US embassy cable - 04HANOI2518

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 HANOI 002518 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV; INL/AAE 
JUSTICE FOR CRIMINAL DIVISION/OPDAT, ICITAP, OIA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR, KCRM, PINS, VM, CNARC 
SUBJECT:  VIETNAM'S JUSTICE SECTOR: CLIMATE AND LANDSCAPE 
FOR U.S. COUNTERNARCOTICS AND ORGANIZED CRIME ASSISTANCE TO 
VIETNAM 
 
Reftel: Hanoi 1584 
 
1. (U) This message incorporates the report of the 
ICITAP/OPDAT team that visited Hanoi July 19-23 2004 in 
advance of planned DOJ counternarcotics training activities. 
 
2. (U) Summary: DOJ is ready to implement the training 
programs supported with INCLE funds and listed in the U.S.- 
Vietnam Counternarcotics LOA.  Two training courses, each 
targeting two separate groups, will address key weaknesses 
within the main agencies charged with investigating, 
prosecuting, and deciding narcotics cases in Vietnam. 
 
3. (U) The conclusion of the letter of agreement on 
counternarcotics cooperation (LOA) between Vietnam and the 
United States, and the subsequent execution of the U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection training iterations in Hawaii 
and Hanoi in July and August, have created favorable 
conditions for DOJ to provide further counternarcotics and 
organized crime assistance to the GVN.  GVN interlocutors 
want U.S. assistance in these areas of criminal activity and 
are willing to cooperate to make the OPDAT phase of LOA 
implementation a reality.  Since 1999, the GVN has taken 
substantial steps to address the threats of illicit drugs 
and organized criminal groups, but it lacks the experience 
at all levels of its justice sector institutions necessary 
to provide consistent and purposeful direction regarding 
strategic planning, resourcing, and capacity building, and 
to carry out effective operations.  End summary. 
 
GVN RESPONSES TO NARCOTICS AND ORGANIZED CRIME 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
4. (U) Counternarcotics:  Vietnam is a state party to 
multinational international agreements that address the 
illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic 
substances.  Since 1996, the GVN has pursued a comprehensive 
domestic drug control approach.  At the planning level, 
Vietnam's national drug control committee (Standing 
Committee for Drug Control) was established in 1997.  From 
1997 onward, the Vietnamese made efforts to increase the 
ability of law enforcement agencies, including the police, 
customs, and border army, to act in concert to address 
illicit drug trafficking in selected urban and border hot 
spots.  For example, the GVN recently concluded a protocol 
which established two drug interdiction task forces, 
composed of police, customs, and border army officials, 
under border army leadership in order to concentrate on the 
most frequently used drug trafficking routes (Reftel).  This 
advanced interagency investigative cooperation. 
 
5. (U) In June 2001 the GVN's national law for narcotic 
drugs prevention and suppression entered into force.  This 
law, together with the additional eight decrees issued 
pursuant to its provisions, was intended to focus the 
efforts of the government agencies on the drug problem and 
to foster more effective cooperation, domestically and 
internationally, to counter the threat of the illicit drug 
trade.  One possible weakness of the GVN drug control regime 
is that, despite the plethora of GVN pronouncements dealing 
with drugs (all of which have the force of law), criminal 
offenses are found only in the penal code of 1999, as 
revised, and not in any other legislation.  Therefore, it is 
necessary to locate a corresponding offense section in the 
penal code whenever criminal penalties are sought.  There 
exists a serious risk that the proliferation of drug control 
legislation will contribute to a lack of knowledge, spotty 
enforcement, and extensive training requirements. 
 
6.  (U) Organized crime: Vietnam has signed, but has not yet 
ratified, the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized 
Crime and its two protocols.  As compared to the approach 
taken with regard to illicit drugs, Vietnam does not have a 
specific law addressing organized crime.  Depending upon the 
facts of each case, the various Vietnamese legal documents 
which address organized criminal activity must be obtained 
and reviewed to ensure a valid basis for investigation 
exists and that proper procedures are followed in any given 
investigation. 
KEY GVN ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
7.  (U) Police:  Generally speaking, various "investigating 
bodies" can carry out criminal investigations but the police 
handle the majority of them.  The police operate under the 
direction of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), which 
reports to the Prime Minister.  There are approximately 
75,000 police officers who are organizationally assigned to 
general police functions, traffic, criminal investigation 
units, fire protection, corrections, and customs.  The 
management ratio (the number of management personnel 
compared with functional personnel) is between 30 and 35 
percent, with lower functional ranks representing 65 to 70 
percent of the total force composition.  The total number of 
police personnel directly responsible for investigative 
functions represents approximately 14 percent of the whole, 
with approximately 6,000 general crimes investigators and 
approximately 4,500 police dedicated to counternarcotics 
investigations.  Investigative tasks and responsibilities 
are distributed by function among three sub-units.  Unit "C- 
14" is responsible for investigating crimes such as 
prostitution, gambling, and human trafficking.  Unit "C-16" 
is responsible for investigating more serious crimes such as 
murder, robbery, and sexual assault.  Unit "C-17" is 
responsible for counternarcotics investigations. 
 
8.  (SBU) Compentencies appear to exist that are rare in 
other regional law enforcement agencies.  MPS personnel are 
fairly well educated and engaged.  Observations from other 
donors of counternarcotics assistance indicate that the 
Vietnamese are amenable to new methods, are studious and 
adaptable, and implement new techniques quickly. 
 
