US embassy cable - 04ANKARA5114

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 005114 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINS, PREL, TU 
SUBJECT: RULING AK PARTY'S HYPOCRITIC OATH: THE ATTEMPT TO 
RE-CRIMINALIZE ADULTERY AND FORNICATION 
 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric S. Edelman; reasons: E.O. 
12958 1.4 (b,d). 
 
1. (C) Summary: An attempt by ruling AK Party (AKP) to 
re-criminalize adultery and fornication raises serious 
questions about AKP's commitment to EU values and the party 
leadership's ability to move away from its Islamist roots. 
End summary. 
 
2. (U) In the run-up to the EU's October progress report on 
Turkey's implementation of Copenhagen Criteria for membership 
and in the midst of outgoing EU Commissioner for Enlargement 
Verheugen's determinedly upbeat visit, the ruling AKP 
leadership -- PM Erdogan and Deputy PM/FonMin Gul -- has 
insisted on seeking to re-criminalize adultery and 
fornication (zina).  Verheugen, who had planned to raise the 
issue only in private meetings with Erdogan and Gul, was 
forced to declare publicly Sept. 9 that AKP's move "must be a 
joke."  (Note: EU views on the proposed adultery legislation 
will be reported septel. End Note). 
 
3. (U) But Islam-influenced AKP's move is no joke, and once 
again Erdogan and his government have demonstrated a 
questionable sense of timing and agenda.  Zina has been 
de-criminalized in Turkey since 1996, when Turkey's 
Constitutional Court voided the then-current law because it 
provided lighter penalties for men than for women.  Despite 
that, the GOT is pushing to have the mid-September 
parliamentary debate on revisions to the Turkish Penal Code 
-- revisions essential to comply with Copenhagen Criteria -- 
include zina.  Initially attempting to introduce the issue in 
a way which would penalize only women, AKP then agreed to 
main opposition CHP's apparent offer to support the move if 
both men and women would be subject to prosecution. 
 
4. (U) Erdogan, Gul and others assert that the move is 
designed to protect women and that the vast majority of 
Turkey's population wants re-criminalization in the light of 
Turkey's traditions and moral values.  As expected, AKP's 
move has provoked distaste within the "secular" elite. 
 
5. (C) More significant is the scorn expressed to us by 
leading figures in the mainstream conservative/pious 
opposition (e.g., political consultant Huseyin Kocabiyik) and 
those close to, or within, AKP (e.g., former Customs 
undersecretary Nevzat Saygilioglu, AKP MP Ersonmez Yarbay). 
This scorn stems from what both "secularists" and pious 
critics of AKP see as AKP's rank hypocrisy.  Many contacts 
from across the spectrum have remarked bluntly that, were the 
move to succeed, Education Minister Huseyin Celik (openly 
consorting with his secretary), Interior Minister Abdulkadir 
Aksu (a predilection for teenage girls), and Erdogan foreign 
policy advisor Omer Celik (Russian prostitutes) would be 
among the many AKP officials vulnerable to prosecution.  Our 
contacts note that the practice of "preacher weddings" (imam 
nikahi), under which a man will have an imam bless his union 
-- whether for several hours or sine die -- is thin cover 
indeed for cheating.  Contacts who have a grounding in Islam 
note that the most authoritative saying of Mohammed (hadith) 
on zina requires several male eyewitnesses of the act itself 
to prove commission.  Both men and women who have criticized 
the move also point out that AKP's plan to have the law 
applicable only on complaint from the aggrieved party renders 
it hollow since most women would fear being thrown out on the 
street -- or worse -- if they sought to have their husband 
charged. 
 
6. (C) In addition, internal AKP critics such as Yarbay have 
underscored to us that, by pursuing re-criminalization of 
zina, the AKP leadership is distracting attention from trying 
to fix serious flaws in the draft Penal Code revision, 
including holdover language restricting freedom of speech 
(article 159 on speech considered insulting to the presidency 
or armed forces) or criminalizing the wearing of Islamic 
dress. 
 
7. (C) Why this issue, and why now?  Since coming to power 
both Erdogan and Gul have repeatedly made a point of 
asserting publicly that they have changed, that they and 
their party are firmly committed to democratic values.  Yet, 
as we have seen with AKP's attempts to force the pace on 
other issues of high sensitivity for Turkey's rigid 
Establishment (e.g., Islamic headscarves, general university 
access for graduates of preacher high schools), both men 
remain trapped by deeply ingrained Islamist instincts. 
Erdogan demonstrates this tendency in a more open, 
tribune-of-the-people way, Gul in a way which is hidden 
behind an affable manner but, in the view of the broadest 
possible cross section of our AKP contacts, even more 
categorical underneath. 
 
8. (C) Moreover, both men see such an initiative as (1) 
resonating deeply with the AKP base, a base otherwise more 
and more frustrated at AKP's inability to date to increase 
employment or achieve a breakthrough on the Islamic headscarf 
question, and (2) putting additional pressure on the 
prevailing, narrow Kemalist definition of secularism and on 
"secularists" for approving sin.  Additional factors include 
the Erdogan-Gul rivalry, with each man determined to 
outmaneuver the other, and Erdogan's inability to control 
policy gambits by the most radical elements in his party. 
 
9.  (C) Justice Minister and AK government spokesman Cicek 
told the Ambassador September 9 that the zina issue is 
topping his agenda.  Cicek thinks there is no constitutional 
problem with the law as long as it treats men and women 
equally.  Cicek said the AK government is trying to find 
middle ground on the law with the law's opponents by making 
it a crime only for those who want it to be a crime.  (Note: 
This refers to a possible provision in the law that cases 
will only be prosecuted upon the complaint of an aggrieved 
spouse.  End Note.) 
 
10. (C) Comment: AKP's move goes against the grain of EU 
values, but even AK and CHP contacts opposed to the law 
expect the zina legislation to pass Parliament.  We expect 
that, if passed, such legislation will be vetoed by President 
Sezer.  The draft law has not yet been made public, but we 
expect the law on its face will treat men and women equally. 
However, those opposed to the law predict that, in practice, 
the law's impact will fall more heavily on women.  We think 
AKP's stance raises troubling questions about how much 
Erdogan, Gul, and their party's base have really changed from 
their hard-core Islamist past.  End Comment. 
EDELMAN