US embassy cable - 04COLOMBO1510

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 001510 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS AND S/CT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/13/2014 
TAGS: PTER, PREL, PGOV, CE, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA:  VISIT OF S/CT COORDINATOR AMB. J. 
COFER BLACK 
 
Classified By: JAMES F. ENTWISTLE, Deputy Chief of Mission.  REASON:  1 
.4 (B,D). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1.  (C) In meetings with Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) 
officials on September 8, Coordinator for Counterterrorism 
Ambassador J. Cofer Black underscored U.S. appreciation of 
Sri Lanka's support of the Global War on Terror.  He 
emphasized USG commitment to helping the GSL achieve a 
peaceful resolution to Sri Lanka's lengthy ethnic conflict, 
while stressing that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) will remain on the Foreign Terrorist Organizations 
list until it renounces violence in word and deed.  GSL 
interlocutors thanked Ambassador Black for the firm line the 
U.S. has adopted against the LTTE, asserting that the U.S. 
stance had helped convince the Tigers to sign the 2002 
Ceasefire Agreement.  Most interlocutors attributed the 
recent spike in violence to LTTE efforts to quell internal 
dissension in the East, but agreed that the Tigers are not 
contemplating a return to full-scale hostilities.  Ambassador 
Black also addressed a well-attended media roundtable with 
local print, radio and television journalists.  End summary. 
 
 
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MEETINGS WITH MFA, SECURITY AND 
INTELLIGENCE OFFICIALS 
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2.  (U)  On September 8 Coordinator for Counterterrorism 
Ambassador J. Cofer Black met with Government of Sri Lanka 
(GSL) officials involved in foreign affairs, security, 
defense and intelligence.  Interlocutors included Foreign 
Secretary H.M.G.S. Palihakkara; Secretary of Defense Cyril 
 
SIPDIS 
Herath; Secretary of Public Security, Law, and Order Tilak 
Ranaviraja; Director of Internal Intelligence Keerthi 
Gajanayake; Director of Military Intelligence Major General 
Kapila Hendawitharana; and Inspector General of Police Indra 
De Silva.  Ambassador Black was accompanied by the Charge. 
 
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SRI LANKAN COOPERATION IN GLOBAL ANTI-TERROR EFFORTS 
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3.  (C)  Ambassador Black opened the meeting with the Foreign 
Secretary by thanking Palihakkara for his government's 
 
SIPDIS 
support in the global campaign against terror.  He attributed 
recent progress made against al-Qaeda to the successful 
cooperation the U.S. has received from its international 
partners in this fight, but noted the need for greater and 
more concerted international pressure to be levied against 
state sponsors of terrorism.  In particular, he urged the 
Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) to exert its influence with the 
governments of Iran and Syria to cease their support of 
international terrorist organizations.  Sri Lanka has every 
reason to support the global war on terror because it has 
suffered so much from acts of terrorism over the past two 
decades, Palihakkara responded, adding that the GSL in the 
past has used its membership in the Non-Aligned Movement, 
APEC, SAARC and other international and regional groupings to 
push stronger counter-terrorist agendas.  As Sri Lanka's 
Ambassador to Thailand (mid-2001 to mid-2004), Palihakkara 
said his mission had worked closely with USG law enforcement 
agencies to exchange information and to improve surveillance 
of suspicious individuals and organizations. 
 
4.  (C)  Dr. Rohan Perera, Legal Advisor for the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Chairman of the UN Ad Hoc Committee on 
Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, noted that the 
GSL has taken its obligations under UN Security Council 
Resolution 1373 very seriously.  Chairing the Ad Hoc 
Committee on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, 
the GSL is spearheading efforts to draft a nuclear terrorism 
convention and a comprehensive counter-terrorism convention. 
He reported hearing "more moderate voices" from OIC member 
states during the June Working Group meeting on the nuclear 
terrorism convention, adding that even Syria was "much less 
strident than usual," while Jordan offered "some constructive 
proposals."  Turkey was especially helpful as Chair of the 
last Working Group, he said, noting that he expects upcoming 
OIC Chair Morocco to play a similarly cooperative role during 
the 6th Committee meeting in October.  During the most recent 
SAARC Summit in Islamabad, he continued, the GSL had taken 
the initiative to call for a protocol on terrorist financing. 
 The GSL's special efforts not to ascribe an ethnic or 
religious dimension to terrorism in these international 
fora--not to "Islamicize" terror--have helped keep 
counter-terrorism cooperation and initiatives "moving along," 
Palihakkara observed.  Ambassador Black commended the GSL for 
being "a force for positive change behind the scenes." 
 
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LTTE AND PROSPECTS FOR NEGOTIATIONS 
------------------------------------ 
 
5.  (C)  Foreign Secretary Palihakkara thanked Ambassador 
Black for the USG's "constructive position" on designating 
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) as a Foreign 
Terrorist Organization (FTO), which he described as 
supporting the GSL's efforts to urge the LTTE back to the 
negotiating table.  International "disapproval" is essential 
to making the Tigers realize that they must approach 
negotiations with more flexibility and a greater willingness 
to compromise than they have demonstrated so far, he stated. 
Despite many recent "challenges," primarily from LTTE 
violations and assassinations of political opponents, the 
Ceasefire Agreement is still holding, he asserted, with no 
imminent fundamental threat to its continuation.  The GSL has 
decided to take "a patient line" in response to LTTE 
violations, Palihakkara said, because maintaining the 
Ceasefire Agreement is crucial to further progress toward 
negotiations.  In a separate meeting, Public Security, Law, 
and Order Secretary Tilak Ranaviraja also expressed his 
thanks to Ambassador Black for the consistent USG message 
regarding the Tigers' designation as an FTO, in addition to 
the United States' constant call for a political solution to 
the ethnic conflict. 
 
6.  (C) The lack of progress toward resuming negotiations is 
not due to any fundamental disagreement on substance between 
the two parties, Palihakkara said, adding that the GSL 
already had "gone more than the extra mile to accommodate the 
LTTE's pre-negotiation demands," including consideration of 
the Tigers' proposal for an Interim Self-Governing Authority 
(ISGA).  Even the recalcitrant Janatha Vimukti Peramuna 
(JVP), the Government's pro-nationalist coalition partner, 
has agreed to allow the ISGA as part of a possible agenda for 
talks.  The LTTE knows, moreover, that reverting to 
full-scale conflict is "not an option."  Nor would it want 
to, suggested officials from the Directorate of Internal 
Intelligence (DII).  The LTTE has made thousands of dollars 
in "taxes" collected from travelers since the road to Jaffna 
reopened and is busily building the infrastructure of a de 
facto "interim administration," the DII officials charged. 
 
 
7.  (C) All GSL interlocutors identified the LTTE's new 
feeling of "vulnerability" as stemming from the unprecedented 
rebellion last March of its powerful Eastern military 
commander and his cadres as the key obstacle to resuming 
talks.  Once Karuna's approximately 6,000 cadres disbanded in 
the East, the LTTE has had difficulty re-establishing a 
strong armed presence in that region.  The LTTE feels 
weakened by this internal fragmentation and is unlikely to 
pursue negotiations until it believes it has successfully 
faced down this threat from within its own ranks.  Secretary 
of Defense Cyril Herath, Director of Internal Intelligence 
(DII) Keerthi Gajanayake and Director of Military 
Intelligence (DMI) Major General Kapila Hendawitharana 
provided a similar assessment to Ambassador Black, with 
Herath asserting that the LTTE would never reestablish full 
control in the East.  While the GSL realizes the Tigers' need 
for internal stability and has decided it can wait until the 
LTTE feels ready, the Foreign Secretary said, the 
international community can play a helpful role by "reminding 
the LTTE they need to show by their actions they have learned 
the art of compromise."  Noting that Norwegian Special Envoy 
Solheim is scheduled to visit Sri Lanka next week, 
Palihakkara reported that the GSL has indicated to Norwegian 
facilitators that it is "ready to discuss with the LTTE 
(possible modalities of) interim authority at any time, 
including the ISGA," as one of the proposals on the table. 
The U.S. wants to support GSL efforts to secure a peaceful 
resolution to the lengthy conflict, Ambassador Black told all 
interlocutors, and will continue to emphasize that the LTTE 
will remain on the Foreign Terrorist Organizations List until 
it renounces violence in word and act. 
 
