US embassy cable - 04AMMAN7752

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 AMMAN 007752 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, KISL, PTER, JO 
SUBJECT: ISLAM AND POLITICS IN JORDAN 
 
REF: A. AMMAN 6213 
     B. AMMAN 7619 
     C. AMMAN 6215 
     D. AMMAN 5109 
     E. AMMAN 2764 
     F. AMMAN 3380 
 
Classified By: CDA David Hale for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d) 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1.  (C)  There has been a steady and unmistakable increase in 
the influence of Islam in Jordanian society over the last two 
decades.  The younger generation, in particular, has embraced 
its Islamic roots.  Surprisingly, participation in the Muslim 
Brotherhood and its political wing, the Islamic Action Front 
(IAF), has not significantly risen as Jordanians no longer 
feel the need to join these groups to confirm their religious 
identity.  The IAF leadership, still effectively controlled 
by elder-generation East Bankers, remains more pragmatic than 
its rank and file (mostly Palestinian) members.  However, its 
anti-U.S. rhetoric is on the rise and its public statements 
on Iraq and other issues have, at times, approached the 
boundaries of the GOJ's tolerance.  The IAF's opportunistic 
alliance in parliament with social conservatives and populist 
mavericks have paralyzed passage of key elements of the 
King's reform agenda; PM Fayez's tenure may hinge on success 
in breaking that logjam when Parliament reconvenes in 
mid-November.  While Islamic extremists remain a small 
percentage of Jordan's population, their numbers may be on 
the rise, are loosely organized, and increasingly difficult 
to counter.  End Summary. 
 
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LOOKING TOWARD HEAVEN 
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2.  (C)  As almost anyone in Jordan will tell you, Islam has 
had a growing influence on Jordanian society over the last 
two decades.  Whether exhibited by the wearing of headscarves 
by women, or by attendance at prayers in the country's 
mosques, Jordan (including relatively cosmopolitan Amman) is 
at least outwardly a more religiously devout place than in 
the recent past.  During the 1970s, for example, headscarves 
were by far less common than miniskirts at the University of 
Jordan, whereas today a large majority of females on campus 
choose to cover their hair.  According to societal observers, 
going to mosque regularly no longer raises eyebrows, and more 
Jordanians than ever are performing daily prayers in public. 
 
3.  (C)  The resurgence of Islam has not bypassed younger 
Jordanians.  Dr. Fares Braizat, Director of Polling at the 
Center for Strategic Studies (CSS), told PolOff that a recent 
CSS poll showed that young adult Jordanians between 18 and 24 
years in age (excluding Christians) are, in general, more 
conservative and devout in their religious views than their 
parents.  He further noted an increase in the number of 
Jordanians who identified themselves as Muslims first, and as 
Jordanians second.  Braizat and other sociologists theorize 
that Islam may have filled a void created by the decline of 
Arab nationalism and the collapse of socialist and communist 
ideology.  Another theory is that Jordanians may have more 
tightly embraced Islam as a way to confront a perceived 
onslaught of Western social and cultural values. 
 
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MB, IAF MEMBERSHIP STALLS 
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4.  (C)  Despite growing religious devotion, the Jordanian 
Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and its political offshoot, the 
Islamic Action Front (IAF), have not seen a noticeable 
increase in its active membership.  Dr. Ibrahim Gharaibeh, 
former MB member and social researcher who closely follows 
the Islamic movement, explained to PolOff that as Jordanian 
society has grown more religious in character, devout Muslims 
no longer feel a need to join the MB to publicly confirm 
their faith.  "Twenty years ago almost everyone who went to 
mosque every day was in the Muslim Brotherhood," said 
Gharaibeh, "but today most regular worshipers are not."  MB 
tactics aimed at boosting membership, such as the funding of 
mass wedding ceremonies for poor Jordanians, have not had a 
noticeable impact. 
 
5.  (C)  The IAF, the largest and best organized political 
party in Jordan, is sometimes portrayed in a radical light. 
Yet local observers almost uniformly characterize its 
leaders, particularly the 14-member Executive Bureau, as 
ultimately pragmatic and loyal to the Hashemite family. 
Despite frequent public clashes on policy issues, when push 
comes to shove, the IAF's desire to maintain its favored 
status with the regime has shown it is willing to cave under 
GOJ pressure, even at the expense of its own credibility. 
Senator Mohammad Al-Azaydeh, who left the IAF in 1997 but 
retains ties with the party, told PolOff there was a "gap" 
between the IAF leadership (primarily East Bankers) and some 
of the rank and file (predominantly of Palestinian origin), 
who favor a more confrontational approach.  However, he 
believes that the Executive Bureau was fully capable of 
keeping its members "under control." 
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GROWING CONCERN ABOUT EXTREMISM IN JORDAN 
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6.  (C)  While the MB and IAF may be able to keep their 
members in line, and the GOJ maintains a close hold on their 
activities, there is growing concern about religious 
extremism in Jordan, particularly among non-affiliated, poor, 
and disaffected youth.  The Zarqawi-directed bomb plot last 
April involving local Jordanian extremists was a wake up call 
to many ordinary Jordanians about the growing danger of 
radical Islam.  Gharaibeh contended that, despite the 
increased interest in Islam, only a very small fraction of 
Jordanian Muslims were extremist in their views.  Yet he 
conceded that the absolute number of Jordanians espousing 
Islamic extremism was most likely growing in number, 
prompting the King's recent directives to challenge these 
messages (ref A).  Elaborating on the recent confrontation 
between the GOJ and Islamists over unlicensed mosque 
preachers (ref B), a local daily recently pointed out that 
Jordanians are tuning out official sermons, which they know 
are vetted by the regime, and increasingly tuning in other 
sources of religious guidance.  These include radical 
Islamist messages (of the Salafist and Takfiri bent) that are 
circulated more informally through leaflets, cassettes, and 
during discussions in private homes beyond the reach of the 
security services.  Contacts both inside and outside the 
government worry that the young in particular are 
increasingly susceptible to radical messages and willing to 
carry out violent acts in accordance with these teachings. 
As an example, Jordanian authorities point to four young 
Jordanian-Palestinians intercepted in July trying to 
infiltrate Israel as influenced by Takfiri teachings (ref C). 
 
