US embassy cable - 04ROME3520

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ROME 003520 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA, AF 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/13/2014 
TAGS: PREL, IZ, IR, SU, IT, EUN, IAEA 
SUBJECT: ITALY:  SENIOR MFA OFFICIAL PESSIMISTIC ON MIDDLE 
EAST, SUDAN 
 
REF: A. ROME 2950 
     B. STATE 193154 
     C. ROME 3480 
 
Classified By: A/DCM Tom Countryman for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary. DCM hosted a lunch in honor of MFA Under 
Secretary for the Middle East and Africa Alfredo Mantica and 
 
SIPDIS 
his Chief of Staff Paola Imperiale, along with Pol M/C and 
Poloff, on September 8 .  Mantica presented a fairly 
pessimistic outlook for the situations in Iraq, Iran, and 
Sudan.  On Iraq, he found it hard to envision a greater EU 
role in the near future.  On Iran and Sudan, he stressed the 
need for broader strategic visions.  Mantica, as has become 
the norm in our encounters with Italian government officials, 
took the opportunity to raise Italy's concerns about UN 
Security Council reform.  End summary. 
 
Skeptical on EU Role in Iraq 
 
2. (C)  Mantica noted that UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's 
recent remarks that Iraq would not be ready for elections by 
January are not helpful and play into terrorists' hands.  He 
was skeptical that the EU, with 25 member states with "deep 
differences," would be able to achieve consensus on EU 
support for the UN in Iraq.  At the recent informal meeting 
of Foreign Ministers in Maastricht, he said, member states 
finally agreed, but only after much negotiation, to provide 
EU training for Iraqi security forces, but it was unclear how 
this would develop in practical terms (the Germans offered 
money, the French schools, and the Italians on-the-ground 
training). 
 
3. (C) Based on the difficulties surrounding this less 
problematic issue, he said he had "no idea" how the EU could 
ever agree to providing the 4,200 soldiers necessary for UN 
protection.  There were no formal discussions on this topic 
at Maastricht and it would be a long time before the EU would 
be able to provide a complete political answer, he said. 
Mantica commented that even NATO had found it difficult to 
reach consensus on its role in Iraq, despite the initial 
enthusiasm generated by the surge in transatlantic goodwill 
at Normandy.  DCM replied that he hoped the EU would 
accelerate its decision to support the UN in Iraq because the 
"political clock is ticking" and the UN has the necessary 
expertise for providing election support.  The decision 
shouldn't be made for the UN because of the inability or 
unwillingness of the international community to provide 
protection and financial support in a timely manner. 
 
Iran -- Facing up to political realities 
 
4. (C) Mantica argued that Iran views its nuclear program as 
necessary to becoming a regional power.  In Tehran's mindset 
(which Mantica deemed a very coherent rationale), because it 
is surrounded by countries like Pakistan, India, and Israel 
that already have nuclear weapons, Iran sees no reason to 
limit its own nuclear ambitions.  DCM argued back that we 
need to change this way of thinking and convince Tehran that 
pursuing a nuclear weapons program will only freeze Iran out 
of the international community and make their situation 
worse.  Mantica replied that Iran is a special case.  Its 
motivation stems not from the usual Arab rhetoric blaming the 
rest of the world for its problems, but from a sense of 
unusually strong national pride and "empire" that dictates 
that Tehran be recognized as a regional power.  Mantica noted 
that one way Iran can gain international respect is by 
playing an active and constructive role in stabilizing Iraq. 
 
5. (C) Another problem, Mantica continued, is knowing "which 
Iran" we are talking about.  He agreed with Pol M/C's 
assertion that dealing with reformers like Khatami is not 
effective because they do not hold the power in Iran.  Reform 
efforts have failed, Mantica argued, noting that, 
paradoxically, the dismal civil society situation (rampant 
drug abuse, prostitution, etc.) blatantly contradicts the 
fundamentalist values that Iranian leadership is trying to 
promote.  Italy had hoped that Khatami would be able to 
change this situation, and that internal reforms would help 
resolve Iran's external difficulties, but it was clear even 
before the recent parliamentary elections that he had been 
unsuccessful.  Mantica said that Italy and Europe had now 
 
 
come to the realization that the reformist experiment was 
over and it is time to face new political realities in Iran, 
with eyes wide open.  The problem, though, is who to trust 
now. 
 
6. (C) Mantica said the EU3 initiative was unproductive and 
that eventually France, Germany, and the UK would stop trying 
to be the "head of the class" and let the Iran issue be dealt 
with in the larger EU context where, in Italy's eyes, it 
belongs.  Responding to DCM's inquiry as to whether the EU is 
ready to refer Iran's noncompliance with the IAEA to the UN 
Security Council, Mantica said he didn't know.  The problem 
with consensus, he said, is that you have to go with the 
least common denominator.  Logically, however, he opined, the 
answer should be yes, since France holds a veto in the 
Security Council. 
 
Another plea on UN Security Council Reform 
 
7. (C) Taking advantage of the opening on UNSC issues, 
Mantica asked (somewhat rhetorically) why the US didn't help 
Italy.  DCM responded that the USG -- including President 
Bush -- is aware of the Italian position, reiterating the USG 
position that the US criterion is effectiveness.  Mantica 
replied that the problem involves more than just the security 
council, where one more vote won't make a difference, but the 
entire UN system.  The UN, he said, was born with a certain 
political character that it was time to revisit.  His 
personal view was that the UN plays the role of honest 
broker, but not that of a world government where a few 
countries decide the fate of the others. 
 
Sudan -- Need to look at the big picture 
 
8. (C) On Sudan, Mantica agreed that the humanitarian crisis 
in Darfur was the most immediate priority.  However, he 
stressed that a long-term political solution to the crisis 
would only be possible by addressing the broader north-south 
political problem in Sudan as a whole.  The Abuja peace talks 
are an important attempt to reach an overall political 
solution, he said, but we must convince the Sudan People's 
Liberation Movement (SPLM)  to be honest about their 
willingness to integrate the south in a united Sudan. 
Mantica opposed the SPLM's proposal for three militaries 
(African Union, Sudanese government, and SPLM soldiers) to 
serve as peacekeepers in Darfur, arguing that a unified 
military presence is needed to avoid a full-scale civil war. 
Furthermore, he opined, it is difficult to explain 
peace-keeping to Africans. 
 
9. (C) Mantica also agreed with the US draft resolution on 
Sudan, but said that not even sanctions will help resolve the 
situation.  He was convinced that the Khartoum government was 
even more a victim of events than those who had caused them. 
The important thing, he stressed, is not to cut off 
discussions. 
 
10. (C) Regarding the November 19-21 Great Lakes conference 
involving Foreign Ministers and Heads of State, Mantica said 
that Rwanda and Uganda are opposed to Angola's participation. 
 The Netherlands (as a party to the conference, not in its 
role as EU President) is trying to find a compromise. 
 
 
BAGHDAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED 
 
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	2004ROME03520 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL