US embassy cable - 04KINSHASA1745

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001745 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, CG 
SUBJECT: POLITICALLY-INEPT RUBERWA PLAYS CARDS BADLY 
 
REF: KINSHASA 1657 
 
Classified By: Poloff Meghan Moore for Reasons 1.5 B and D 
 
1. (C) Summary. On September 10, VP Azarias Ruberwa met with 
a CIAT delegation and complained about the CIAT's 
ineffectiveness, the state of army integration, security 
sector reform, and hate media. It is unclear how committed 
Ruberwa and his followers will be to the transition if their 
key demands cannot be met. End summary. 
 
2. (C) Since the RCD/G's return on September 1, the Supreme 
Defense Council has met twice. National Security Advisor 
Samba Kaputo told DCM and polcouns on September 10 that the 
council would discuss military integration, disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration (DDR), and what he calls 
'military missions' and what Ruberwa calls 'parallel military 
structures.' On September 6-8, the Council of Ministers 
discussed Ruberwa's evaluation of the transition. 
 
RCD/G Hard-liners Meet with CIAT 
------------------------------- 
 
3. (C) MONUC Poloff told poloff that on September 10 an 
abbreviated CIAT group (South Africa, Belgium, UK, 
Netherlands in its capacity as EU President, Angola and 
African Union) met with Ruberwa (in his capacity as RCD/G 
President) and a group of RCD/G hard-liners who all went to 
Goma during the recent transition standoff. The two-hour 
meeting took place at Ruberwa's residence. For 1 1/2 hours, 
Ruberwa went through the standard litany of RCD/G complaints. 
He complained extensively about the CIAT's ineffectiveness, 
said the CIAT was partly to blame for past problems with the 
transition and would be responsible for future possible 
problems if it did not take a more active role--perhaps as an 
arbitrator of disputes. He also complained that the 
Independent Electoral Commission (CEI), at the local level, 
would be staffed by PPRD faithful because the CIAT failed to 
support earlier RCD/G calls for representation for all 
components at all levels of the electoral process. (Comment: 
Earlier this year, we and other CIAT members lobbied hard to 
prevent precisely what Ruberwa is proposing, because it would 
have politicized the CEI and rendered it unwieldy. End 
comment.) 
 
4. (C) Ruberwa also complained about parallel military 
structures, nonexistent progress on army integration, 
security sector reform and hate media (septel). He said that 
there was very little money in the budget for general 
military expenditures, and no money in the current budget for 
army integration. (Comment: These two points are valid. Most 
military spending is decided by the 'Maison Militaire'--an 
advisory structure within the Presidency. End comment). 
Ruberwa said there has been no progress on security sector 
reform, citing as an example the fact that the ANR (the main 
intelligence agency) has never submitted a single report to 
him. Finally, Ruberwa loudly complained about the climate of 
hate media which he claims is being supported directly by 
those close to the President. (Comment: This serious 
allegation has some merit. On September 9, moderate Vice 
Minister of Interior, Paul Musafiri (MLC) told polcouns that 
for $100, anyone could go on television and say anything they 
wanted. He suggested that PPRD members had provided money to 
certain individuals, including Pastor Ngoy, to deliver 
anti-Banyamulenge messages. End comment.) 
 
Comment 
-------- 
 
5. (C) CIAT colleagues present told the Ambassador that it 
was a fatiguing exercise. Present with Ruberwa in the room 
were a variety of RCD/G leaders, most known as relative 
hard-liners. None of the non-Tutsi RCD/G Ministers who 
refused to accompany Ruberwa to Goma recently nor associate 
themselves with the RCD/G decision to 'suspend' participation 
in the transition were present. Subsequent discussion in the 
CIAT indicated that the CIAT will not make any formal 
response to the many RCD/G points, but rather indicate that 
the CIAT is actively engaged in addressing problems and 
issues that threaten continued progress in the transition, or 
violate principles and provisions of the underlying peace 
accords. 
 
6. (C) Though some of his complaints are valid, Ruberwa has 
played his cards badly. Although intelligent, Ruberwa often 
seems politically blind and has consistently managed to 
present himself as a defender of the Banyamulenge and 
Rwandans first, and of the Congolese second. His often 
emotional reaction to nationality issues seems to have played 
into the hands of extremists (like Bizima Karaha and Moise 
Nyarugabo) within his party, and has probably strengthened 
the hand of PPRD and MLC hard-liners, making compromise on 
key questions such as amnesty and nationality laws that much 
more difficult. Pro-government press, most notably the daily 
L'Avenir and the digitalcongo.net website, have had a field 
day-- a veritable Ruberwa-roast over the past several days. 
 
7. (C) As the political space for moderate, reasoned debate 
continues to erode, the possibility for political stalemate 
or, worse, conflict, grows larger.  In response, the CIAT 
will likely play a more active role, privately and publicly. 
There is still political will to reach the elections (partly 
because no one party or individual wishes to be identified as 
the spoiler, and we believe that this commonality of 
interests between the international community and the 
Congolese political class, together with progress on some of 
the RCD/G's more reasonable demands, will enable the 
transition to recapture momentum. End comment. 
MEECE