US embassy cable - 04SANAA2408

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AMBASSADOR DELIVERS THERMOBARICS, STATE SPONSORED TERRORISM DEMARCHES

Identifier: 04SANAA2408
Wikileaks: View 04SANAA2408 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Sanaa
Created: 2004-09-12 05:15:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: ETTC KSTC PARM PREL PTER PINR YM DEMARCHE COUNTER TERRORISM
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SANAA 002408 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2014 
TAGS: ETTC, KSTC, PARM, PREL, PTER, PINR, YM, DEMARCHE, COUNTER TERRORISM 
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR DELIVERS THERMOBARICS, STATE SPONSORED 
TERRORISM DEMARCHES 
 
REF: A. STATE 187644 
     B. STATE 188657 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Thomas C. Krajeski; reasons 1.4 (b), (d). 
 
1.  (C)  Summary.  Ambassador took the opportunity of his 
introductory meeting with Deputy Foreign Minister Mustafa 
Noman to deliver refs A and B.  Noman listened carefully to 
both messages and asked questions, but offered no immediate 
response.  Discussions on G-8 BMENA process covered septel. 
End Summary. 
 
2.  (S/NF) Ambassador delivered ref A to Deputy Foreign 
Minister Noman on September 7.  He stressed that out of the 
six state sponsors of terrorism, the roles of Syria and Iran 
are the most damaging to peace and stability in the region. 
Ambassador noted Syrian support for HAMAS, Hizballah, and 
other dangerous terrorist organizations.  Moving to Iran, the 
most active state sponsor of terrorism in the world, 
Ambassador said direct and indirect support for terrorist 
elements operating in Iraq is increasing.  Ambassador noted 
Yemeni suspicions regarding Iranian support for al-Houthi. 
Noman nodded but offered no immediate response. 
 
3.  (S)  Ambassador thanked the DFM for his Ministry's 
assistance during A/S Bloomfield's August 31 - September 2 
visit to Yemen.  The visit, he reported, was successful on 
many levels, and we hope to have an agreement on the MANPADS 
buyback initiative soon.  Continuing on the subject of the 
danger posed by man-portable shoulder-fired weapons, 
Ambassador shared with Noman that the USG has information 
that the ROYG is interested in purchasing thermobaric 
rocket-propelled grenade launchers and grenades from Russia 
(ref B).  These weapons, Ambassador emphasized, are easily 
transported and operated by a single individual and pack 
significant destructive power, making them an ideal terrorist 
weapon.  Ambassador urged the ROYG not to add these dangerous 
systems to its arsenal. 
 
4.  (S)  Noman sought clarification as to the nature of 
thermobaric weapons, and asked which countries are the main 
manufacturing nations.  Ambassador replied that our 
information suggests the ROYG is looking to buy them from 
Russia.  The DFM promised to pass the information to the 
Cabinet to ensure they are aware of the risk posed by these 
weapons. 
KRAJESKI 

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