US embassy cable - 04YEREVAN2062

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 YEREVAN 002062 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/CACEN; INR 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2014 
TAGS: PINR, ECON, PTER, TBIO, PARM, AM, KPRP 
SUBJECT: ARMENIA: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AND PROLIFERATION 
 
REF: STATE 80982 
 
Classified By: DCM A.F. Godfrey for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1. (S/NF) Armenia does not have an active biological warfare 
program nor does it have an interest, desire or capability to 
start one (reftel).  The Armenian government has denied ever 
having a biological warfare program and currently Armenian 
biological institutes and private companies are struggling 
with low salaries and lack of new equipment.  This 
significantly hampers their ability to find international and 
domestic clients to purchase their vaccines, medicines and 
technological know-how.  The Armenian government has 
instituted strict export laws concerning the export, import 
and transit of dual-use items.  The Armenian emergency 
management administration stated that protection against 
biological attack was a lower government priority than 
preparing for other potential disasters, such as earthquakes, 
chemical or nuclear accidents.  End Summary. 
 
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ACQUISITION OF BW-RELATED ITEMS AND EXPERTISE WMDB 
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2. (S/NF) The MFA's Armen Isralian and Aram Tanyan, Deputy 
Head of the Armenian Emergency Management Administration 
(AEMA), both stated in no uncertain terms that the Armenian 
government (GOAM) did not conduct any biological warfare 
research during the Soviet period, that no research is 
currently underway and that they strongly believed that there 
was no interest or capability to start a program now.  Both 
explained that it was against Soviet doctrine to have any 
sensitive defense research located in a Soviet republic which 
bordered a NATO country.  Both also explained that soon after 
independence, with the terrible economic conditions and lack 
of electricity, it would have been nearly impossible to start 
and/or maintain any type of biological weapons program in 
Armenia.  Jean Akopian of the Institute of Microbiology (IM) 
told us that none of Armenia's chemical or biological 
institutes were secret closed institutes during the Soviet 
period, which was a prerequisite to conduct sensitive defense 
research.  Post has no evidence that the GOAM is working with 
any other country in order to acquire WMDB. 
 
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BW-ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT AND ARMENIAN EXPORT CONTROL POLICIES 
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3. (S/NF) Israelian told us that in 2003 the GOAM had 
established an export law modeled on the Australian group 
principles.  This law gives the Armenian export commission 
multiple tools to turn down any export that has dual-use 
properties.  The commission consists of nine deputy ministers 
who have the ability to call in scientific experts if needed. 
 The export control law carries penalties of up to eight 
years in prison and the commission has the legal right to 
question scientists that were working on biological programs 
overseas.  Isrealian told us that to his knowledge, the GOAM 
has never exported any biological agents.  Isrealian stated 
that a GOAM concern was that Armenia could become a transit 
corridor for illegal dual use items for Iran, and therefore, 
the GOAM purposefully made their export laws as strict as 
possible.  Israelian told us that after the fall of the 
Soviet Union, hundreds, if not thousands of qualified 
Armenian scientists and specialists either emigrated to 
Europe, America and Russia or simply took up other 
professions.  Israelian, as well as others in the scientific 
community, also stated that he had no first hand knowledge of 
any Armenian scientists who have worked or were currently 
working on Iranian or other rogue nation biological or other 
weapons programs.  Scientists have told us that oppressive 
Islamic environments, low pay, perceived low level of science 
and concerns about working with pariah states have 
discouraged most if not all Armenian scientists from working 
in Iran or other rogue nations.  The scientists and directors 
of scientific institutes told us that that western grants 
have helped Armenian scientists stay in Armenia, but more 
consistent funding from the GOAM will be needed in order to 
stop good Armenian scientists from emigrating or leaving the 
field of science altogether. 
 
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BW DETECTION, DECONTAMINATION AND MEDICAL CARE 
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4. (S/NF) After discussions with senior officials at the MOD, 
the defense attache reported his impression that the MOD has 
limited chemical, and biological defense capabilities and are 
placing biological defense at a low priority due to the lack 
of resources and low perceived threat.  The MOD does have one 
specialized unit, the 21st independent nuclear biological 
chemical defense battalion, which has approximately 92 
soldiers.  In order to deploy soldiers to Iraq as part of the 
coalition, the MOD had formally requested vaccinations 
against anthrax, typhoid, meningitis and smallpox. 
5. (S/NF) AEMA's Tanayan told us that his organization was 
working with international donors on various disaster relief 
projects to prepare for possible earthquakes and/or chemical 
accidents.  Tanyan told us that the AEMA does have a nuclear, 
biological, chemical laboratory where they can test for 
various chemical, radioactive and biological agents.  He also 
reported that the equipment is from the Soviet era, not up to 
international standards and does not allow the AEMA to 
conduct tests quickly.  Tanyan stated that AEMA has good 
specialists in biological, chemical and nuclear disciplines 
but they do not have the training, language skills and 
equipment to do international level work.  AEMA has a plan to 
open an local AEMA office in every region of Armenia in order 
to coordinate with all GOA agencies in the event of a 
disaster.  Tananyan admitted it would be very difficult to 
outfit all of the offices with modern equipment in order to 
do any accurate testing.  He stated that AEMA was working 
with local scientific institutes and various government 
agencies to compile a complete list of biological entities 
and where and how they were stored in Armenia. 
 
6. (S/NF) Tanyan explained that the AEMA SOP for any 
outbreaks of biological hazards among crops was to isolate 
and quarantine the infected area and then burn the crops. 
AEMA has the same SOP for infected farm animals.  Tananyan 
told us that Armenia has had some outbreaks of dysentery and 
cholera in the regions outside Yerevan but they were able to 
contain them quickly.  AEMA stated that they currently do not 
have any biological detection devices and they believed that 
the GOAM and the MOD were also probably lacking such 
equipment.  AEMA complained that they have very few vaccines 
on hand and do not even have the minimum stockpiles for 
ordinary problems such as snakebites and insects. 
 
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IMPACT OF BIOTECHNOLOGY AND SECURITY OF RESEARCH PATHOGENS 
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7. (S/NF) Dr. Harachya Hovhannisyan, a senior biologist at 
Armenicum, told us that the lack of modern equipment 
seriously limited the international-level work was being 
conducted in the field of biotechnology in Armenia. 
Armenicum, an Armenian biotechnology company currently being 
funded by Armenian businessmen (allegedly including Minister 
of Defense Serzh Sargsian) was one of the exceptions. 
Hovhannisyan told us that Armenicum was working on AIDS 
vaccines and had sold some medications to Indian clients. 
Dr. Hovhannisyan stated that Armenicum was guarded by 
Armenian soldiers, and he felt that this measure had been 
taken to safeguard the expensive American machinery as well 
as Sargsian's personal investment.  Dr. Akopian of IM 
explained that IM was currently specializing in sugar 
substitutes, nitrogen, natural zeolites, and agricultural 
nitrogen techniques.  Akopian told us that they have garnered 
some interest from the Chinese company Northstar.  The 
Armenian Lysine Plant, Lizin, who had been sanctioned by the 
Department of State in May of 2002 for two years for the 
attempted sale of fermenters to Iran, told us that after 
their sanction expired, they planned to market and sell 
livestock feed, lysine, vitamins, medicines and sugar 
substitutes to local domestic companies as well as any 
interested international clients. 
EVANS