US embassy cable - 04KINSHASA1746

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 001746 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, CG 
SUBJECT: RCD/G WANTS MORE FROM TRANSITION 
 
REF: KINSHASA 1657 
 
Classified By: Poloff Meghan Moore for Reasons 1.5 B and D 
 
1. (C) Summary. In exchange for returning to Kinshasa and the 
transitional government on September 1, VP Ruberwa asked the 
government and international community to address a laundry 
list of RCD/G concerns about the transition. The demands, 
which ranged from disbanding parallel military structures and 
firing a military commander to sorting out parastatal 
appointments and ending hate media, did not resonate with 
many Congolese who have vastly different concerns with the 
present state of the transition. End Summary. 
 
It Isn't Fair... 
---------------- 
 
2. (C) Ruberwa met with the Ambassador and polcouns on 
September 1 and with the Ambassador, the British Ambassador, 
and former Senator Nancy Kassebaum Baker, who visited the DRC 
in her capacity as a member of the Blair Commission for 
Africa, on September 2. Ruberwa claimed the RCD/G has not 
received equal treatment in the transition, discussed general 
insecurity in the east, and raised what he called the 
'genocide' in Gatumba. Ruberwa gave the Ambassador a summary 
of political, military, and economic demands, including an 
end to parallel structures within the transitional 
government, dismissal of certain military commanders, 
convening the Supreme Military Council, removal of recently 
deployed FARDC troops from eastern DRC and a share of posts 
in the parastatals and other government entities. The RCD/G 
also called on the transitional government to end hate media 
and develop a plan to bring refugees back to S. Kivu. See 
para 5 for complete list. 
 
 
...or Working 
------------- 
 
3. (C) In addition to his specific demands, Ruberwa said the 
transition process is not working, and he does not see how 
elections can take place in this type of insecure 
environment. President Kabila makes most important decisions 
within the Presidency and the 'Maison Militaire' (a parallel 
military advisory structure controlled by the President and 
key hardliners, including Samba Kaputo) without any reference 
to Ruberwa. For example, Ruberwa said he was not informed 
that VP Bemba and Kabila planned to send large numbers of 
troops to the east, which further marginalized his role as VP 
of Politics and Security. (Comment: Bemba sent large numbers 
of troops from Gbadolite and reportedly received several 
million dollars for ferrying troops in his planes. End 
comment.) Ruberwa said that S. Kivu military commander BG 
Mabe had deliberately integrated anti-Banyamulenge forces 
into the military, which has contributed to a generally 
anti-Banyamulenge, anti-RCD, and anti-Ruberwa policy on the 
part of the former government. 
 
Mbeki's Mediation 
----------------- 
 
4. (C) Ruberwa said he was very happy with South African 
President Thabo Mbeki's mediation efforts during his August 
30-31 visit to Kinshasa. (Note: On September 10, he told a 
CIAT delegation the same thing. See septel. End note.) 
Ruberwa said Mbeki wanted to see the Global Accord respected, 
understood there were stresses in the transition, and tried 
hard to mediate specifically between Kabila and Ruberwa. 
(Comment: In fact, one presidential advisor told polcouns 
that Mbeki's high-profile involvement angered President 
Kabila, and led to Kabila's refusal to meet jointly with 
Ruberwa and Mbeki during the latter's visit, forcing the 
South African President into a series of time-consuming 
'shuttle diplomacy' meetings--a method later confirmed by the 
South African Ambassador in a CIAT briefing. End comment.) 
 
What does the RCD/G want? 
------------------------- 
 
5. (U) The RCD/G's list of demands, as presented in Ruberwa's 
August 31 letter to Mbeki, follows: 
 
--End parallel structures within the transitional government 
and encourage the normal functioning of Institutions set up 
by the All Global and Inclusive Accord 
 
--Set up a joint mechanism (CIAT ) Components) to evaluate 
the transition every three months and include the mediator 
and the co-mediators in the follow-up process for the 
transition 
 
--Recognize the role of the Vice President in charge of the 
Political, Defense and Security Commission in the daily 
management of military, security and diplomatic issues, as 
well as his authority over the army and security services 
 
--Finish dividing up 'responsibilities' within the 
parastatals, financial enterprises, security services and the 
local provincial administration. Until divided, retain 
existing structures put in place by the various 
administrations 
 
--Release individuals jailed for political opinions or 
membership in the RCD 
Military Demands 
--Dismiss the 10th Military Region Commander (BG Mbuja Mabe) 
and certain of his officers who were 'actual or intellectual' 
authors of the Gatumba genocide, and killings and massacres 
in Bukavu and Kalehe (Comment. There is no proof to support 
these allegations. End comment.) 
 
--Convene the Defense Supreme Council and establish a 
calendar of meetings (done) 
 
--Immediately set up a mechanism to identify and neutralize 
ex-FAR, Interahamwe and FNL militia who are hiding in the 
FARDC 
 
--Reinstate all former ANC commanders and put them back in 
control of their respective units until the army integration 
process is complete 
 
--Stop all new deployments of troops to eastern DRC until the 
regular integration process is complete 
 
--Regroup recently deployed troops to eastern DRC outside 
North and South Kivu until integration can take place and 
negative forces (ex-FAR, Interahamwe, and FNL) can be removed 
from the FARDC 
 
--Reinstate the 8th Military Region Commander's (BG Obedi) 
authority over all of North Kivu 
 
--Immediately release arrested former ANC military officers 
 
Economic/Financial Demands 
--------------------------- 
 
--Allow Goma-based companies and enterprises which were 
authorized by the former RCD administration to operate 
throughout the country 
 
--Audit public property management without obstructions from 
state agencies 
 
--Submit large expenditures of all government agencies, 
including the Presidency, to public bid procedures and make 
joint decisions on government expenditures 
 
Other Concerns 
-------------- 
 
--Set a time-line for the return of refugees from Burundi and 
Rwanda, and provide for the refugees' security 
 
--End hate media, as well as discriminatory, racist, ethnic 
and xenophobic speeches 
 
--Ensure non-discriminatory access to official media for all 
political parties 
 
Comment 
-------- 
 
6. (C) Ruberwa's demands are focused on RCD/G and 
Banyamulenge concerns and are out-of-touch with political 
realities in much of eastern DRC and Kinshasa. Most Congolese 
hope to get to elections as quickly as possible and want to 
see more of the central government--not less. Ruberwa 
undoubtedly feels buffeted by strong forces he cannot 
control. He is mistrusted by most of the political leaders in 
Kinshasa, he is under attack from Bizima Karaha and other 
hard-liners within his own party, and not unrelated--he 
harbors strong fears for his personal security at all times. 
His inability to act as a national vice president by seeing 
past his political party and ethnic identity, however, 
severely limits his effectiveness as a party and national 
leader. Moreover, the problem is made worse by his tendency 
to make unhelpful, impassioned statements when provoked by a 
perceived injury to one of his constituencies. (Note: Unless 
provoked he has an intensely legal, pedantic style of 
speaking. End note.) We will encourage Ruberwa to think and 
act to present the RCD/G as a national political party and 
not as an ethnic movement, to further his own interests as 
well as those of his core constituency and the country 
generally. Most importantly, we will stress the importance of 
avoiding any military actions that will only work to the 
further detriment of Tutsis and other groups in the east, and 
to his own party. He and other RCD/G leaders, however, must 
be aware of their very limited popular support and therefore 
limited options for a political future in a post-election DRC. 
MEECE