US embassy cable - 04BOGOTA9437

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 009437 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/13/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, EAID, KJUS, PINR, CO, ELN Peace Process 
SUBJECT: ELN WILLING TO TALK BUT NOT MUCH 
 
REF: BOGOTA 8262 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affairs Milton K. Drucker for reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (U) On September 6, the Central Command (COCE) of the 
National Liberation Army (ELN) formally responded to the 
GOC's August 3 communiqu reported reftel.  The ELN's written 
response criticized the GOC for its delay in responding to 
the ELN's June 4 negotiating proposal and for failing to 
address the substance of the ELN's offer.  Nevertheless, the 
COCE said it accepted the GOC's August 3 response as a 
positive sign of willingness to dialogue.  The tone of the 
ELN's letter was cautious but civil and left the door open 
for further communication and continuing facilitation by the 
Government of Mexico. 
 
2. (U) Begin unofficial translation: 
 
Last August 3, we received your letter responding to the 
proposed humanitarian accord presented by the ELN on June 4. 
As you can see, the Government's response took two months, 
while this message only took one month, which means the ELN's 
speed of response is twice that of the Government. 
 
But what most stands out in the Government response is that 
none of its seventeen paragraphs mention the ELN's June 4 
proposal.  It seems that the Government did not understand or 
intentionally ignored what we are proposing. 
 
To not respond to an interlocutor's proposals or to dodge 
them can lead us into a dialogue of the deaf, which is not at 
all productive in building (mutual) confidence, so it is 
obvious we are speaking different languages.  We have 
advanced a bit; at least we realize that we are speaking, 
even if we do not understand each other.  In any case, 
despite the delay in the Government's response, we value it 
as a positive sign of interest in dialogue. 
 
We deduce from the Government's proposal that we are very far 
apart.  The Government maintains that all is well in the 
country, that with the Democratic Security Policy things will 
be even better, and that the solution to the social and armed 
conflict can be reduced to demobilization and disarmament. 
In the meantime, the guerrillas will declare a unilateral 
ceasefire to demonstrate they can stop "being terrorists," 
and if they stop kidnapping the Government can release some 
imprisoned guerrillas, that is, "if they do not misbehave 
again." 
 
The country has spent more than 13 years reflecting on the 
situation and concluded that the armed conflict has deep 
social roots, that the State is primarily responsible for the 
chaos that Colombia is living through, and that as long as 
these causes are not overcome, it will be very difficult for 
a paradise of peace to reign on a boat that is adrift. 
 
The Government has proposed that we cease kidnapping, to 
which the ELN says to the Government that it should turn over 
the thousands of "disappeareds", the State being primarily 
responsible for them.  Of course we will have to address this 
issue, the ELN is aware of this, but while we take that large 
step, it would be better to decide on modest, realistic 
goals. 
 
It is then a matter of clarifying our visions with respect to 
PEACE, and whether achieving peace requires social and 
political transformations that would make the use of arms 
unnecessary.  It is critical to know whether the State is 
disposed to take such a track.  We believe that the effort to 
clarify is assisted by the facilitation of Mexico, the Group 
of Friends and other national and international efforts. 
 
The nation continues its path towards greater and greater 
polarization, increasingly as a result of hawkish policies 
and repressive actions against the population.  If this bad 
environment does not change in favor of democracy and 
persecution does not end, the search for peace will be as 
futile as plowing the desert. 
 
We would like to invite the Government to examine these 
proposals with more flexibility and that, with the goal of 
recreating initiatives, international facilitating bodies 
work to overcome current obstacles.  To that end, we 
reiterate that the ELN proposes to work towards a 
Humanitarian Accord whereby, in addition to reaching an 
agreement with the Colombian Government about the use of 
mines and explosives, we reach a General Amnesty for the 
Political Arrests and Prisoners of War, and a bilateral, 
temporary ceasefire.  Agreements which together could open 
the way to the longed for political solution that all 
Colombians dream of. 
 
When negotiating a deal, you cannot ask of the insurgency 
what the Government is not willing to take on ) that is, the 
healthy principle of reciprocity. 
 
Dare to think of peace, it is a notion shared by the people 
of the nation. 
End text. 
 
------------------- 
Mediation by Mexico 
------------------- 
 
3. (C) On September 15, the Charge d'Affaires met with 
Ambassador Andres Valencia, the Government of Mexico's 
designated facilitator for GOC outreach to the ELN.  Valencia 
said the generally respectful tone of the ELN's response -- 
particularly its failure to allude to the Colombian 
military's recent killings of three alleged ELN union 
activists in Arauca Department -- was encouraging.  He 
admitted that the relatively positive tone surprised him, 
given the GOC's insistence in its August 3 letter on a 
unilateral ELN cease-fire before negotiations could begin. 
Valencia opined that if the GOC were to insist on such a 
hard-line precondition, it would essentially kill the process 
before it even begins.  He admitted he is still struggling to 
understand both sides' bottom-line negotiating positions and 
demands, but said he believes that a degree of flexibility by 
the GOC will permit measurable progress over time.  He asked 
the U.S. to urge the GOC to be more flexible in the 
discussion with the ELN. 
 
4. (C) Valencia also noted the ELN, unlike the 
paramilitaries, is broke.  They have no way of supporting 
themselves if they stop kidnapping and other illegal acts. 
Therefore, according to Valencia, in order for an 
ELN-ceasefire to be effective, the ELN will need some way of 
obtaining sustenance.  In response to a Valencia idea, the 
Charge pointed out it was unreasonable to expect the GOC to 
feed the ELN during negotiations, but perhaps some outside 
group might think it appropriate.  Nonetheless, he reminded 
Velencia that the ELN had been declared a terrorist 
organization by the United States and the EU countries.  This 
would be a severe constraint on anyone trying to assist the 
ELN during negotiations. 
DRUCKER