US embassy cable - 04COLOMBO1526

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 001526 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/13/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PREL, CE, Political Parties, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA:  AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES PEACE PROCESS 
WITH PRIME MINISTER, PEACE SECRETARIAT 
 
REF: A. COLOMBO 1521 
     B. COLOMBO 1510 
     C. COLOMBO 1362 
 
Classified By: AMB. JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD.  REASON:  1.4 (B,D). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1.  (C)  In separate meetings with Prime Minister Mahinda 
Rajapakse and Peace Secretariat head Jayantha Dhanapala on 
September 15, the Ambassador discussed prospects for resumed 
negotiations between the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) and 
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).  While Rajapakse 
expressed guarded optimism, Dhanapala offered a bleaker 
assessment, noting that in the lack of movement tensions 
between the Tigers and GSL security forces have increased in 
Trincomalee and Nagarkovil, while the small but vocal 
"anti-peace" lobby in the South had become more strident. 
Dhanapala does not expect the visit of Norwegian Special 
Envoy Erik Solheim to alleviate the situation, since he has 
returned to Sri Lanka with no new proposals from the LTTE. 
Dhanapala asked the Embassy to raise LTTE encroachments in 
Trincomalee with the ceasefire monitors.  Both Rajapakse and 
Dhanapala agreed that the LTTE seems to have dropped the 
March defection of Eastern military commander Karuna as a 
pretext for refusing to negotiate.  End summary. 
 
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PM POSITIVE; 
JVP CAN'T JUMP YET 
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2.  (C)  In a September 15 meeting with the Ambassador, Prime 
Minister Mahinda Rajapakse described President Chandrika 
Kumaratunga as "very confident" that she can soon restart 
talks with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).  He 
offered several reasons for this assessment.  The LTTE seems 
to have stopped raising the March defection of Karuna, its 
Eastern military commander, as a purported obstacle to 
resumed negotiations, Rajapakse said.  In addition, the GSL 
has formulated a proposal for a multipartisan Advisory 
Council on the peace process (Ref A).  Finally, even the 
Janatha Vimukti Peramuna (JVP), the left-wing nationalist 
coalition partner that has been most vocal in criticizing the 
LTTE's proposal for an interim admiinistration, has now said 
it is ready to discuss it, he noted.  The PM thinks the JVP's 
apparent turnaround is the result of a pragmatic political 
calculus, rather than a fundamental change of heart.  It is 
too early for the JVP to break ranks with the government, 
Rajapakse said; the party will remain a coalition partner at 
least until local council elections in April 2006, he 
predicted.  Moreover, the pro-LTTE Tamil National Alliance 
(TNA), with its 22 seats in Parliament, has pledged to 
support the government if talks resume, he added. 
 
3.  (C)  For now, the President has shelved her proposal for 
a constituent assembly to abolish the executive presidency, 
Rajapakse indicated.  Instead, the government is formulating 
a comprehensive package of proposed constitutional 
changes--including an interim arrangement for the north and 
east--instead of "doing it piece by piece," the PM said.  If 
talks resume, the government and LTTE could reach a 
negotiated settlement within one year, he predicted 
confidently. 
 
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PEACE SECRETARIAT MORE PESSIMISTIC 
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4.  (C) In a meeting with the Ambassador the same day, 
Jayantha Dhanapala, the head of the Peace Secretariat, 
sounded a more pessimistic note.  Dhanapala opened the 
meeting by thanking the USG for its August 19 statement 
condemning LTTE violence, as well as for the firm line 
communicated by Coordinator for Counterterrorism Ambassador 
Cofer Black in the media coverage of his recent visit (Ref 
B).  The indignant reaction to Ambassador Black's comments by 
pro-LTTE TNA MPs and media show that "the penny has dropped" 
and his words hit home, Dhanapala said.  The Ambassador and 
Dhanapala agreed that the tough messages from the EU and the 
Japanese have also been helpful (Ref C).  Nonetheless, 
Dhanapala said, the basic situation remains "congealed in a 
stalemate."  In the impasse, the anti-peace lobby, which 
Dhanapala believes remains a tiny minority of the general 
population, is becoming more vocal and strident, appearing to 
dominate the discourse on this important issue and to 
overwhelm supporters of the peace process.  Although the 
President is personally committed to recommencing talks, she 
has not, despite his urging, launched a pro-peace public 
relations campaign to fill the vacuum and to refocus on the 
benefits of peace, he said.  The Peace Secretariat cannot 
mobilize public support for the peace process on its own, he 
observed; that must be done at the political level. 
 
5.  (C) If the GSL succeeds in getting talks restarted, 
Dhanapala continued, that will dissipate some of the 
anti-peace lobby and "bring the JVP more earnestly on board" 
once they see that negotiations are "a going thing."  The GSL 
has already spent a good deal of time preparing its 
negotiating position, he said.  Thus, if talks did resume, he 
believes an agreement on an interim arrangement could be 
reached quickly and discussion of a final arrangement begun. 
The window of opportunity is closing quickly, however, he 
warned.  If the LTTE decides not to resume talks until it 
"cleans up" the East, the JVP might take advantage of the 
lack of progress to engage with restive Muslim groups in the 
East, he suggested, and thereby increase pressure for a 
"de-merger" of the North and East.  Tiger supremo Prabhakaran 
does not understand the domestic political constraints the 
President is facing, Dhanapala said; "he thinks we're as 
(politically) monolithic as he is." 
 
