US embassy cable - 04COLOMBO1558

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001558 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS 
NSC FOR DORMANDY 
PLEASE ALSO PASS TOPEC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, CE, NO, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT: NORWEGIAN ENVOY SOLHEIM FINDS GSL AND LTTE 
COMMITTED TO PEACE PROCESS 
 
REF: COLOMBO 1555 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead.  1.4(b,d) 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY: Solheim is frustrated with the stalemate in 
the peace process, but the cease-fire has saved thousands of 
lives.  He thinks bold steps are needed to resume the talks. 
He thinks talks will resume if the wording of the agenda 
regarding an interim authority is resolved.  The Tigers are 
feeling international pressure and resent what they perceive 
as "bias."  Norway sees this as a long-haul process in which 
concerted donor action will be important.  Solheim may visit 
Washington in early October.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (U) Norwegian Special Envoy Erik Solheim briefed the 
donor group September 17 at the end of his four-day visit to 
Sri Lanka.  Solheim had met Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eela 
(LTTE) official Thamilchelvan in Kilinochchi on September 16, 
and had seen President Kumaratunga the morning of the 17th. 
He also met with Opposition Leader Ranil Wickremesinghe. 
 
FRUSTRATION WITH STALEMATE, BUT BETTER THAN WAR 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
3.  (C) Solheim began by noting that press pieces that 
morning had carried his public statement expressing 
"frustration" with the stalemate in the peace process.  It 
was important, however, to put this in context.  Over the 
last two years of the ceasefire, some two to three hundred 
people had been killed.  If the war had been ongoing, that 
number would have been two to three thousand.  Solheim also 
noted that he saw no signal that either side wanted to go 
back to war.  Obviously hostilities could resume through some 
inadvertent incident, but, he believed, there was no 
deliberate plan by either side to resume fighting.  The 
bottom line was that the "no war/no permanent peace" 
situation was certainly preferable to a resumed war. 
 
BOLD STEPS NEEDED TO RESUME TALKS 
--------------------------------- 
 
4.  (C) The question then was how to move to the next phase. 
Solheim had told both sides that a bold step was needed.  At 
present they were bogged down in small issues, namely the 
wording of the agenda with regard to the Interim Self 
Governing Authority (ISGA).  Thamilchelvan told Solheim that 
the LTTE had already showed flexibility when it gave up its 
demand for a separate state, which had been the mandate of 
Tamil parties since the 1970s.  By contrast, the government 
had done nothing to prepare the Southern public to accept 
federalism, Thamilchelvan said.  This will take time, so an 
interim setup was needed.  Therefore, Thamilchelvan said, the 
LTTE cannot be flexible on the formulation for talks. 
However, once talks started they could be flexible on the 
ISGA proposal, and were ready to discuss alternate proposals. 
 Thamilchelvan thought the government was now in a better 
position to enter talks based on the ISGA because of the 
entrance into the ruling coalition of the Ceylon Workers 
Congress, and because of statements by the opposition United 
National Party (UNP) that it would support the government if 
it entered negotiations based on the ISGA.  The LTTE, 
Thamilchelvan said, would not put forward any further 
conditions.  The Tigers were now preparing for a seminar they 
would hold in Geneva in two weeks, which would be followed by 
visits to some European countries.  The Tigers, Solheim said, 
were in no particular hurry, and saw no need to help any 
particular Southern political party. 
 
