US embassy cable - 04BOGOTA9200

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 009200 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
GENEVA FOR JEFF DELAURENTIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2014 
TAGS: EAID, MOPS, PINR, SNAR, CO 
SUBJECT: COLOMBIA'S "HOMETOWN SOLDIERS" PROGRAM 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affairs Milton K. Drucker for reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
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Summary 
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1. (C) The GOC's "Hometown Soldiers" Program has become a 
hallmark of President Uribe's Democratic Security Policy. 
The program is designed to supplement regular military units 
with platoons of local soldiers that perform basic security 
functions.  A valuable outcome of the program has been 
greater cooperation from local residents and their more 
active engagement in the GOC's informants network.  Hometown 
soldiers currently number over 21,000, and the GOC has plans 
to expand the program further.  NGO criticisms of the program 
have not struck a chord with the public at large.  End 
Summary. 
 
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How The Hometown Soldier Program Works 
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2. (C) The Colombian Military's (COLMIL) "Hometown Soldiers" 
Program ("Soldados Campesinos") allows youth to fulfill their 
obligatory conscription service in their own home towns or 
regions.  According to Government sources, hometown soldiers 
receive ten to twelve weeks of training.  Because hometown 
soldiers receive only minimal instruction in offensive 
operations, their training lasts about two weeks less than 
that of regular soldiers.  They are uniformed members of the 
military who wear military rank, are subject to the military 
code of justice, and earn the same salary as regular 
(nonprofessional) soldiers. 
 
3. (C) Hometown soldiers live in rudimentary facilities or 
field tents donated or built by the towns in which they work. 
 They provide protection to local government officials -- 
many of whom used to govern from distant, safer urban centers 
-- in addition to labor for various government initiated 
civic projects. 
 
4. (C) Local commanders are responsible for recruiting and 
training hometown soldiers.  They conduct background checks 
on all recruits, including hometown and regular soldiers, to 
screen out individuals with criminal records and potential 
terrorist infiltrators.  At the end of their service, many 
hometown soldiers reenlist in the professional soldier 
program under four to six year contracts.  Professional 
soldiers earn 350,000 Colombian pesos a month (about 140 
USD), while hometown soldiers earn a monthly salary of only 
50,000 pesos (about 20 USD). 
 
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GOC Touts Program's Successes 
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5. (C) GOC officials tout the Hometown Soldiers Program as an 
irrefutable success.  The soldiers' familiarity with the 
hinterland has proven to be an effective tool in finding and 
neutralizing members of illegal armed groups. 
 
6. (C) Totaling over 21,000 in 500 municipalities, hometown 
soldiers guard critical infrastructure and participate in 
civil affairs projects.  Hometown soldiers have become 
instrumental in executing the military's "clear and hold" 
strategy, serving as local stay-behind forces in conflictive 
areas.  There are, for example, over 2,000 hometown soldiers 
in Cudinamarca Department who are helping secure the region 
in the aftermath of the COLMIL's Plan Patriota Phase IIA, 
which uprooted a previously strong FARC presence.  In 
addition, hometown soldiers' confidence with local residents 
has increased citizen participation in the Government's 
informants network. 
 
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Skepticism of Civilian Involvement in Conflict 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
7. (C) On August 31, Emboffs met with Ana Maria Diaz and 
Andrea Milena Bolanos of the Colombian Commission of Jurists 
(CCJ), a prominent, left-leaning human rights NGO.  Diaz and 
Bolanos criticized the Hometown Soldiers Program for 
allegedly increasing civilians' vulnerability to the internal 
armed conflict.  They claimed, for example, that guerrillas 
retaliate against the friends and families of hometown 
soldiers, leading to an increase in forced displacements. 
They also argued that because hometown soldiers receive 
little or no instruction regarding anti-personnel mines, 
intelligence operations, and anti-kidnapping efforts, they do 
not have the expertise to carry out operations they are 
regularly asked to perform.  Diaz and Bolanos had clearly 
done only limited research on the program's effects, however. 
 They based their arguments on examples they had not 
personally researched, and in the majority of cases could not 
verify that the soldiers in question were hometown soldiers. 
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Comment 
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8. (C) To date there have been no credible human rights 
violations ascribed to hometown soldiers, and only a few 
hometown soldiers have been killed or wounded.  Despite the 
fears of both NGOs and the GOC, the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC) have not launched a major offensive 
against hometown soldiers.  So far, NGO complaints about the 
program, based more on conjecture than evidence, have had 
little resonance with the public at large. 
DRUCKER