US embassy cable - 04RANGOON1225

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001225 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV; INR/B; PACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, MARR, BM, TH 
SUBJECT: THE BURMESE REGIME'S "SELECTIVE ENGAGEMENT" WITH 
THAILAND 
 
REF: A. BANGKOK 6164 
 
     B. RANGOON 512 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  A recent exchange of top military visits 
between Burma and Thailand indicates improving relations 
between the SPDC and the Royal Thai Armed Forces and is a 
sign that many wounds have healed since the two armies 
squared off during a series of deadly border skirmishes in 
mid-2002.  However, SPDC Chairman Senior General Than Shwe 
has apparently failed to respond to multiple requests from 
Thai Prime Minister Thaksin to meet in Rangoon, a likely 
indication that the regime's new found comfort zone with the 
Thai does not extend from the uniforms to the suits.  End 
Summary. 
 
2. (U) On the heels of Burmese Joint Chief of Staff General 
Thura Shwe Mann's August 24-26 visit to Bangkok (reftel), 
Thailand's top military brass made recent, successive visits 
to Rangoon to meet with senior SPDC officials.  From August 
31 to September 1 Royal Thai Army Commander in Chief General 
Chaisit Shinawatra made a two-day visit to Rangoon.  Just 
over a week later, September 10-11, Supreme Commander General 
Somdhat Attanand made an almost identical high-profile visit. 
 Gen Chaisit will replace Gen Somdhat as Supreme Commander on 
October 1. 
 
3. (C) Each Thai general had substantive meetings with the 
SPDC's top two leaders, Senior General Than Shwe and Vice 
Senior General Maung Aye.  According to Thai Embassy 
political counselor Kallayana Vipattipumiprates, who attended 
all of the meetings, General Chaisit gave Than Shwe 
assurances that his forces would not allow insurgents to use 
Thai territory as a base "to disrupt" neighboring countries 
and that he was confident his successor, deputy CINC General 
Pravit Kongsuwan, would adhere to the same policy.  Although 
the two generals did not discuss ongoing talks between the 
SPDC and the Karen National Union (KNU), Than Shwe expressed 
an appreciation for the role Thai forces had played in 
"controlling" the border environment, observing that a more 
secure border would lead to mutually beneficial development. 
 
4. (C) According to Kallayana, General Chaisit's meeting with 
Maung Aye revealed interesting commentary from the Burmese 
Army chief.  Maung Aye said that "it is time we opened our 
hearts to those who seek a peaceful and democratic" Burma and 
he expressed the SPDC's desire to complete the regime's road 
map as soon as possible.  It had not been easy negotiating 
with the ethnic cease-fire groups, he said, but the GOB had 
achieved progress, including with the KNU.  Maung Aye 
repeated the word "democracy" several times, said Kallayana, 
but qualified his remarks by adding that Burma "seeks a 
version of democracy that is acceptable to the (Burmese) 
people and to the international community," a process that 
"might take longer than expected and therefore we are not 
certain about a timeline for the road map." 
 
5. (C) The SPDC accorded the same red-carpet treatment to 
General Somdhat Attanand's follow-on visit, including 
meetings with top SPDC authorities, an official dinner for 
the "Thai goodwill delegation," and full coverage by 
state-run media.  SPDC Chairman Than Shwe, according to the 
Thai political counselor, told Somdhat he wanted to continue 
"close relations" between the Burmese and Thai militaries and 
hoped there would be no disruption after the Supreme 
Commander retires in October.  At the official dinner on 
September 10, host Vice Senior General Maung Aye joked to his 
guests about his own retirement, saying he was "an old man," 
and identified JCS Shwe Mann, Secretary 1 Lt Gen Soe Win, and 
Secretary 2 Lt Gen Thein Sein as "my replacements." 
 
SIPDIS 
 
6. (C) The Thai Minister of Defense is also expected to make 
a visit to Rangoon in the coming months.  However, the SPDC 
has failed to respond to several requests by Prime Minister 
Thaksin to meet with Senior General Than Shwe.  The PM has 
made at least two official requests and the Burmese have to 
date ignored the issue.  According to Kallayana, the PM is 
keen to advance a plan involving Thai support for the 
development of Dawei, a southern Burmese port city near the 
Thai border, and other bilateral issues.  The RTG, he said, 
views PM Khin Nyunt as "hamstrung" by the less flexible Than 
Shwe and consequently Thaksin wants to "go to the top" and 
deal directly with the SPDC Chairman. 
 
7. (C) Comment:  The SPDC generals take great delight in 
hosting visitors such as the Thai military leadership: the 
discussions focus on mutual border issues; their guests are 
polite and avoid raising sensitive political issues; and in 
the process the Burmese relish a perceived boost in their 
legitimacy.  However, the SPDC's apparent dismissal of PM 
Thaksin's quiet entreaties is puzzling, particularly given 
Thaksin's willingness to create a "soft" international venue 
(the "Bangkok Process") for the Burmese regime to pitch their 
road map.  The Thai political counselor says the RTG is 
surprised by the snub and he opines that Than Shwe is keen to 
avoid Thaksin because the SPDC suspects ("with good reason") 
that the Thai will raise the continued detention of Aung San 
Suu Kyi and other "unpleasant" political issues.  End Comment. 
 
8. (U) This message has been coordinated with Embassy Bangkok. 
Martinez