KUMARATUNGA SUPPORTS NORWEGIAN ROLE 
----------------------------------- 
 
5.  (C) President Kumaratunga, Solheim said, was eager to get 
to talks, but he had not achieved any breakthrough in his 
discussion with her.  Ambassador asked if she had any 
reaction to Solheim's request for "bold steps."  Solheim said 
that she was considering what she might do.  (n.b., President 
left the following day for the UNGA session and will be out 
of country for 7-10 days, so nothing should be expected in 
that time frame.  Ambassador will see Kumaratunga upon her 
return.)  Ambassador noted that Kumaratunga had made a very 
positive statement about the Norwegians after her meeting 
with Solheim, and presumed that was not coincidental. 
Solheim said that was correct.  He had told Kumaratunga that 
Norway had been put into an awkward position the last few 
months.  It faced constant public criticism in the South 
since it was working with the Tigers, but this was part of 
its role as facilitator.  Kumaratunga had then issued her 
statement, which was part of her running battle with her 
coalition partners, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP). 
Kumaratunga for her part had told Solheim that it would help 
if the Tigers would reiterate their commitment to a federal 
solution. 
 
CEASE-FIRE BROADLY FOLLOWED 
--------------------------- 
 
6.  (C) On the status of the cease-fire, Solheim said that 
both parties were broadly adhering to it, but neither party 
was strictly following it.  The government had tried to use 
Karuna to weaken the LTTE, while the LTTE continued its 
campaign of assassinations of its opponents.  Hence both 
sides were playing with fire. 
 
TIGERS FEELING INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE? 
-------------------------------------- 
 
7.  (C) Solheim said that Thamilchelvan complained about 
"bias" from the international community.  International 
pressure was one-sided, Thamilchelvan said, and directed 
against the Tigers.  August statements by the US and the EU 
were examples, as were comments by the US Counter-terrorism 
Coordinator Ambassador Cofer Black during his recent visit. 
He also complained specifically about high-ranking military 
visits from the US and India.  In a private aside, Solheim 
told Ambassador that LTTE theoretician Balasingham had told 
him that the mid-August statement by Deputy Secretary 
Armitage had been useful as it put pressure on the LTTE to 
stop murdering its opponents.  Solheim asked that comment be 
kept strictly private.  (COMMENT: Good, the Tigers are 
getting the message.) 
 
INFLUENCE OF EAST? 
------------------ 
 
8.  (C) Ambassador told Solheim that his (Solheim's) emphasis 
seemed to be on resolving the agenda issue as the roadblock 
to resumed talks.  However, many in the South were saying 
that the Tigers would not come back to the table until they 
were able to reassert their control in the East.  Did he 
think that was the case? Solheim said he did not agree.  If 
the President met the LTTE demands on the agenda and ISGA, he 
said, the Tigers will come to the table.  Solheim also said 
that Balasingham would resume his role as chief negotiator 
for the Tigers. 
 
LONG-HAUL APPROACH 
------------------ 
 
9.  (C) Solheim concluded by saying that the Norwegians were 
in this for the long haul.  The donors needed to think, he 
said, how to use their money to underpin the peace process. 
They needed to assist not only the government and the LTTE, 
but also civil society. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
10.  (C) Solheim's entire visit was conducted in a low-key 
manner.  His comments to the press were minimal, and press 
coverage was largely confined to the inside pages -- a sharp 
contrast to previous visits.  As noted above, the Tigers seem 
to be feeling some international pressure, but it is not 
clear if it has actually changed their behavior in any way. 
His assessment that neither side wants or is planning for a 
return to war is hopeful -- if it is accurate.  His further 
assessment that only the ISGA formulation remains as a 
roadblock to new talks can only be tested if the Government 
comes around on that point.  It is also quite possible that 
the Tigers will just come up with new conditions. 
 
11.  (C) COMMENT CONTINUED:  The LTTE meeting in Geneva, 
which will be attended by Tamil expatriates from around the 
world, could be useful if the expats argue for a return to 
talks without further conditions.  Department contacts with 
potential US-based participants could be helpful, and we 
would encourage them.  END COMMENT. 
 
SOLHEIM TO WASHINGTON? 
---------------------- 
 
12.  (U) After the meeting, Solheim told Ambassador that he 
was thinking of visiting the US soon -- perhaps the week of 
October 4 -- to renew contacts and share ideas.  Ambassador 
said he thought this would be useful.  Norwegian Embassy may 
be in touch to discuss a possible trip. 
LUNSTEAD