US embassy cable - 01GABORONE3343

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 GABORONE 003343 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/11/11 
TAGS:  PREL, PTER, BC 
SUBJECT:  TFUS01: GOB SUPPORTS COALITION STRIKES AGAINST 
THE TALIBAN 
 
REF:  A) STATE 169975 B) STATE 175419 
 
CLASSIFIED BY DCM LESLIE BASSETT FOR REASONS 1.5 (B)(D) 
 
 
1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  PUBLIC AND PRIVATE STATEMENTS BY THE GOB 
TO DATE HAVE BEEN FULLY SUPPORTIVE OF USG ACTIONS AGAINST 
TALIBAN MILITARY TARGETS.  IN A 10/11 MEETING WITH THE 
AMBASSADOR,  MFA PERMANENT SECRETARY ERNEST MPOFU DEFENDED A 
MORE CAUTIOUS APPROACH IN ORDER TO AVOID EXTREMIST 
RETALIATION AGAINST BOTSWANA'S MISSIONS ABROAD, BUT 
SUBSEQUENTLY CONCEDED THAT HIS MINISTER'S POLICY WAS TO 
SUPPORT THE USG.  MPOFU ALSO REPORTED THE CONVOCATION OF AN 
AD-HOC COMMISSION TO COORDINATE GOB ACTIONS AGAINST 
TERRORISM.  END SUMMARY. 
 
INITIAL REACTIONS FULLY SUPPORTIVE 
 
2.  (C)  ON OCTOBER 8 VP IAN KHAMA PHONED THE AMBASSADOR TO 
CONVEY HIS PERSONAL SUPPORT FOR THE COALITION EFFORT 
AGAINST THE TALIBAN.  HE APPLAUDED THE DECISION TO ACT, 
ACCEPTED INDICATIONS THAT USAMA BIN LADEN WAS THE 
PERPETRATOR, AND WISHED THE USG SUCCESS IN CARRYING OUT THE 
ENGAGEMENT.  ASKED IF HE WOULD MAKE HIS SUPPORT PUBLIC, 
HOWEVER, KHAMA DEMURRED, SUGGESTING THIS WAS AN ISSUE FOR 
THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, AND NOTING THAT BOTSWANA TENDS TO 
TAKE A LOW PROFILE.  THAT "DOESN'T MEAN IN ANY WAY WE'RE 
NOT SUPPORTIVE," HE ADDED. 
 
3.  (U)  OCTOBER 10 PRESS QUOTED FOREIGN MINISTER MERAFHE 
OFFERING HIS COUNTRY'S FULL SUPPORT FOR THE U.S.-LED 
STRIKES AGAINST THE TALIBAN.  HE NOTED THE ACTION WAS NOT 
PREMATURE, AS THOSE WHO HARBORED THE PERPETRATORS OF THE 
SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS HAD BEEN GIVEN AMPLE TIME TO SURRENDER 
BIN LADEN AND HIS SUPPORTERS.  MERAFHE ONCE AGAINST 
CHARACTERIZED THE SEPTEMBER 11 TRAGEDY AS AN ATTACK ON 
HUMANITY AS A WHOLE. 
 
MOVING PAST BUREAUCRATIC DOUBTS 
 
4.  (C)  ON OCTOBER 11 MFA PERMANENT SECRETARY ERNEST MPOFU 
REQUESTED A MEETING WITH THE AMBASSADOR TO DISCUSS GOB 
RESPONSES TO THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS.  HE PROVIDED THE 
AMBASSADOR WITH THE STATEMENT WHICH HAD SERVED AS THE BASIS 
FOR MERAFHE'S REMARKS.  THE EXTREMELY CAUTIOUS DOCUMENT 
REGRETS THAT AFGHANISTAN DID NOT SURRENDER THE SUSPECTED 
PERPETRATORS, HOPES THAT USG ACTIONS ARE CONSISTENT WITH 
THE UN CHARTER, AND EXPRESSES THE VIEW THAT THE ATTACKS 
SHOULD BE OF MINIMAL DURATION.  MPOFU DEFENDED THE WEAK 
STATEMENT AS A NECESSARY HEDGE TO AVOID PROVOKING EXTREMIST 
GROUPS.  BOTSWANA'S MISSIONS WORLDWIDE ARE NOT SECURE, HE 
POINTED OUT.  IN CAPE TOWN THAT DAY, MPOFU ADDED, THERE WAS 
A DEMONSTRATION AT THE BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION, CO-LOCATED 
IN THE SAME BUILDING AS THE BOTSWANA MISSION.  THE GOB 
LACKS THE RESOURCES TO SECURE ITS OFFICIALS AND PREMISES; 
IT CANNOT AFFORD TO PROVOKE EXTREMIST REACTIONS. 
 