9.  (U) Procuracy:  The Supreme People's Procuracy (SPP) is 
an independent organ of government, responsible directly to 
the National Assembly and the Office of the President.  The 
SPP has three main functions: it supervises criminal and 
security investigations, undertakes criminal and civil 
trials and appeals, and is responsible for the enforcement 
of laws against members of the government and the judiciary. 
Both civilian and military prosecutors function from within 
the SPP, which, on the civilian side, is organized at the 
three administrative levels (central, 64 provinces and 
cities, and 610 districts) of the country.  There are 
approximately 10,000 SPP employees nation-wide, of whom 
2,500 are provincial level prosecutors and approximately 
3,500 are prosecutors at the district level. 
 
10.  (U) Courts:  The Supreme People's Court (SPC) is also 
an independent organ of government, responsible directly to 
the National Assembly and the Office of the State President. 
The courts are also organized at the three administrative 
levels of the country into the central Supreme People's 
Court, 64 provincial and city courts, and 610 district 
courts.  The jurisdiction of each court is set forth in the 
criminal procedure code and operates on both a subject 
matter and geographical basis.  Each of the three levels of 
the courts has the jurisdiction to act as a trial court of 
the first instance, with the higher level courts acting as 
the appellate court for the previous level.  Matters of 
constitutionality of laws are not adjudicable before the 
courts. 
 
11.  (SBU) The Procuracy and the Courts are distributed 
nationally according to geography rather than according to 
demand, which results in significant differences in the 
levels of activity in different jurisdictions.  These levels 
of activity mean that personnel in certain areas develop 
more expertise than others, creating imbalances in 
experience and ability in different parts of the country. 
In addition, maintaining satisfactory levels of competence 
in both organizations is complicated by the practice of new 
prosecutors and judges receiving on-the-job training while 
serving as apprentices for older "mentors".  There is 
apparently little attention given to ensuring that only the 
most capable perform duties as mentors.  Finally, the 
quality of judicial decision-making is affected by the 
presence of lay assessors.  Lay assessors are non- 
professional elected judges who serve with professional 
judges on judicial panels.  At all court levels, the 
majority makes decisions and lay assessors always outnumber 
the professional judges. 
 
12.  (U) Ministry of Justice:  In Vietnam, the MOJ is not 
responsible for supervising investigators, prosecutors, or 
judges.  It does, however, have responsibility for legal 
aid.  In addition to providing defense counsel for indigent 
persons, war veterans, and war invalids, and overseeing the 
"pro bono" legal aid services of the 64 bar associations 
throughout Vietnam, the MOJ concentrates on preparing new 
laws for consideration by the National Assembly and its 
departments.  Generally, MOJ and other players in the 
drafting process use surveys of the practitioners in the 
field to obtain data to assist in the initiation of laws or 
for the revision of existing laws. 
 
NEW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE IN FORCE 
------------------------------------ 
 
13.  (U) The revised 2003 criminal procedure code (CPC) 
entered into force on July 1, 2004.  One significant change 
involves oral argument at trial.  For the first time, after 
the presentation of evidence and questioning of witnesses is 
completed, the prosecutor is now required to make an 
"accusation," based on the documents, evidence examined at 
trial, and on the presentations of the accused, the defense 
counsel, the counsel of others, and others participating in 
the court session.  In addition, after the defense has made 
a closing argument, the court may require the prosecutor to 
answer the defense's claims. 
 
WHERE AND HOW THE U.S. CAN HELP 
------------------------------- 
 
14.  (SBU) At various times, Vietnamese counterparts told 
DOJ representatives that Vietnam lacked experience attacking 
organized crime groups, identifying illicit drugs, and in 
the following areas:  methods of search and seizure in 
economic crime cases, undercover operations and dealing with 
cooperating witnesses, presenting complicated drug and 
financial evidence at trial, charging decisions in organized 
crime cases, and sentencing considerations in drug cases. 
 
15.  (U) DOJ has developed two assistance programs, each 
addressing two groups of Vietnamese participants.  Program 
one is an anti-narcotics best practices program.  Vietnamese 
criminal investigators and those members of the Procuracy 
whose duty is to supervise illicit drug investigations will 
comprise one target group for this program.  The second 
target group will be made up of members of the Procuracy who 
are responsible for trying these drug cases and the judges 
who decide them.  The objective of the anti-narcotics best 
practices program is to familiarize participants with best 
practices relating to illicit drug crime control from 
investigation through sentencing.  Its methodology will 
include a focus on key areas of investigation and trial 
methodology that are essential to successful anti-narcotics 
prosecutions.  Practical problem solving will require the 
Vietnamese participants to use skills and tools recognized 
in the international community in case-study exercises that 
mirror real world drug cases prevalent in Vietnam. 
 
16.  (U) The second DOJ assistance program, focusing on 
organized crime, will also target two groups.  One group 
will comprise Vietnamese criminal investigators and those 
members of the Procuracy whose duty is to supervise 
organized crime investigations.  The second group will be 
composed of members of the Procuracy who are responsible for 
trying these organized crime cases and the judges who decide 
them.  The objective is to familiarize participants with 
international practices of organized crime control and 
international standards of conduct for government personnel 
involved in organized crime control.  Conditioned upon crime 
trends in Vietnam, the program will use economic crimes 
(including money laundering and bank fraud) for practical 
problem solving.   The Vietnamese participants in the second 
program will also be required to use skills and tools 
recognized in the international community in case-study 
exercises that mirror real world organized crime activities 
prevalent in Vietnam. 
 
THE WAY AHEAD 
------------- 
 
17.  (U) In response to the requests of Vietnamese officials 
to maintain the momentum thus far achieved in implementing 
the counternarcotics cooperation LOA, DOJ provided us with 
the detailed day-by-day agendas for the two assistance 
programs for presentation to GVN counterparts.  The GVN's 
internal deliberative processes are time consuming, and will 
likely require several more weeks of consultations before 
they can approve these two new programs or agree on a venue. 
However, in the meantime we will continue to work with DOJ 
on the details. 
MARINE