US embassy cable - 04THEHAGUE2300

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 002300 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, BM, NL 
SUBJECT: DUTCH PREVIEW ASEM 
 
REF: BRUSSELS 3822 
 
Classified By: POL Counselor Andrew Schofer for Reasons 1.4 (B/D) 
 
1. (C) Summary: The Dutch expect the GAERC to endorse the 
compromise solution informally agreed among EU members at the 
September 9 Gymnich meeting (reftel), but expect some 
"fine-tuning" of technical aspects of the agreement. 
According to the Dutch, the French are "catching up" after 
their Minister's absence from the Gymnich, but their 
"technical concerns" should be resolved shortly. Areas for 
fine tuning include the exact targets of an expanded visa ban 
and EU financing prohibition.  The Dutch also previewed the 
agenda for the October ASEM summit in Hanoi. End Summary. 
 
2. (C) Poloff met September 10 with Eric Verwaal, Head of 
MFA's Southeast Asia Division and Special Assistant to EU 
Presidency Envoy Hans van den Broek, to follow-up on the 
Gymnich conclusions and preparations for the Asia-Europe 
Meeting (ASEM).  Verwaal first apologized that the Dutch had 
"ignored" the U.S. and others during the ASEM negotiation 
process, explaining that it had been necessary in order to 
ensure that a solution to the participation impasse would be 
found.  He commented that many EU members had "strong 
feelings" and "competing views" about participation - on both 
sides of the issue - and that a solution could not have been 
reached if open discussion had been held throughout 
negotiations.  He assessed that all EU members were "quite 
relieved" that a solution had been found and that 
preparations for the meeting - now one month away - could 
progress.  Verwaal visited Hanoi this week to initiate 
preparations. 
 
Compromise Solution 
------------------- 
 
3. (C) Verwaal stated that the compromise solution allows for 
the ten new EU members and three new Asian states to accede 
to the ASEM.  It calls for the Burmese junta to fulfill the 
three conditions outlined at the Tullamore Gymnich - release 
Aung San Suu Kyi, cease harassment of the National League for 
Democracy, and allow genuine open debate at the National 
Convention.  If these conditions are not met, the EU will 
strengthen its Common Position to expand the visa ban list to 
all serving members of the military at the rank of 
Brigadier-General or above, prohibit EU-registered companies 
from making finance available to named Burmese enterprises, 
and provide for EU member states to vote against extending 
international finance institution loans to Burma.  The 
compromise also recognizes that the European Commission will 
address the issue of Burmese illegal logging, and that the EU 
plans to expand assistance to the people of Burma in the 
areas of health and education, managed through the UN system 
or non-governmental organizations.  Verwaal commented that 
the expanded visa ban and finance prohibition would represent 
a strengthening of the EU Common Position, that voting 
against IFI loans was a continuation of the status quo, and 
that addressing Burmese illegal logging operations and 
expanding assistance to the people of Burma would have been 
necessary in any case. 
 
4. (C) Verwaal expected that any changes to the EU Common 
Position would be formalized at the October GAERC meeting 
(after ASEM).  The EU would allow its Asian partners "until 
the last minute" to show results in their efforts to convince 
the Burmese government to fulfill the Tullamore conditions. 
 
Some "Fine-Tuning" Expected 
--------------------------- 
 
5. (C) Noting that Gymnich results were always "informal" and 
subject to "formalization" at the GAERC, Verwaal said that 
some "fine tuning" was expected.  Verwaal said that the date 
of the "deadline" for compliance might be moved back from 
October 8 to "mid-October" since the GAERC would be the first 
opportunity to formalize a revised EU Common position.  He 
also said that the exact targets of an expanded visa ban and 
list of Burmese corporations to which financing was forbidden 
had not been specified.  He noted that the French were "a 
little behind" since the French FM had missed a planned 
briefing on the issue in The Hague because he was traveling 
in Iraq, and because the French has not participated at the 
FM level in the Gymnich.  He argued that French concerns were 
"technical" rather than political; for example, the French 
argued for naming "military-owned" versus "state-owned" 
enterprises for sanctions.  Verwaal was optimistic that all 
the French issues would be resolved shortly.  He also noted 
that it would be "difficult to say" whether the Foreign 
Ministers would agree to revise the EU Common Position (i.e. 
strengthen sanctions) if the Burmese released Aung San Suu 
Kyi within the time allotted, since that would be a concrete 
positive step -- and the other two conditions were not as 
concrete (the National Convention, for example, will not 
convene until at least November according to Verwaal). 
 
Expectations of ASEM 
-------------------- 
6. (C) Verwaal observed that the Dutch saw the ASEM as a good 
opportunity to "remark about the situation in Burma."  He 
expected that the Dutch EU Presidency would make a comment, 
and that some EU partners would wish to build upon that 
comment.  He noted, however, that the Asian partners did not 
wish to make ASEM a "single-issue" forum. 
 
7. (SBU) Verwaal provided the expected agenda for ASEM. 
There will be four consecutive sessions: (A) International 
and Regional Developments, (B) Closer Economic Partnership, 
(C) The Future of ASEM, and (D) Cultures and Civilizations. 
Sessions B and D have an advance draft declaration building 
on previous meetings, and will each issue final declarations 
following the ASEM.  Session A and D conclusions will be 
included in the final "Chair Statement" which will accompany 
the other two declarations.  The sessions will be attended at 
Head-of-State level and will be "relatively informal." 
SOBEL