US embassy cable - 04ANKARA5191

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 005191 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2024 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, PINR, MOPS, TU, IZ 
SUBJECT: TURKISH GENERAL STAFF J3 CHIEF DELIVERS TOUGH 
MESSAGES ON PKK AND IRAQ 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 4893 AND PREVIOUS 
     B. ANKARA 3758 
     C. USDAO ANKARA IIR 6 898 0384 04 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Eric S. Edelman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (S/NF) Summary: In his Sept. 8 introductory call by 
incoming ODC Turkey Chief Maj. Gen. Pete Sutton, TGS J3 LTG 
Metin Yavuz Yalcin accused the U.S. of meeting with PKK 
operatives, failing to capture PKK leader Osman Ocalan, and 
standing by while Kurds sought to alter Kirkuk's population. 
He added that Turkish troops will remain in northern Iraq to 
monitor the PKK even after U.S. troops depart.  Yalcin 
pressed the U.S. to take steps to improve security for 
Turkish truckers in Iraq, adding that if the Turkish GLOC 
closes the coalition would then be compelled to use the 
Persian Gulf for supply.  He noted the Oct. 3 target date for 
dissolution of the Peace Monitoring Force in northern Iraq. 
End summary. 
 
2. (C) While most senior TGS leaders have been cordial and 
generally anodyne in their meetings with incoming ODC Turkey 
Chief Maj. Gen. Pete Sutton, TGS J3 LTG General Metin Yavuz 
Yalcin took a more aggressive approach in their Sept. 8 
courtesy call.  Yalcin read from talking points on 3 x 5 
cards, and started off by stating that he knew for a fact 
that U.S. military officers had had meetings with the 
PKK/Kongra-Gel in northern Iraq.  How, asked the general 
rhetorically, was this possible when the United States has 
declared the PKK a terrorist organization?  Yalcin stated 
that there are 5000 PKK terrorists in northern Iraq, and 1500 
carrying out ops in Turkey.  He added that Turkish troops are 
in Iraq to monitor the PKK, and that they will remain in Iraq 
during the U.S. presence there and beyond. 
 
3. (S/NF) Yalcin went on to recount the incident last March 
in which Turkish intelligence provided us with information on 
Osman Ocalan's whereabouts in northern Iraq, and accused the 
U.S. of failing to capture him because we thought Ocalan had 
moderated his views (ref c).  (Comment: Yalcin's 
understanding of this incident and of our views of the PKK 
and Ocalan are quixotic at best, disingenuous at worst. 
Conflicting signals from TGS and faulty Turkish intelligence 
were the reasons Ocalan was not arrested.  End comment.)  He 
lambasted our "failure" to capture Ocalan by asking if the 
U.S. would pass up a chance to capture Osama bin Laden if he 
were somehow to moderate his views.  When MG Sutton asked if 
Yalcin thought support for the PKK was now strengthening or 
weakening, Yalcin responded that it did not matter to him one 
way or the other: his job as a military man was to ignore 
politics and defeat the terrorists. 
 
4. (C) Yalcin repeated oft-heard Turkish concerns regarding 
the population distribution in Kirkuk.  He accused Iraqi 
Kurds of displacing Kirkuk's Turkmen population and of 
seeking hegemony over the area's natural resources.  Yalcin 
added that 40% of Iraq's oil resources is in this area and 
should be used for the benefit of all Iraqis.  "This is a 
very sensitive issue and known by all U.S. troops," he said, 
implying that we were standing by and allowing the Kurds to 
take over Kirkuk. 
 
5. (C) Yalcin pressed the U.S. to take active steps to 
provide security for Turkish truck drivers in Iraq, many of 
whom carry goods for coalition use (ref a).  He claimed that 
32 drivers have been murdered and over 70 attacked, and that 
the Turkish MFA was working on the problem.  He noted the 
importance of the Turkish GLOC, and that if the GLOC were to 
close (due to the unwillingness of drivers to drive) the 
coalition would have to use the Persian Gulf for supply, 
which would not be convenient. 
 
6. (C) Yalcin noted the October 3 target date for dissolution 
of the Peace Monitoring Force (PMF) in northern Iraq, noting 
agreement among the Turkish MFA, MNF-North, and TGS.  He 
pointed out the issue that the IIG will need to provide 
employment for the Iraqi members of this force (ref b). 
 
7. (C) Comment: This combative style is typical for Yalcin, 
but it is in strict contrast to the pleasant demeanor of most 
Turkish flag and general officers.  As J3, his job is 
operations, and the infiltration of PKK/Kongra-Gel members 
into Turkey from Iraq has become one of his biggest 
challenges.  This may explain why he, more than any other 
military officer, would get so passionate about our lack of 
action.  End comment. 
 
8. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
EDELMAN