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NEW AND IMPROVED LTTE? 
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8.  (C)  The freedom of movement allowed LTTE operatives by 
the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) has helped the Tigers boost 
their intelligence-gathering capabilities, including on 
Colombo-based targets, GSL interlocutors complained.  DII 
Gajanayake cited the LTTE's successful assassination of 24 
GSL informants over the past three months as proof of the 
Tigers' extensive intelligence network.  According to 
Gajayanake, the DII has been unable to make similar advances 
because of financial and legal constraints.  The DII has only 
a shoestring budget, while "money is nothing for the LTTE." 
He lamented the suspension of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 
(PTA) under the Ceasefire Agreement.  Without the PTA, 
suspects must be produced before a magistrate within 24 
hours--not enough time to "interrogate" them adequately, he 
charged.  On the military side, Herath and Hendawitharana 
expressed concern over the LTTE's growing capability at sea 
and the GSL's limited ability to monitor such developments. 
Both officials thought that the Sea Tigers, the group's naval 
wing, were developing their underwater demolition expertise. 
In response, however, the DMI stated that the GSL did not 
have the resources to develop adequate naval capacity to deal 
with the growing concern.  (There were not even enough 
resources for adequate coastal narcotics interdiction, 
according to the Public Security Secretary.)  Despite the 
LTTE's military expertise, the DMI added that there was no 
evidence the group was in communication or involved with 
other known global terrorist groups.  Domestically, however, 
the ceasefire had allowed LTTE cadre free movement in the 
government areas and the DMI and Public Security Secretary 
made similar comments that the LTTE has conducted 
intelligence gathering on Colombo-based targets.  Regarding 
border security issues, Ranaviraja told Ambassador Black that 
the GSL has approved the draft Memorandum of Intent (MOI) 
with the USG for the Terrorist Interdiction Program/ Personal 
Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System 
(TIP/PISCES) and will be ready to sign the MOI shortly. 
 
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OTHER NATIONS' ROLES 
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9.  (C)  Ambassador Black asked the Foreign Secretary to 
describe neighboring nations' roles in supporting GSL efforts 
toward a negotiated solution to the conflict.  Characterizing 
India as "very supportive," Palihakkara said that some 
Western countries, especially those in the EU, should adopt a 
"firmer line" against the LTTE, especially with regard to 
illicit financial transactions.  That said, he acknowledged 
that the EU's August 16 statement condemning recent Tiger 
violations had been "very helpful."  Ambassador Black 
committed to redoubling USG efforts, including on the margins 
of the upcoming UNGA, to persuade EU partners to maintain 
such helpful pressure on the LTTE. 
 
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SRI LANKA'S MUSLIM POPULATION 
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10.  (C)  Ambassador Black asked several interlocutors about 
Sri Lanka's Muslim community and if there were any signs of 
radicalization or militancy.  Ranaviraja felt that Sri Lankan 
Muslims, in general, were comfortable and went to the Middle 
East only for employment opportunities to send money home. 
He admitted to some tensions among Muslims in the ethnically 
diverse East, but said there was no evidence of arms 
collecting.  Responding to a query that the Muslims in the 
East were acquiring the weapons abandoned by LTTE's Eastern 
military commander, Ranaviraja said only a few of the 
abandoned weapons had been traced to Muslims but admitted 
that the majority of the weapons cache remained unaccounted 
for. 
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MEDIA ROUNDTABLE 
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11.  (U)  Sri Lankan media coverage of Ambassador Black's 
statements and interviews was extensive, with all papers 
running front-page or prominent inside page stories, some 
with a photo of Black.  The stories were based on a media 
roundtable Black held with six editors of the main English 
and vernacular newspapers.  Sinhala-language papers as well 
as English newspapers played up Black's denunciation of the 
LTTE and his call for the group to renounce terrorism in word 
and deed.  Tamil papers highlighted his statements calling 
for both sides to return to the negotiating table.  Sri 
Lanka's two leading TV stations, independent MTV and 
government-owned Rupavahini, ran lengthy excerpts during 
their prime-time evening newscasts (in English, Sinhala, and 
Tamil) of interviews they conducted with Ambassador Black. 
Both emphasized his call for the LTTE to renounce terrorism. 
No editorials have yet appeared commenting on Black's 
statements, although we expect a few to be published in the 
coming days.  The full transcript of Black's press briefing 
is available on the embassy's web site. 
 
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COMMENT 
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12.  (C) Ambassador Black's meetings with GSL officials 
served to underline our determination to keep the LTTE 
designated as an FTO, a stance warmly welcomed by the GSL. 
Moreover, GSL officials listened carefully to and largely 
agreed with Ambassador Black's presentations on global U.S. 
counterterrorism efforts.  Moreover, the broad and prominent 
coverage generated by Ambassador Black's media round table 
and separate TV interviews helped reinforce to the public our 
messages that the LTTE must renounce violence, and that both 
sides must move towards a negotiated settlement as the only 
possible solution to the conflict.  Finally, Ambassador 
Black's visit succeeded in highlighting to the GSL and to the 
public U.S. satisfaction with the good cooperation Sri Lanka 
has shown on counterterrorism issues.  END COMMENT. 
 
13.  (U) Ambassador Black cleared this cable. 
LUNSTEAD