US embassy cable - 04ANKARA5140

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 005140 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEFENSE ALSO FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY 
BAGHDAD ALSO FOR DCM JEFFREY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, MOPS, TU, IZ 
SUBJECT: TURKS SEEK AVENUE TO GET HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE 
TO TALAFAR, REITERATE CONCERNS RE CASUALTIES AND ETHNIC 
BALANCE 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 5117 
 
     B. ANKARA 5100 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Eric S. Edelman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary: Turkey urgently seeks first-hand access to 
Talafar to evaluate the situation there to provide 
humanitarian assistance to this predominantly Turkmen Iraqi 
city, MFA Undersecretary-designate Tuygan told the Ambassador 
on Sept. 13.  GOT continues to be concerned about getting 
accurate casualty figures, the alleged presence of peshmerga 
units in the city, and the ethnic future of not only Talafar, 
but the entire Ninewah province.  GOT is taking a moderate 
public line, but is feeling pressure from the Turkish people 
and an unhelpful press.  Our facilitation of Turkish 
humanitarian aid would take pressure off the GOT and head off 
its contemplating steps harmful to our efforts in Iraq.  End 
summary. 
 
2. (C) MFA Undersecretary-designate Ali Tuygan called in 
Ambassador Sept. 13 to discuss the situation in Talafar (see 
refs).  Ambassador informed Tuygan that the USG was fully 
apprised at very high levels of Turkish concerns regarding 
this predominantly Turkmen city.  Deputy Defense Secretary 
Wolfowitz had also informed Ambassador that he had agreed to 
the Turkish request for a POC to help coordinate the Turkish 
effort to get humanitarian supplies into the city. 
 
3. (C) U/S Tuygan said he appreciated the Ambassador's 
readout, but reiterated several Turkish concerns.  First, he 
claimed that the Talafar region had been a peaceful one until 
the latest round of operations.  He noted reports that about 
200 insurgents had entered the city, and questioned whether 
the magnitude of force that the coalition had applied was 
necessary for what he termed a relatively small number of 
insurgents.  Tuygan repeated GOT concerns (see ref a) about 
the presence of peshmerga (in Iraqi uniform), and highlighted 
the GOT's sensitivity about peshmerga operations in Talafar. 
 
4. (C) Finally, Tuygan added that the GOT was having a hard 
time getting a clear report from the ground on the situation 
in Talafar, including accurate casualty figures, since the 
Turkish Special Forces in the area do not have access to the 
city.  (Note: According to Task Force Olympia's LNO to the 
Turkish military in northern Iraq, it is the Turkish military 
itself which has ordered its SF in Talafar to hunker down 
near the airport and not to venture into town.  End note.) 
Without first-hand knowledge, Tuygan said, the GOT is forced 
to rely on U.S. reports, its own limited intelligence 
reporting, and reports from Turkmen sources.  (Comment: Some 
Turkmen sources have wildly exaggerated civilian casualty 
figures to the Turkish press, and the Iraqi Turkmen Front's 
representative in Ankara has made extremely unhelpful 
comments to the press, characterizing the coalition operation 
as "genocide" and as a bid to wrest Talafar from Turkmen 
control and hand it over to the Kurds.  End comment.) 
Ambassador noted that the Turkish LNOs at Task Force Olympia 
HQ in Mosul are receiving full briefings on the operation, 
but Tuygan responded that the GOT was seeking first-hand 
reports. 
 
5. (C) On the Turkish effort to send humanitarian assistance 
to Talafar, Tuygan reported that the Turkish Embassy in 
Baghdad had contacted the IIG's Acting Foreign Minister, who 
had agreed to the Embassy's request to provide Turkish 
assistance to the city.  According to Tuygan, the minister 
referred the embassy to the Governor of Mosul for "practical 
arrangements."  Tuygan reiterated the need for Turkish LNOs 
to gain access to Talafar in order to assess the humanitarian 
needs there and report to Ankara. 
 