6.  (C)  Opposition Leader Ranil Wickremesinghe has not 
responded formally to the President's offer to join an 
Advisory Council (Ref A), Dhanapala said.  He added that the 
Government had made clear to Wickremesinghe that the proposed 
Council would be "a sounding board" for parties, NGOs and 
other stakeholders to voice their views on the peace process, 
rather than an effort to achieve national consensus.  The 
proposal is an attempt to address criticism that the previous 
(Wickremesinghe) government had not been sufficiently 
transparent and inclusive, he concluded. 
 
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OSLO ENVOY "EMPTY-HANDED" 
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7.  (C)  Norwegian Special Envoy Erik Solheim has returned to 
Sri Lanka "empty-handed," Dhanapala said, with no fresh 
initiative to offer from the Tigers.  (Note:  Solheim arrived 
in Sri Lanka September 14 and will depart o/a September 17. 
End note.)  According to Dhanapala, Solheim has urged the GSL 
to take a "bold step"--which Dhanapala interpreted to mean 
accept the Tigers' controversial proposal for an interim 
administration as a basis for resumed negotiations--but could 
not offer the GSL any reciprocal assurance that such a "bold 
step," if offered, would be accepted by the LTTE.  Without 
some kind of assurance of how the LTTE would react, the "bold 
step" urged by Solheim would be nothing but "a leap in the 
dark," Dhanapala said, adding that he was "puzzled" that the 
Norwegians seemed to expect the GSL to take that political 
risk.  He expressed little confidence that Solheim would make 
an effort to impress upon his LTTE interlocutors the 
Government's political constraints. 
 
8.  (C)  Because the GSL is the more rational party, the 
Ambassador said, it unfairly receives more pressure from 
other actors to be flexible and offer compromises.  In 
addition, the aid given by other governments and mulitlateral 
organizations gives them the opportunity to apply pressure on 
the GSL, he noted.  The LTTE, on the other hand, seems 
generally unresponsive to such pressure, readily 
subordinating incentives like socio-economic development for 
its purported constituents to political issues.  How can 
donor governments help provide positive incentives for the 
LTTE to accept negotiations? the Ambassador asked.  The GSL 
has already undertaken some confidence-building measures--for 
example, the President's announcement that she is willing to 
include the controversial "interim arrangement" on a possible 
agenda for negotiations--and could do more, like increase 
patrolling in the East to reduce factional violence, 
Dhanapala responded.  The LTTE, however, might respond best 
to pressure from the expatriate Tamil community, which 
finances, either voluntarily or involuntarily, much of its 
operations, he asserted, adding that he believes pressure 
from the Tamil diaspora helped persuade the LTTE to accept a 
ceasefire.  He urged the USG to expand contact with the Tamil 
diaspora in the U.S. to this end. 
 
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TENSIONS IN NORTH AND EAST 
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9.  (C) Dhanapala agreed that the split between Karuna, the 
Tigers' former Eastern military commander, and LTTE 
headquarters appears to have "faded as an issue."  The Tigers 
remain concerned, however, about their grip on the East, he 
suggested.  The situation in the northeastern district of 
Trincomalee is "very worrisome," Dhanapala reported, where 
extensive LTTE bunkers could put Tiger artillery within reach 
of ships approaching the harbor.  The LTTE's "lock on 
security" in Trincomalee infringes on the GSL's 
responsibilities under the international law of the sea to 
safeguard shipping in those waters, he asserted.  The Indian 
government has already raised these concerns to the 
Nordic-sponsored Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), he 
reported and suggested that the U.S. Embassy's Defense 
Attache might raise it as well.  The LTTE's demand that the 
GSL swap LTTE detainees for two Sinhalese home guards the 
Tigers abducted in Trincomalee on August 18 has also 
increased tensions.  Both the Government and SLMM have ruled 
out any such trade, he stated.  In the north, the situation 
is Nagarkovil is "very, very tense."  (Note:  The GSL has 
accused the LTTE of expanding its forward defense line (FDL) 
in Nagarkovil, which is approximately 40 km north of Jaffna 
town.  End note.) To make matters worse, the SLMM's proposal 
for addressing this situation is "not even-handed," he 
complained; it recommended that both parties move back even 
though the GSL has not expanded its FDL. 
 
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COMMENT 
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10.  (C) The different assessments offered by the Prime 
Minister and Dhanapala are colored by their different areas 
of expertise.  Rajapakse generally has good insights into the 
domestic political front, while Dhanapala is better informed 
on the peace process.  We are inclined to view Dhanapala's 
gloomier assessment as, unfortunately, the more accurate. 
The longer the hiatus between talks, the more time for 
sticking points to emerge, for the President's maneuvering 
space to narrow, and for positions to harden.  While the PM's 
reasoning that the JVP will not quit the government may be on 
target, that doesn't mean that the JVP will not continue 
militating against dialogue and undermining the atmosphere 
for compromise.  The President is in a box, hemmed in by the 
Tigers on one side, chauvinist Sinhalese politics on the 
other, and the Norwegian facilitators--at least in 
Dhanapala's view--watching unhelpfully from the sidelines. 
Without some kind of signal from the LTTE, it will be 
difficult for her to break the impasse alone.  It seems 
doubtful, however, that the Norwegian visit will provide that 
impetus. 
 
11.  (C)  Comment (continued):  Dhanapala's suggestion that 
the Tigers might be motivated through contact with the Tamil 
diaspora seems to us a good one.  The Tigers are holding a 
major meeting in Switzerland at the end of the month which 
many Tamil expats will attend.  Department may wish to 
contact Rudrakumaran and other Tamil contacts likely to 
attend to pass on a message.  That message would be similar 
to our most recent public statements:  the Tigers need to 
change their behavior.  If they do, they can move along the 
path to legitimacy. 
 
 
LUNSTEAD