US embassy cable - 04KINSHASA1728

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001728 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/15/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, CG, PREL, MARR, MONUC 
SUBJECT: CONGOLESE, MONUC VIEWS ON TRILATERAL AGREEMENT AND 
JVM 
 
Classified By: POLCOUNS MSANDERSON, REASONS 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY:  The DRC appears willing to sign both a 
Trilateral Agreement and a Joint Verification Mechanism (JVM) 
in New York during the UNGA.  The GDRC is continuing to press 
for agreement on terms of reference of the JVM, since it 
believes a Trilateral Agreement among the DRC, Uganda and 
Rwanda would be yet another "paper tiger" accord without an 
effective and functional JVM in place.  We believe it is 
important that SecGen Annan bring the parties together on the 
margins of the UNGA in New York to finalize the terms of 
reference of the JVM.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
2. (C) Both National Security Advisor Guillaume Samba Kaputo 
and Presidential Advisor Andre Kapanga told us September 10 
that because the DRC strongly supports a trilateral agreement 
President Kabila wants to make sure that it is effective.  To 
that end, the President continues to insist that Rwanda and 
the DRC reach agreement on the terms of reference of the 
Joint Verification Mechanism (JVM), which will ensure that 
the confidence building measures of the trilateral agreement 
actually work.  According to MONUC, Kigali has again proposed 
changes to the JVM, the latest coming on the same day that 
Kinshasa had sent a letter accepting the proposed terms of 
reference unchanged, an agreement which clearly has once 
again been overtaken by Rwanda's changes.  MONUC, from whom 
we received copies of the Rwandan proposals, reminded us that 
Rwanda has consistently refused to meet with SRSG Swing to 
discuss the terms of reference. 
 
3. (C) President Kabila responded September 7 to the SecGen's 
letter on the JVM, accepting/accepting the document as 
written -- including the elimination of the phrase calling 
for immediate investigation of all reports, which was a major 
concession by Kinshasa.  The Congolese also have named all 
their team members for the JVM, and forwarded those to the 
SecGen as well.  They have, therefore, fully complied with 
the initial requirements to operationalize the JVM, as 
outlined in the SecGen's August 18 letter to the three 
Presidents. 
 
4. (C) On the same day (September 7) President Kagame wrote 
to the SecGen proposing further/further revisions to the 
terms of reference -- revisions of which Kabila clearly could 
not have been aware.  These include a demand to "verify 
Congolese interference in internal Rwandan politics" -- a 
point not previously raised, to our knowledge.  We presume, 
therefore, that the JVM will still require further 
consideration. 
 
5. (C) MONUC expressed considerable surprise at the new 
demands by Kigali, and observed that Rwanda has consistently 
found a way to delay progress on the JVM, first by refusing 
to meet with Swing to discuss it (even when Swing went twice 
to Kigali after meetings were promised), and now by 
constantly proposing new elements to the terms of reference. 
 
6. (C) On the Congolese side, the frustration which President 
Kabila expressed personally the USG delegation during their 
visit to Kinshasa on August 26 to discuss the trilateral 
agreement continues to echo loudly here.  Both Samba Kaputo 
and Kapanga (striking because the latter normally is much 
more moderate) said bluntly that the DRC cannot understand 
why Kinshasa always seems to be cast in the spoiler role. 
Both questioned the utility of signing yet another "paper 
tiger" accord, which is all the trilateral agreement would be 
absent an effective and functional JVM. 
 
7. (C) Both agreed that confidence-building measures are 
essential to stop mutual recriminations and establish an 
environment in which genuine progress could be made -- 
together with MONUC -- on addressing the FDLR/Interahamwe 
issue, as called for in the trilateral document.  Absent the 
JVM, however, such an environment would exist only in theory. 
 
8. (C) Kaputo indicated on September 10 that the Presidency 
might, however, be open to the idea of signing both documents 
together in New York, ie., the JVM first (presumably 
following a meeting hosted by the SecGen to work out 
remaining differences on the terms of reference), and then 
the trilateral agreement. 
 
9. (C) On September 15 at a lunch hosted by the Ambassador, 
Kapanga reiterated that the GDRC wants to move forward on the 
Trilateral Agreement and the JVM.  He pointed out that 
Rwanda's revisions to the JVM had been accepted three times 
by the GDRC, but added that it was his understanding (from 
sources he did not share) that the SecGen would not accept 
the latest revisions being proposed by the Rwandans. 
 
10. (C) The Ambassador provided Kapanga an outline of the 
proposed signing ceremony with Secretary Powell to take place 
in New York on September 23, and Kapanga said the notional 
schedule looked excellent.  While Kapanga was not in a 
position to state categorically that President Kabila would 
sign the agreement, he pointed out that the four principal 
advisors accompanying Kabila to New York (Foreign Minister 
Raymond Ramazani Baya, Ambassador-at-Large Leonard She 
Okitundu, Samba Kaputo, and Kapanga) were all very much in 
favor and would advise the president accordingly.  Kapanga 
went so far as to suggest that Kabila would be willing to 
stay in New York through the 23rd (instead of leaving the 
22nd as initially planned) expressly for a signing ceremony. 
 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
11. (C) Despite frustration that the terms of reference for a 
Joint Verification Mechanism have still not been agreed upon 
(due to what they perceive as Rwanda's lack of good faith), 
the Congolese clearly want a trilateral agreement.  We could 
help facilitate the process by exploring with the SecGen's 
office if they have already planned, or would be willing to 
consider, hosting a "reconciliation meeting" on the margins 
of the UNGA to finalize the terms of reference prior to the 
planned September 23 signing of the trilateral agreement. 
END COMMENT. 
MEECE