6. (C) Tuygan then turned to Turkish concerns regarding the 
future of Talafar's ethnic makeup.  He requested that by no 
means should U.S. forces withdraw and leave peshmerga in 
charge of the city.  He said that for the GOT, the ethnic 
makeup of Talafar was related to its concerns that Kurds are 
attempting to shift the ethnic balance in Kirkuk in their 
favor.  Tuygan said the Turks do not want ethnic strife to 
come to Talafar.  MFA Deputy DG for the Middle East Safak 
Gokturk added that Turkey was concerned that Talafar could 
now be seen by those Kurds who are now seeking to disrupt 
Kirkuk as a soft target, a place where the ethnic balance in 
Iraq could be shifted.  The entire province of Ninewah could 
be in play, he said. 
 
7. (C) Ambassador made three main points in response to 
Tuygan.  First, since we are dealing with a real-time 
battlefield situation, we should be cautious about claims 
made in the press, especially those by organizations such as 
the ITF.  He cited outlandish reports in the Turkish press, 
such as that 95% of the city had been destroyed.  Ambassador 
noted the care that coalition troops took to spare the 
civilian population, and also cited our own preliminary 
estimates of anywhere from 12-20 civilians killed and 20-50 
wounded.  He added that Iraqi doctors had reported that most 
of the injuries seemed to be from mortar (e.g., insurgent) 
fire, flying debris, and indirect fire. 
 
8. (C) Second, Ambassador rejected Tuygan's claim that 
coalition use of force was disproportionate to the threat 
("only" 200 or so insurgents).  He noted that the USG and GOT 
share the goal of returning full sovereignty to the Iraqis, 
and that by rooting out the insurgency the coalition was 
seeking to help the IIG assert its authority.  Najaf and 
Fallujah regrettably showed that it only takes a relatively 
small number of insurgents to cause widespread disorder, 
noting reports that up to 50,000 people fled Talafar when the 
insurgents moved in, well in advance of the coalition 
operation there.  He reminded Tuygan of what life had been 
like in Najaf under Muqtada al-Sadr. 
 
9. (C) Third, Ambassador addressed the issue of ethnic 
balance.  He said there have been no widespread attempts by 
Kurds to take over Turkmen houses or flood the city with 
Kurds.  Moreover, coalition forces have set up control 
checkpoints in and around Talafar to deter any such attempts. 
 Ambassador also pointed out that there are in fact no 
peshmerga units in Talafar, though there are some Iraqi Kurds 
in ING forces there.  Finally, Ambassador said he is working 
closely with Washington and Baghdad to ensure that everyone 
understands the extreme sensitivity that surrounds the ethnic 
make-up of Talafar's new civilian administration. 
 
10. (C) Tuygan responded that the current situation in 
Talafar should not be viewed in isolation.  The GOT is 
concerned that the Turkmen are dissatisfied with their 
participation in the new Iraq, and complained that first CPA 
and now the IIG have made insufficient efforts to recruit 
Turkmen into the ING.  Perhaps if this had happened, Tuygan 
mused, local Talafar authorities could have defended 
themselves better against the insurgents in the first place. 
 
11. (C) Ambassador responded that we understand that the 
Turkmen of Talafar have generally tried to avoid being drawn 
into the conflict, that the town's residents were primarily 
merchants, not fighters, and for that very reason was 
vulnerable to the insurgency. 
 
12. (C) Tuygan took the Ambassador's point regarding 
irresponsible statements by the ITF, and added that in its 
own statements the GOT has tried to be balanced and to point 
out that the battle in Talafar is neither between the U.S. 
and Turkey nor the U.S. and the Turkmen people.  He 
reiterated his point that for the GOT, getting humanitarian 
assistance to Talafar and accessing the city were of greatest 
importance now.  Ambassador repeated our offer to assist on 
both scores. 
 
13. (C) Comment: While it is true that at times the Turks 
have invoked the Turkmen minority in Iraq as a wedge to 
insert its own interests there, Turkish public opinion 
regarding the Turkmen is of genuine concern, especially when 
paired with the press asking why the U.S. military will exert 
such an effort to root out 200 insurgents but will not take 
action against the PKK, a terrorist organization responsible 
for the death of thousands of innocent Turkish civilians over 
the years.  The GOT has sought to take a moderate stance, but 
it must demonstrate to the Turkish people that it is capable 
of helping the Turkmen.  Our facilitation of Turkish efforts 
to get humanitarian assistance to Talafar is therefore 
essential, as it will take pressure off the GOT and preclude 
its consideration of steps detrimental to our efforts in 
Iraq.  End comment. 
 
14. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
EDELMAN