US embassy cable - 04SANAA2421

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 002421 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2014 
TAGS: MARR, MOPS, MCAP, PGOV, PREL, PINR, PTER, YM, COUNTER TERRORISM 
SUBJECT: ROYG FORCES KILL REBEL CLERIC AL-HOUTHI IN 
SEPTEMBER 10 RAID 
 
REF: SANAA 2225 AND PREVIOUS. 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Thomas C. Krajeski; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C)  Summary.  Anti-American rebel Shi'ite cleric 
al-Houthi was killed on September 10 in an early morning raid 
on his cave hide-out in the Sa'da Goverornate.  The ROYG has 
announced an end to the 10-week insurgency, which resulted in 
well over 1000 deaths.  ROYG forces have already begun 
redeployment from the north, although it remains unclear 
whether or not al-Houthi supporters will regroup.  End 
Summary. 
 
2.  (S/NF) Rebel cleric Hussein Badr Eddine al-Houthi was 
killed early morning on September 10 near Haidan in the Sa'da 
Goverornate.  His death came at the end of a two-day siege 
conducted by Yemeni Central Security Forces (CSF) on caves 
defended by al-Houthi supporters near Haidan.  A USG-trained 
CSF Counter Terrorism (CT) team led the operation, resulting 
in the fatal shooting of al-Houthi and the loss of one member 
of the CT unit, and two regular CSF.  After identification by 
family members, al-Houthi's body was transported to an 
undisclosed Army medical facility in Sanaa. 
 
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Saleh Healing Inter-Service Wounds 
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3.  (U)  Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh officially 
congratulated ROYG Military leaders on their victory over 
forces of rebel cleric Hussein Badr Eddine al-Houthi on 
September 10, declaring an end to the 10-week long rebellion. 
 In his statement, Saleh commended the Minister of Defense 
Alaiwa, Minister of Interior al-Alimi, Commander of the 
Northwest Region Al-Ahmar, Commander of the Air Force Mohamed 
Saleh, and Central Security Forces (CSF) Chief Yahya Saleh. 
 
4.  (S/NF)  The failure of ROYG forces to quickly and 
decisively end the rebellion when it broke out in June sent 
shockwaves through the military and security apparatus. 
During the increasingly bloody conflict, MOD sources reported 
bitter finger pointing between President Saleh's cousin, 
al-Ahmar, and his son and Commander of the Special Forces 
Ahmed Saleh, as well as clashes between the MOD and MOI on 
field tactics and deployment techniques. 
 
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Premature Redeployment? 
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5.  (S) Anxious to put this painful episode to bed, the ROYG 
leadership was quick to declare victory.  CSF were redeployed 
to Sana'a on September 11.  It will take longer for the 7000 
Army troops to redeploy from the north, but efforts are 
already underway.  No fighting was reported since al-Houthi's 
death, but it may be premature to assume all pockets of 
al-Houthi supporters will fade back into their surroundings. 
(Comment:  Al-Houthi's religious teachings may not resonate 
widely with the Yemeni population, but his rebellion may have 
enjoyed some public support due to anti-Americanism or latent 
anti-regime sentiment.  It is premature to rule out the 
possibility remnants of al-Houthi supporters could regroup to 
exploit ROYG weaknesses, or even target western and/or 
foreign interests should the opportunity arise.  End Comment). 
 
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MOI Please, But Downplaying Role of USG CT Assistance 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
6.  (S/NF)  Minister of Interior Alimi told DCM that 
commanders in the field attributed the victory directly to 
USG CT training.  "Had it not been for your training the CSF 
unit that stormed the cave, we could have suffered more than 
forty casualties."  The evening of September 11, however, 
DATT was visited in his home by a representative of the 
Directorate of Military Intelligence who asked that any 
public credit for ending the long and bloody conflict go to 
MOD and not MOI.  (Comment:  It will be interesting to see if 
Saleh, who has publically tried to spread his praise, will 
privately acknowledge the role of U.S. assistance.  End 
Comment). 
 
7.  (S/NF) Other channel reporting confirms a minimum of 135 
CSF casualties due to just one incident of friendly fire, 
indicating severe weaknesses in ROYG forces tactical 
coordination and command, control and communication 
capabilities.  (Comment: Future FMF and security-assistance 
programs should consider addressing these shortcomings in 
ROYG forces' abilities.  End Comment). 
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ROYG vulnerabilities revealed 
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8.  (S/NF)  Although the actual number of dead and wounded 
soldiers, rebels, and civilians is unknown, Post believes the 
number to be in the low thousands.  ROYG officials complained 
to Emboffs and senior U.S. officials throughout the conflict 
that their forces were ill prepared for this fight, asking 
repeatedly for intelligence and security assistance. 
President Saleh told visiting A/S for Political Military 
Affairs Bloomfield that ROYG forces were not properly 
equipped to defeat al-Houthi, and confided to CENTCOM 
Commander General AbiZaid that the fighting in the north had 
become unbearable in human, material, and political cost. 
 
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Comment: 
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9.  (S)  While al-Houthi and his followers may not have had 
the capability to severely or permanently weaken the regime, 
the ongoing and costly nature of the conflict demonstrated 
ROYG vulnerabilities which either remaining al-Houthi 
supporters or other regime rivals, be they tribal or 
ideological, may still seek to exploit.  Requests made by 
President Saleh and other senior ROYG officials for U.S. 
security assistance and intel sharing (reftels) should not be 
dismissed due to al-Houthi's death.  Post recommends these 
requests be reviewed in the context of U.S. interests in 
regime stability and increased U.S.-Yemeni cooperation in the 
GWOT.  End Comment. 
KRAJESKI