US embassy cable - 04ABUDHABI3210

Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.

LOCAL VIEWS ON PROSPECTS FOR UAE DEMOCRATIZATION

Identifier: 04ABUDHABI3210
Wikileaks: View 04ABUDHABI3210 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Abu Dhabi
Created: 2004-09-16 06:04:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PGOV PHUM SOCI KWMN KDEM KMPI TC SA
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
null
Diana T Fritz  02/05/2007 05:36:00 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Search Results

Cable 
Text:                                                                      
                                                                           
      
C O N F I D E N T I A L        ABU DHABI 03210

SIPDIS
CXABU:
    ACTION: POL
    INFO:   MEPI RSO AMB DCM P/M ECON

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: AMB:MSISON
DRAFTED: POL:SRADDANT CG:JDAV
CLEARED: A/DCM:HOWINDECKER POL:JMAYBURY MEPI:HWECHSEL

VZCZCADI692
PP RUEHC RUEHZM RUEHRH RUEHDE
DE RUEHAD #3210/01 2600604
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 160604Z SEP 04
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5947
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 1379
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 4341
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 003210 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/ARP, NEA/RA and DRL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/14 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, SOCI, KWMN, KDEM, KMPI, TC, SA 
SUBJECT: LOCAL VIEWS ON PROSPECTS FOR UAE 
DEMOCRATIZATION 
 
REF: A) ABU DHABI 1589 B) 03 DUBAI 1318 C) 03 
DUBAI 3529 D) 03 ABU DHABI 1813 E) 03 DUBAI 2103 
 
1. (U) Classified by Ambassador Michele J. Sison 
for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D). 
 
2. (U) This message was jointly drafted by Embassy 
Abu Dhabi and ConGen Dubai. 
 
3. (C) SUMMARY: The slow but steady regional trend 
toward democratization has triggered some, albeit 
limited, discussion in Emirati circles about the 
prospects of taking similar steps here in the UAE. 
The local media has been reporting regularly on the 
progress of Saudi Arabia's moves toward its first 
municipal election, and people often compare and 
contrast Saudi Arabia's democratization steps to 
those made in Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman.  Our 
contacts were generally supportive of 
democratization in the region, although they 
maintain that UAE rulers should adopt changes 
slowly.  A proposal in Dubai to hold popular 
elections for a District Council was dropped this 
month in lieu of an appointed council.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
----------------------------------- 
EMIRATI THOUGHTS ON DEMOCRATIZATION 
----------------------------------- 
 
4. (C) Dr. Muhammed Abdullah Al Roken, an attorney 
who is seeking government permission to operate an 
independent human rights NGO (Ref. A), told Poloff 
that UAE nationals are ready for increased 
political participation, and are watching and 
quietly discussing the shift toward democracy in 
other Gulf countries.  However, Al Roken, an avowed 
Islamist who was removed from a professorship at 
UAE University in Al Ain post-9/11 as part of a 
government sweep of potential extremists from 
positions of influence, believes that change will 
have to flow from the government to the masses, not 
vice versa.  He believes that most Emiratis would 
not try to pressure the UAEG into political changes 
for fear of social and political blowback.  He 
opined that the wealthy are too self-centered to 
risk political and social disfavor.  On the other 
hand, poorer and less educated Emiratis are too 
intimidated to speak out, he believes, and count 
their blessings that they are able to approach 
their rulers occasionally for handouts. 
 
5. (C) At the other end of the spectrum, some Dubai 
contacts have argued that Dubai and the other 
emirates already have functioning "bedouocracies" - 
- their term for the existing political system of 
rule by hereditary tribal chiefs who hold daily 
"open courts" or majlises, during which all male 
citizens can have direct access to their leaders, 
should they desire it.  (Note: Rulers' majlises are 
all-male events.  End note.)  This system amounts 
to a type of direct representation that, they feel, 
serves the UAE's small population quite well and 
obviates the immediate need to import western-style 
democracy.  Many others, particularly in Dubai, 
believe that it is very important if only for PR 
purposes for the UAE to start moving cautiously in 
the direction of popular elections. (Note: The need 
for caution is mentioned frequently by even the 
strongest backers of increased political 
participation in the UAE, mainly due to concerns 
about the "destabilizing" effects of direct 
elections, which some observers here believe have 
been evident in Kuwait and Bahrain. End note.) 
 
