US embassy cable - 04KINSHASA1759

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001759 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, PREL, MARR, MOPS, CG 
SUBJECT: ELECTIONS JEOPARDIZED BY ARMY REFORM PROBLEM, SAYS 
S. KIVU GENERAL 
 
Classified By: Poloff Edward Bestic for Reasons 1.5 B and D 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY:  Gen. Budja Mabe, Kinshasa's senior officer 
in South Kivu, told the Ambassador Sept. 8 the Congo needs 
outside help with military reform in order to be able to hold 
elections.  The FDLR, rebel Congolese officers, and 
neighboring countries are the chief threats to security, and 
the non-Banyamulenge of Uvira are not keen to see the 
Banyamulenge return--a problem that has deep roots. Mabe came 
across as intelligent and articulate, if not completely 
forthcoming, and likely with the sense to tailor his message 
to his USG audience, qualities lacking in many FARDC 
officers.  He appears to want to engage with the USG.  END 
COMMENT. 
 
 
A Motley Collection of Forces 
----------------------------- 
2. (C) 10th Military Region commander Gen. Felix Budja Mabe 
told the Ambassador Sept. 8 he has made some progress on 
military integration, but that the Congolese need outside 
support for further reform.  Without an effective army, there 
will be no security and therefore no elections.  His troops 
include elements from the former government, RCD-Goma, local 
defense forces, Mudundu-40 and the Mai-Mai.  On the plus 
side, he claimed Kinshasa authorities are providing 
consistent (but small) salary payments, discipline is "sixty 
percent there," and people are beginning to respect the chain 
of command.  Incompetence is a major problem, however, 
especially among the Mai-Mai.  Mai-Mai groups are organized 
by clan or locality, and their untrained leaders do not 
deserve their rank.  It would be best to wait until after 
elections to begin demobilizing them, he advised, because 
most Mai-Mai are unqualified to serve in the regular army and 
could become a source of instability when they are cut. 
 
 
Military Threats 
---------------- 
3. (C) Mabe said the major threats to South Kivu are the 
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR, aka 
ex-FAR/Interahamwe), neighboring countries, renegade former 
RCD-Goma officers Laurent Nkunda and Jules Mutebusi, and 
"the 8th Military Region."  (Comment:  This is probably a 
reference to Goma-based 8th Military Region commander Gen. 
Obedi Rwibasira, who is widely believed to have supported 
Nkunda and Mutebusi in their recent revolt.  End Comment.) 
In Mabe's view, many if not most FDLR fighters are willing to 
disarm voluntarily and return to Rwanda, but a hard-core 
minority--including most of the senior leaders--restrains 
them.  Overall FDLR strength in the Congo is probably five 
brigades, he estimated, a maximum of 15,000 troops if they 
were at full strength.  Mabe spoke little about Nkunda, other 
than saying the latter's troops attacked government forces 
2-3 days earlier but failed to reach their objectives, the 
areas of Kalehe and Kavumu. 
 
 
Longstanding Tensions in Uvira 
------------------------------ 
4. (C) Discussing the situation at Uvira, Mabe said that 
after the Banyamulenge community there fled across the 
border, squatters moved into their homes.  This, plus the 
fact that many non-Banyamulenge long felt that the 
Banyamulenge had "tried to dominate them," means that those 
remaining in Uvira are "not excited" about the prospect of 
Banyamulenge refugees returning to the city.  Tensions 
between Banyamulenge and other Congolese in South Kivu also 
stem from long-running land disputes, Mabe explained, because 
the Banyamulenge living in the Haut-Plateau area have had a 
tendency to settle in the mid- and lower Plateau areas as 
well.  There have fights over this since as early as 1964; 
Mobutu had seen fit to station a full battalion of troops in 
the area to quell violence. 
 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
5. (C) Mabe came across as an intelligent, articulate 
military officer with a good understanding of political 
dynamics--a contrast with many other Congolese officers.  He 
conveyed the appearance of wanting to engage with the U.S., 
and indeed increase future cooperation.  He was not fully 
forthcoming, however, claiming that his troops are being 
regularly paid (they are not).  Nor did he mention impending 
military action within a short time of this meeting, 
apparently designed to move FARDC troops under his command 
further toward boundaries with the neighboring 8th Military 
Region, reclaiming ground controlled by dissident rebel 
General Nkunda.  Instead, he implied that all current clashes 
result from Nkunda initiatives.  Mabe was direct in 
characterizing Interahamwe forces in his military district as 
a major security threat to the region and the resident 
population, asserting that he fully intended to maintain 
operations against Hutu extremists (e.g. FDLR, Interahamwe). 
He also avoided any inflammatory language regarding RCD-Goma 
or Banyamulenge (South Kivu Tutsi) troops.  Mabe has 
certainly been identified, however, as a major problem by 
RCD-Goma and some Congolese Tutsis, as well as by Kigali, so 
how much of his presentation was constructed for his USG 
audience and how much reflects true personal feeling is 
difficult to assess.  Whatever his actual feelings about the 
current military environment in the Kivus, Mabe's comments 
about the need for external assistance for Congolese military 
reform are on the mark.  While increased pressure is needed 
to force the Congolese parties to further significant 
military integration moves, it is also true that current 
external support appears inadequate and not well coordinated 
between key parties, including South Africa and Belgium.  END 
COMMENT. 
MEECE