US embassy cable - 04ABUJA1573

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 001573 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, EAID, MARR, NI, SU, DARFUR 
SUBJECT: DARFUR PEACE TALKS: WRAPPING UP ROUND ONE 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED. 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: The first round of African Union (AU)- 
mediated discussions on Darfur in Abuja ended September 10 
with the parties remaining far apart on fundamental issues 
and approach to the negotiations.  The AU mediators plan to 
officially adjourn the talks after meeting with President 
Obasanjo on September 14, and will set another round of 
negotiations in four to six weeks.  Repeated attempts to 
forge consensus during this round on a security protocol 
were frustrated by the lack of seriousness on the part of 
the GOS, and by the inexperience and intransigence of the 
rebels.  Hamid Al Ghabid, AU mediation team Chairman, will 
likely prepare a "Chairman's Communique" highlighting areas 
of agreement and issues over which agreement could not be 
reached.  Both sides agreed on the need for an expanded AU 
force and for a strengthened cease-fire, but could not agree 
on mechanisms to accomplish them.  The parties appear 
willing to continue negotiations after the adjournment.  End 
Summary. 
 
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GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN'S POSITIONS 
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2.  (SBU) The GOS delegation's body language gave the 
rebels/mediators an impression the GOS was not serious or 
willing to discuss key issues.  Throughout the proceedings, 
the GOS refused to admit any responsibility for the ongoing 
humanitarian disaster in Darfur.  They repeatedly branded 
the jinjaweit a band of outlaws, and called other Arab 
militias or tribal groups "defense forces," in an attempt to 
sideline the jinjaweit issue.  This also appeared designed 
to anger rebel "movement" representatives, further fueling 
their distrust of GOS intentions.  After Secretary Powell's 
testimony on September 9, however, the GOS delegation 
approached the mediators and observers offering to make 
concessions, such as allowing an expanded AU-monitoring 
mission and protection force, acknowledging their 
responsibility to disarm the jinjaweit and other militias, 
and removing references to DDR in the protocol. 
 
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REBEL INTRANSIGENCE 
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3.  (U)  Rebels remained focused throughout on four key 
objectives: withdrawal of government forces, including 
police, to pre-conflict garrisons; international or AU 
forces to disarm the jinjaweit and to protect civilians; 
creation of an independent commission of inquiry to 
investigate human rights abuses, genocide, and atrocities; 
and a no-fly zone over Darfur for military aircraft and 
civilian aircraft being used for intimidation.  At the same 
time, the rebel movements refused to consider steps common 
to cease-fire arrangements, such as providing information on 
their locations and order of battle to the Cease-Fire 
Commission (CFC) and assembly.  The mediation team and 
international observers have been unable to convince the 
rebel movements to drop insistence on actions that can be 
taken by the international community, i.e. AU and UN, 
outside the peace talks.  In addition, AU and USDEL have 
advised them that their position could sideline them from 
future peace implementation efforts as in the Pronk Plan. 
 
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FRUSTRATED MEDIATION ATTEMPTS 
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4.  (U)  The last AU mediation drafts represented minimum 
requirements the CFC sought, to advance monitoring efforts 
and elicit an invitation for an expanded AU force.  Both 
sides categorically rejected the AU initial draft until they 
were intensely lobbied in foreign capitals.  The GOS 
conceded measures for a workable response after considerable 
pressure.  The rebel movements rejected the initial draft 
and subsequent draft, particularly a provision in the 
preamble that recognizes the sovereignty of Sudan.  The 
rebels also clung to their position that security provisions 
be discussed under political issues. 
 
5.  (SBU)  On September 8, Al Ghabid recognized that he 
would not get a draft that would move the peace process 
forward due to opposition from the rebels, who seemed to 
want to keep international pressure on the GOS.  On the 
security agenda, both sides have agreed on the need for an 
expanded AU force and a strengthening of the cease-fire, the 
return of prisoners, and the non-use of child soldiers. 
However, discussions repeatedly went back to the rebel 
movements' rejecting the so-called "handwritten addition" in 
paragraph six of the N'djamena Humanitarian Cease-Fire 
Agreement.  The rebels consistently refer to the N'djamena 
document as a "forgery", insisting that they had rejected 
the requirement for assembly.  They also maintain that the 
GOS committed to "neutralize the militias" while the GOS 
says that the N'djamena agreement does not mention the 
jinjaweit.  The GOS insistence that the movements be 
cantoned and disarmed along with the militias (as opposed to 
the jinjaweit) was a continuing problem.  Over the weekend, 
however, GOS Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs 
Mohammed Yousef Abdulla and other members of the Sudanese 
delegation said in meetings that they understand the rebels 
are not required to disarm, while the GOS needed to "satisfy 
their constituencies" that they will be protected from 
attacks by the rebel movements. 
 
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NEXT STEPS 
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6.  (U) The formal negotiations ended September 10 even 
though informal meetings occurred throughout the weekend to 
see if compromise language could be reached.  Nigerian FM 
Adeniji will meet with the AU mediation team September 13, 
and Obasanjo is likely to meet with representatives of the 
rebel movements, GOS, and mediation and observer teams on 
September 14.  The AU then plans to officially adjourn the 
negotiations for four to six weeks. 
 
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COMMENT 
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7.  (SBU)  The AU team did not believe a security protocol 
could be reached at this point, and for that reason 
recommended adjourning the proceedings formally to allow 
both sides time to reflect.  The AU will highlight the 
achievement of a humanitarian protocol and the beginning of 
discussions on security issues.  The fact that both parties 
are talking is a big step forward, and the next round -- 
which should cover political issues-- will give a better 
indication of whether the GOS and parties can negotiate a 
workable outcome.  The AU could not work out the security 
protocol in 10-14 days this time, and we expect the 
political agenda will be even more contentious. 
 
8. (U) Minimize considered. 
 
CAMPBELL