----------------------------- 
UAEG VIEWS OF DEMOCRATIZATION 
----------------------------- 
 
6. (C) Government views on holding elections vary 
from emirate to emirate.  Dubai announced with much 
fanfare in April 2003 that it would hold district 
elections within the next three months (Ref. B). 
Dubai notables told us later in the year that a 
"Supreme Council" had been formed to come up with a 
detailed election plan, which would likely include 
some form of direct local elections, ideally prior 
to Summer 2004 (Ref. C).  That deadline also passed 
without comment. 
 
7. (C) During a recent meeting with Mohammed Gergawi, 
Chairman of Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid's Executive Office, 
CG asked for an update on planning for the proposed 
elections.  Gergawi admitted somewhat sheepishly that the 
Supreme Council tasked with planning the elections had 
largely completed its work, and that the final plan does 
not envision any role for direct elections, even for 
Dubai's Emirati national population.  Instead, committees 
of up to a hundred prominent citizens from each 
neighborhood would be appointed by the Ruler's office, and 
they would elect from among themselves a representative (or 
possibly several, depending on the population of the 
neighborhood) to send to a new District Council. 
 
8. (C) CG asked whether the decision to move away from 
direct elections had been entirely local, or whether the 
views of others from neighboring emirates had been taken 
into account.  Gergawi said he could not address that 
point, but that it was important to emphasize that the 
decision was taken mainly to ensure that "extremists" and 
other disruptive elements were not given a platform.  He 
added that, in his opinion, UAE society was not mature 
enough to deal with the inherent instability of an 
electoral free-for-all, even at the local/district level. 
(Comment: This is disappointing news given that Dubai's 
proposed District Council elections were the first, and so 
far only, tangible hint that moves toward greater political 
participation might be in the cards for the UAE. End 
Comment. 
 
9. (C) UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs 
and Deputy Prime Minister Sheikh Hamdan bin Zayed 
has said in the past that he favors an early move 
to democratization in the UAE (Ref. D).  He thought 
this would be a fitting legacy for his father, 
President Sheikh Zayed, and the President's support 
of the political change would make it more widely 
accepted, especially among conservatives.  Sheikh 
Hamdan said that the fact that a number of other 
states in the region, including the Saudis, are 
opening up politically, adds a sense of urgency to 
the matter. 
 
10. (C) However, other Emirati officials are more 
leery of moves toward democratization both here and 
regionally, and even if they support the concept of 
democracy, they believe governments must move 
carefully.  The ruler of Sharjah, Sheikh Sultan bin 
Mohammed Al Qassimi, recommended last year that the 
USG should not push too hard for democratization in 
the Arab world, since holding elections now could 
result in the election of members of radical 
Islamist organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood 
(Ref. E).  Instead of moving directly towards 
popular elections, Al Qassimi recommended that the 
USG encourage other long-term steps that foster a 
culture of democracy, such as improving the 
education system. 
 
-------------------- 
COMMENT ON U.S. ROLE 
-------------------- 
 
11. (U) While it is important that moves toward 
democratization are UAE-initiated, there are a 
number of steps the USG can take to expedite the 
trend and assist the government and potential 
electorate to make the transition to democracy as 
smooth as possible.  MEPI is well positioned to 
continue offering reform programs that emphasize 
increased civil society participation and explain 
democratic processes.  The MEPI-sponsored Media 
Strategy Assistance Workshop, to be held in Abu 
Dhabi next month and attended by 30 participants 
from the region, is an excellent example of how the 
U.S. can support reform in the UAE.  Mission will 
continue to nominate key UAE leaders for IV 
programs, such as the one currently supporting a 
trip of Federal National Council appointees to 
Washington, D.C.  Finally, Mission will continue to 
encourage the UAEG to participate in G8/BMENA 
events that promote democratic reform via economic 
and civil society dialogue, such as the September 
24 BMENA/Foreign Ministers' meeting on the margins 
of UNGA, and the October 1 BMENA/Finance Ministers' 
meeting on the margins of the IMF/World Bank annual 
meeting in Washington. 
 
SISON 

Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04