidies that their 
countries might receive after eventual Turkish membership, 
the attraction of avoiding any decision will grow.  A 
rancorous and fear-driven public debate in Europe this fall 
could easily push the heads of states and government to 
flinch on December 17.  This is an issue the key European 
leaders will have to struggle with; we should listen to their 
concerns and continue to urge them privately to keep their 
eyes focused on the historical nature of the decision rather 
than immediate political gains. 
 
McKinley