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HIJACKING THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE? 
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7.  (C)  Societal tensions between East Bank Jordanians and 
those of Palestinian descent have filtered into the IAF 
hierarchy, Azaydeh said, but the East Bankers still held the 
upper hand in resolving internal policy disputes.  The IAF's 
political advocacy on Palestinian issues, however, is not 
lost on (secular) Jordanian-Palestinians.  Palestinian 
contacts tell us that fear of reprisals from the security 
services (and East Bankers) keep most secular 
Jordanian-Palestinian activists from advocating publicly on 
issues important to their community, such as the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict, citizenship rights, or 
discrimination in Jordanian society.  As a result, the IAF 
has emerged as the main public voice for the cause of 
Palestinians in Jordan.  Earlier this month, for example, it 
was IAF MPs who met with PM Fayez, the Justice Minister, and 
the Interior Minister to discuss concerns that the GOJ had 
plans to withdraw citizenship from Jordanians of Palestinian 
origin.  The emergence of the IAF as a voice for 
Jordanian-Palestinians is a development does not sit well 
with many of our Jordanian-Palestinian contacts.  They say 
that because the IAF's new role ensures that "Palestinian" 
issues remain "oppositionist" issues, not to be taken 
seriously (ref D).  It also feeds the perception of many East 
Bankers that the Palestinians are the root of Jordan's 
troubles, feelings that persist since the 1970 civil war. 
 
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CAPITALIZING ON ANTI-U.S. SENTIMENT, BLOCKING SOME REFORMS 
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8.  (C)  Beyond the Palestinian issue, the IAF also is trying 
to broaden its popularity by increasing its focus on economic 
and foreign policy issues that appeal to the religious and 
the secular alike, according to post contacts.  Its 
opposition to unpopular tax hikes (ref E) struck a chord with 
the public and is also tapping into strong anti-U.S. 
sentiment in Jordan with more denunciations of the American 
administration.  In April of this year, the IAF's Muslim 
Scholars Committee issued a "fatwa" on the obligation to 
oppose the U.S.  administration for its "aggression against 
the Palestinian and Iraqi peoples."  A similar ruling was 
announced in May after the Abu Ghraib scandal (ref F), and 
the party has announced the cessation of any and all forms of 
cooperation with the U.S. government.  More recently, the 
same committee issued a fatwa declaring that joining the 
Iraqi military or police was a "sin against God," as was 
providing food or supplies to American forces in Iraq.  It 
further called for jihad in Iraq and for support for Shiite 
leader Muqtada Al-Sadr.  Jordan's other political parties are 
in disarray, awaiting a new parties law that theoretically 
may bolster moderate, secular forces.  But for now, the only 
organized, active, popular alternative to the IAF on a 
national scale is the network of professional associations, 
which traditionally filled the void created by long bans on 
party formation.  Unfortunately, association leaders are 
caught in an Arab nationalist time warp -- making them both 
anathema to the King and regime and a fairly feeble rival to 
the Islamists on certain issues.  On other matters, such as 
anti-normalization, the two sides have successfully 
capitalized on their overlapping memberships to find common 
cause against the government. 
 
9.  (C)  Despite the IAF's vitriol in denouncing some GOJ 
positions, many of our Jordanian interlocutors dismissed 
these statements as "just talk."  "They sometimes push at the 
boundaries with their edicts," said Gharaibeh, "but they know 
the government will usually leave them alone if they don't go 
beyond words."  The IAF recognizes that some issues may be 
too sensitive for public debate.  Attempts by Islamists to 
secure backing for the return of expelled HAMAS activists, 
for example, have been discreet and low-key.  In Parliament, 
they have successfully joined opportunistically with social 
conservatives and others to block elements of the King's 
reform agenda -- posing such a significant challenge that the 
King ended the summer extraordinary session early, in 
disgust.  The longevity of PM Fayez's tenure may well depend 
on whether he succeeds in breaking this logjam when 
parliament reconvenes after Ramadan.  The King has also made 
clear publicly that the government must do a better job to 
ensure that the "correct" message of Islam is spread through 
the mosques. 
 
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COMMENT 
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10.  (C)  The monarchy's successful taming of the Islamic 
"opposition" over the years -- while banning alternative 
secular political voices -- is coming back to haunt the 
regime.   Building frustration about the regional political 
situation, mounting anti-U.S. sentiment, the seeming 
disconnect between the regime and the masses, and popular 
impatience with aspects of the economic reform program, are 
coalescing to increase the appeal of radical Islamic calls to 
action.  For its part, the GOJ remains confident that it can 
channel and manage Islamic political sentiment with a 
combination of cooptation, surveillance, and, when necessary, 
carefully applied threats of repression.  In post's view, the 
regime's strategy will continue to meet with success in the 
medium term.  Over the longer haul, however, the monarchy 
will need to deliver the democratic political rights it has 
promised, if the King's ambitious plans for a prosperous and 
stable Jordan are to succeed. 
 
11.  (U)  Baghdad minimize considered. 
 
Visit Embassy Amman's classified website at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman/ or access the site 
through the State Department's SIPRNET home page. 
HALE