US embassy cable - 04DHAKA3164

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USG REJECTS REQUEST FOR SUPPORT FOR POSSIBLE COUP

Identifier: 04DHAKA3164
Wikileaks: View 04DHAKA3164 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Dhaka
Created: 2004-09-16 04:13:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: BG PGOV PINR PREL
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
O 160413Z SEP 04
FM AMEMBASSY DHAKA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5437
S E C R E T  DHAKA 003164 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/16/2014 
TAGS: BG, PGOV, PINR, PREL 
SUBJECT: USG REJECTS REQUEST FOR SUPPORT FOR POSSIBLE COUP 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Harry K. Thomas, reasons 1.4 b and d 
 
1. (S) Summary: Retired Bangladesh Army Chief Khan asked for 
USG support in ending Bangladesh,s current administration 
and in bringing a government of national unity consisting of 
senior leaders of both major parties.  Khan said 
Bangladesh,s only way out of dynastic government and the 
rise of Islamic extremism was to draft a new constitution 
based on the presidential system that would prevent current 
Prime Minster Zia or former Prime Minister Hasina from 
holding office. He asked for USG support for a two-three year 
interim government and a constitutional assembly. Ambassador 
responded that the USG would not under any circumstances 
support a coup against the Bangladesh Government (BDG), would 
ensure that any military action against Prime Minister Zia 
would result in sanctions against the successor government. 
End Summary. 
 
2. (S) Ambassador recently dined with Lt. General Noorudin. 
Khan (retired), former Chief of Army Staff and Awami League 
cabinet minister, who requested USG assistance in bringing a 
government of national unity to power and ridding Bangladesh 
of Sheikh Hasina and Khaledia Zia through a series of mass 
agitations.  Ambassador told Khan that the USG supports 
democracy and stability and cannot sanction any extra 
constitutional means of removing the government. The USG does 
not support military coups stressed the Ambassador. 
 
3. (S) Khan responded that Bangladesh,s future is hostage to 
two women who cannot put aside their difference for the 
nation,s sake.  Khan accused the BDG of bankrupting the 
military.  He said the seven top generals &who he derided as 
the malevolent seven8 were the Prime Minister,s brother 
(Retired Major Eskander,s) classmates and were chosen for 
their loyalty and not competence.  He said that the BDG had 
started the politicization of the officer,s corps during 
Zia,s first term (91-96) and that Hasina had accelerated it 
(96-2001).  He recommended that General Abu Tayeb Mahammad 
Zaahirul Alam (called General Zahir), commandant of the 
National Defense College, take charge of the country.  He 
said that General Zahir is a true supporter of democracy and 
would form a government with competent ministers from both 
parties for two-three years to improve Bangladesh,s weak 
institutions, draft a new constitution, end corruption and to 
attract much needed foreign investment before holding 
internationally observed democratic elections. 
 
4. (S) Khan alleged that the BDG fears coups even from its 
Eskander,s batch mates and had sidelined Major General Rokon 
to the Quartermaster Corps earlier this year because he was 
thought to be a threat to the current government.  (Comment: 
There is much speculation over Rokon,s reassignment and 
while it could have been because he is one of the few 
officers thought capable of staging a coup, he is a batch 
mate of the Prime Minister,s brother and may have been 
placed in a holding pattern until a more lucrative assignment 
opens in the coming months.  End Comment.) 
 
5. (S) Khan, a former minister under Sheikh Hasina resigned 
from the Awami League in early 2004 in frustration with its 
inability to focus on the future.  He accused &Hasina of 
losing her cards8 after the August 21 attack on the Awami 
League.  Instead of calling for an independent investigation 
and taking the moral high ground, she insisted on repeated 
strikes and attempted to bring the government down.  She lost 
popular support and an unintended consequence may be that the 
BDG no longer feels compelled to solve the crime, he said. 
Khan said that an interim military government is the only 
alternative to continued dynastic politics.  He said that 
first son Tariq Rahman and his younger brother Arafat Rahman 
& will terrorize the country, extort money from businesses 
and ruin the economy.8  Khan also belittled the political 
abilities of Hasina,s son and sister, asserting they were 
equally as corrupt and venal as the Rahman,s. 
 
6. (S) Khan, in part, blames himself for the country,s 
current predicament.  He said that when Bangladeshi military 
dictator General Ershad was forced out office in 1991, then 
Pakistani military chief Alam Beg, an old friend and 
colleague sent him an emissary urging that Khan become the 
President. When Khan refused, Beg asked whom should Pakistan 
support. Khan recommended that Pakistan support the BNP 
because it consisted of military officers and small 
businessmen he believed would lead the country in the right 
direction.  Pakistan, then used ISI to fund the BNP and 
India,s Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) began funding the 
Awami League. Such funding continues to this day, Khan said. 
We have become the playground for India and Pakistan.  Khan 
claimed that New Delhi was unhappy with Sheikh Hasina,s 
performance and funded both parties during the 2001 
elections.  He claimed that RAW funded Tariq Rahman, who 
pledged to deliver his mother on gas exports and water 
sharing differences but was unable to do so. He predicted New 
Delhi would work hard to bring Hasina back to power in 2006. 
 
7. (S) Khan said that the BDG is catering to the "disastrous 
policies" of Islamic parties in the ruling coalition to 
ensure that it wins the 2006 elections.  He blamed the BDG,s 
decision to ban books of the Ahmadiyya sect and not to 
follow-up on attacks in the northern city of Sylhet on the 
British High Commissioner and the Mayor on its need to 
protect the Islamists. 
 
8. (S) On September 13, Lt. Gen. Mahbubur Rahman, another 
retired Army Chief and current BNP MP, told Ambassador that 
the military would always look to the USG for a signal to go 
ahead with a coup. He said that the USG had played a positive 
role in helping to thwart two potential coups in 1996 and a 
no from the USG would always carry weight.  While expressing 
disdain for Sheikh Hasina and Begum Zia, Rahman predicted 
that Bangladesh would be under dynastic leadership for at 
least another generation.  He said that the Army views itself 
as Bangladesh,s only respected organization and does not 
want to interfere in civilian politics.  Earlier Major 
General Chowdhury, retired, told us that the military would 
no nothing to risk its participation in UN peacekeeping 
missions. 
 
Bio Note Zahir 
 
9. (S) General Zahir is a graduate of the British Staff 
College at Camberley and has traveled extensively, including 
the U.S. for military conferences.  He also served a 
battalion commander in UNIKOM.  Zahir has commanded two 
brigades and two divisions (most officers only get one 
command opportunity at each level) and is well respected by 
colleagues. 
 
10. (S) Comment: Khan maintains excellent ties to the 
military but may be acting on his own.  Many interlocutors 
discount the possibility of a coup but we will keep a close 
eye on military activities. We will take advantage of DAS 
Patterson,s October visit to arrange speaking opportunities 
and meeting with the military to stress the importance of 
civilian leadership, including an address to the National 
Defense College and a meeting with General Zahir. 
 
11.  (S) The United States has tremendous leverage over both 
the Bangladeshi military and civilian rulers because of 
Dhaka,s increasing role in UN peacekeeping missions. 
Bangladesh currently has 12,000 troops participating in UNPKO 
and we should use the carrot and stick approach to remind 
Dhaka that: a) a coup would end their participation in PKO 
and b) that failure to solve terrorist crimes and allowing 
Islamist groups to operate would call into question 
Bangladesh,s ability to join PKOs.   End Comment. 
 
 
THOMAS 

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