5.  (C)  PRESSED BY THE AMBASSADOR, MPOFU CONCEDED THAT THE 
WEAKER STATEMENT WAS SUPERSEDED BY THE MINISTER'S STRONG 
SUPPORT OF THE USG STRIKES AGAINST THE TALIBAN.  THE 
AMBASSADOR STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUING SUCH 
SUPPORT.  HE PROVIDED COPIES OF A LETTER HE WROTE TO 
PRESIDENT MOGAE 10/9 (AS A COVER TO PRESIDENT BUSH'S REPLY 
TO PRESIDENT MOGAE'S LETTER OF CONDOLENCE) WHICH URGED THE 
GOB TO REMAIN PUBLICLY SUPPORTIVE.  THE AMBASSADOR ALSO 
PROVIDED THE TEXT OF HIS 10/10 STATEMENT TO THE PRESS WHICH 
ARGUED THE USG CASE AND CALLED FOR BROAD SUPPORT FROM 
BOTSWANA. 
 
FIRST COORDINATED ACTIONS FROM GOB ON TERRORISM 
 
6.  (C)  MPOFU REPORTED THAT HE HAD RECENTLY CONVOKED AN 
AD-HOC COMMISSION TO COORDINATE GOB RESPONSES TO TERRORISM 
AND ITS FULFILLMENT OF ITS INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS.  THE 
COMMISSION INCLUDES THE BOTSWANA DEFENSE FORCE, THE POLICE 
(INCLUDING ITS INTELLIGENCE AGENCY), CUSTOMS, IMMIGRATION, 
THE CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY, THE BANK OF BOTSWANA, AND THE 
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT.  EACH AGENCY HAD BEEN TASKED WITH 
SPECIFIC ISSUES WHICH WERE TO BE ADDRESSED IN THE NEAR 
TERM; SEVERAL SUBCOMMITTEES LOOKING AT TRANSPORTATION, 
AIRPORT ACCESS, AND FINANCIAL ISSUES WERE ALSO CREATED. 
MPOFU WAS CONFIDENT THIS MECHANISM WOULD ALLOW BOTSWANA TO 
REPORT FULL COMPLIANCE WITH UNSCR 1373 AS WELL AS ITS OTHER 
INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS.  IT WOULD ALSO IDENTIFY ANY 
LOOPHOLES THAT NEEDED TO BE FILLED.  HE OFFERED TO GIVE US 
REGULAR UPDATES ON THE COMMISSION'S PROGRESS. 
 
COOL ON REGIONAL EFFORTS 
 
7.  (C)  THE AMBASSADOR QUERIED MPOFU ABOUT POSSIBLE 
REGIONAL INITIATIVES, PERHAPS WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF SADC. 
MPOFU SUGGESTED THAT FINANCIAL TRACKING EFFORTS WITHIN THE 
REGION ASSUMED THAT FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS WERE PLENTIFUL - 
- IN FACT BOTSWANA TRANSACTED PRIMARILY WITH SOUTH AFRICA. 
HE SUGGESTED THAT SADC MIGHT BEST MOBILIZE ITSELF ON THE 
FRINGES OF AN UPCOMING MEETING OF THE AD-HOC COMMISSION ON 
UNITA SANCTIONS; THE SAME PLAYERS WOULD LIKELY DISCUSS THE 
REPERCUSSIONS OF SEPTEMBER 11. 
 
8. (C)  MPOFU ALSO NOTED THE GOB HAD RECEIVED AN INVITATION 
FOR A SUMMIT IN DAKAR NEXT WEEK TO DISCUSS TERRORISM IN 
AFRICA.  HIS VIEW WAS THAT THE PROPOSAL WAS NOT WELL- 
DEFINED, AND THE GOB WOULD LIKELY NOT ATTEND.  HE 
UNDERSTOOD OTHER AFRICAN NATIONS WERE ALSO SKEPTICAL. 
MPOFU AVERRED THAT PRESIDENT WADE'S REAL PURPOSE WAS TO 
FOCUS ON TERRORISM INSIDE SENEGAL AND OTHER PARTS OF 
AFRICA. 
 
9.  (C)  COMMENT:  MPOFU, THE HIGHEST-RANKING CAREER 
DIPLOMAT IN THE BOTSWANA FOREIGN SERVICE, IS ALSO THE MOST 
CAUTIOUS.  IT IS DISAPPOINTING THAT THE TALKING POINTS FOR 
MINISTER MERAFHE WERE SO WEAK; IT IS HEARTENING THAT HE 
MOVED READILY PAST THEM TO FULLY SUPPORT USG ACTIONS. 
 
LANGE